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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction to Part 2 
The final report of project FATIMA is presented in two parts.  Part 1 contains a 
summary of the FATIMA method and sets out the key recommendations in terms of 
policies and optimisation methodology from both project OPTIMA and project 
FATIMA.  Part 1 is thus directed particularly towards policy makers.  Part 2 contains 
the details of the methodology, including the formulation of the objective functions, 
the optimisation process, the resulting optimal strategies under the various objective 
function regimes and a summary of the feasibility and acceptability of the optimal 
strategies based on consultations with the city authorities.  This part is thus mainly 
aimed at the professional in transport planning and modelling.    
 
1.2 Options for private finance in transport 
1.2.1 General 
 
The concept of using private finance for transport has become more important in 
recent years, in particular because of constraints on public sector spending.  This is 
the key issue underlying  project FATIMA.   
 
The private sector can contribute to the transport system in several ways: 
 
• A tax can be imposed, reflecting the broad transport benefits obtained by the 
private sector; the French Versement Transport is an example.  
 
• A more focused charge can be levied reflecting the specific transport benefits 
obtained by a particular property; the US concept of  ‘value capture’ is based on 
this principle.  
 
• The private sector can be involved directly in financing a new investment, as 
happens with many rail projects, with the operator of the infrastructure repaying 
the loan over its life.  
 
• The private sector can be involved in operation, with the private sector operator 
obtaining its revenue directly from the user.  
 
The first two of these have no direct effect on the specification of a transport strategy, 
but may well help to make the strategy financially feasible. The third introduces the 
impact of private sector objectives, which will emphasise a financial return on 
investment in the specific measures covered. In this case, the private sector may be 
more willing to invest in certain types of project than others, and this could bias the 
specification of the strategy. In the fourth case the charges on users, through fares, 
parking charges or road use charges and tolls, will be determined in part to maximise 
revenue, and this can significantly affect the performance of the overall strategy.  For 
example, higher  fares designed to produce a return on investment in a new urban rail 
system may reduce patronage and hence the contribution to congestion relief and 
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environmental protection. 
1.2.2 What is private finance and why use it? 
 
The financing of a project can be said to be purely private if  
• the private party runs all risks, and  
• the investment is paid directly by its users, and  
• the operation is based on user charges. 
A key objective of private financing is to overcome the shortage of public funding, 
which constrains the range of possible transport strategies.   
The private sector usually seeks for commercial profit that can be gained either as 
income from investment interests, or as value capture through an improvement in the 
transport system.  Furthermore, despite higher cost of capital raised from commercial 
sources and the need to cover the risks and gaining commercial profit, it has been 
argued that the overall cost for the community could be lower with private financing, 
than if the government provides the facilities from taxation funds. If this is so, it 
would be due to the efficiency in management of capital and manpower that results 
from the profit motive of private enterprises.   
The following objectives for private financing of infrastructure projects have been 
identified: 
• minimisation of the impact of additional taxation, debt burden or financial 
guarantees on the finances of the government; 
• introduction of the benefits of private sector management and control techniques 
in the construction and operational phases of the projects; 
• promotion of private entrepreneurial initiative and innovation in infrastructure 
projects; 
• increase in the financial resources that might be available for the projects. 
  
In addition to the commercial profit that is dependent on the investment time, interest 
rates and risk management, participation in financing of the transport system can 
bring value capture benefits to the investor. Value capture appears as private 
contributions that result in increase in property values, attraction of customers, 
facilitation of employee’s travel to work and provision of cheaper and more reliable 
transport opportunities. Benefit sharing mechanisms can be grouped into two 
categories; land development or leasing arrangements and direct charges on 
benefiting parties. 
1.2.3 Risks 
 
The major issue in involving private financing for transport infrastructure investments 
concerns the sharing of risk.  Investments in infrastructure include, like all 
investments, various types of risks. Because of the long time periods included, these 
risks may be very high. The following main classes of risk may be distinguished: 
• political risks; for example, changes in transport policy, nationalisation, interven-
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tion/regulation by the government, etc.; 
• financial risks; for example, fluctuations in interest rates, fluctuations in exchange 
rates, wrong expectations about inflation, etc.; 
• construction risks; for example, delays, unexpected and higher costs etc.; 
• operational risks; for example, damage by accidents, vandalism, demand 
shortfalls, etc.; 
• commercial risks; for example, wrong cost estimates, wrong estimates of the 
traffic volume, unexpected competition, etc. 
These risks may make the private investor generally more conscious of the necessity 
of efficient forecasting and appraisal techniques than the public sector, because 
transport projects have often been subject to cost overruns and delays.  These, 
together with inadequate forecasts for the future, have previously resulted in low 
levels of interest by the private sector. It is also believed that, generally, investment in 
transport infrastructure is seen as having a higher risk than investment in other types 
of projects 
1.2.4  Division of responsibility  
 
Almost all European transport infrastructure has been financed and operated by 
governments or by public organisations tied to the government. In the case of 
railways in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, there is at present 
a trend to separate the financing and operation of infrastructure. In this approach, the 
management and financing of infrastructure are under responsibility of the govern-
ment. The operation takes place on a private basis, where the operator imposes user 
charges. In this situation there may be several suppliers of transport services, which 
allows competition. This model corresponds to recent EU regulations and is proposed 
or under discussion in several countries (Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
The private sector is not always willing wholly to finance urban transport 
infrastructure due to the risks involved in recovering the high start-up costs, so public-
private partnerships are often used, particularly through franchising agreements.  
Franchising is a way of organising public-private partnerships.  A franchise can be 
defined as a contract between a transport authority (the franchiser) and a private 
company (the franchisee), by which the latter obtains the right to operate a transport 
system, facility or service. Granting of an exclusive operating franchise is an 
incentive to operate the service without fear of competition for sufficient time to 
recuperate the investment and make a profit. Under a conventional franchise contract, 
the franchisee pays the franchiser for using his property rights. In the case of transport 
infrastructure, this situation may be reversed: the transport authority may compensate 
the private company for an expected operational deficit. These franchise contracts 
may be distributed by means of tendering. There may be two different kinds of 
contracts: a given transport system, facility or service is transferred to the company 
which offers to operate it at the lowest costs; alternatively, the contract is transferred 
to the company which offers the best transport system for a given budget. Such 
systems need detailed agreement on service levels and operating conditions, in order 
to meet both efficiency and equity criteria and other transport objectives. The 
following approaches to franchising may be identified: 
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• BOT: Build-Operate-Transfer (the usual approach: facility paid for by the 
investor/franchisee but is owned by the concessionaire/franchiser; the investor 
maintains and operates the facility during the concession period and then transfers 
ownership back to the franchiser), with the following variants: 
• BOO: Build-Own-Operate: Investor retains ownership, operates in perpetuity via 
an open-ended franchise; 
• DBOT: Design-Build-Operate-Transfer: as BOT, with the franchisee also 
designing the scheme; 
• DBOO: Design-Build-Own-Operate: as BOO, but the franchisee also designs the 
scheme. (This is known as DBFO – Design-Build-Finance-Operate – in the UK); 
• BOOS: Build-Own-Operate-Sell: at the end of the franchise period the state pays 
a (residual) value to the franchisee; 
• BOOT: Build-Own-Operate-Transfer: as BOOS, without terminal payment; 
• BOTT: Build-Operate-Training-Transfer: investor is required to provide training 
before the facility is transferred (mainly for developing countries). 
  
Regarding public transport, when introducing competition to the public transport 
system, the authorities have to take into account scale economies, market size and the 
social service requirements of the system.  Selection of the form of competition for 
public transport is a matter of finding the best combination of different objectives of 
government authorities, the technical and economic characteristics of the supplying 
modes, the nature of the local market demands, and what can be afforded, both by 
individuals and governments. The critical factor is the introduction of effective 
competition. The competition in the public transport system can be arranged in many 
ways, for example:  
• concessions;  
• comprehensive competitive tendering of service packages; 
• competitive tendering of subsidised services; or  
• completely free entry to the market.  
The choice depends on technology, city size and complexity, environmental and 
distributional policy issues and the administrative capability of authorities. It is 
widely accepted that private sector participation needs to be part of a phased, 
comprehensive reform. This reform includes separation of regulatory and operational 
functions, liberalisation of entry, corporatization of former state enterprises and the 
consideration of appropriate systems of regulation. 
In terms of public transport regulation, it is important to distinguish between two 
basic types of regime. Firstly there is a regime in which the public authorities set the 
policy (e.g. the levels of fare and frequency) and secondly there is a regime in which 
private operators are free to do so.  In the latter case there is a distinction as to 
whether a perfect market is operating or whether the operators are monopoly 
providers, either informally or formally (through franchising).  Although these 
distinctions are particularly relevant for public transport, they can also be used when 
considering the private financing of other sectors.  
Public/private partnerships in general have the potential for creating synergy between 
the public service culture and the entrepreneurial approach.  It is possible to specify 
five desirable features for a successful public/private partnership.  These features are:  
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• a joint interest in delivering an effective service; 
• a co-operative effort, with clear division of responsibility; 
• shared cost and revenue relationships, with more flexibility than if the public 
sector operates alone; 
• private sector interest in the well-being of the customer and quality of service; 
• public sector concern for the wider public interest, especially the well-being of 
non-users. 
These and other issues regarding the use of private finance in transport were reviewed 
as an early part of the FATIMA project, the review providing the basis for the 
development of a range of objective functions against which to assess integrated 
transport strategies.  These objective functions are set out in the following section. 
 
2. DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
2.1 Overview of objective functions 
The objective functions used in FATIMA were arrived at through a review of current 
practice and future opportunities in private financing of transport, starting  from the 
acknowledgement that public finance for transport is currently scarce.  Information 
for the review was obtained through a literature search and from interviews with 
public officials, politicians and representatives of private companies.  Based on this 
review, the FATIMA project defined a range of objective functions to be used in the 
modelling process, and these are described below.  
 
Essentially, five new objective functions were defined for FATIMA; three of these 
corresponded to regimes in which private involvement is regulated by the city 
authority and two objective functions correspond to regimes in which private 
involvement is deregulated.  Before defining these objective functions (in Sections 2.6 
to 2.10), some preliminary definitions are given (in Sections 2.2 to 2.5) of 
components of the functions. A fuller specification of all the objective functions is 
given in Minken (1998). 
2.2 Present Value of Finance (PVF) 
The Present Value of Finance (PVF) of a measure is defined as the net financial 
benefit of the measure to government and other providers of transport facilities, both 
public and private. 
 
In the FATIMA study, where only one future target year is being modelled, PVF is 
defined as: 
( 2.1 ) PVF I
r
fi
i=1
 
= − + +∑ 11
30
( )
*  
where: I is the present value of the cost of infrastructure investment, compared 
to the do-minimum scenario; 
f is the net financial benefit to transport suppliers in the modelled 
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nimum scenario, taking into account 
r is the annual (country specific) discount rate. 
2.3 Economic Efficiency Function (EEF) 
net benefits, B, consists of net benefits to travellers, operators 
nd the government. 
 be charted by running the model many 
mes over with different generalised costs. 
re in cost benefit analyses of transport, and it goes by the name of 
e rule of a half. 
The present value of net benefits, B, over a 30 year period is given by: 
(2.2) 
target year, compared to the do-mi
both revenue and operating costs; 
 
 
The present value of 
a
 
The generalised cost of travel is defined as the monetary costs, plus in-vehicle time 
cost (in-vehicle time multiplied by the value of time), plus other elements of travel 
time costs, such as waiting time cost, access time cost etc.  Consistent with the 
assumption underlying the transport models themselves, the demand for trips on a 
particular travel movement (e.g. origin-destination pair, mode, trip purpose) is defined 
as a function of the generalised travel costs of that movement and other movements.  
These demand functions need not be given an explicit analytical form, but are 
embedded in the transport model, and can
ti
 
The net benefits to travellers are evaluated as the generalised consumer surplus from 
the change in generalised costs on all travel movements, assuming that the demand 
functions are linear in the relevant region of generalised costs.  This is a standard 
evaluation procedu
th
 
B
r ii += 11 ( )
 u is the net benefit to transport users in the target year, co
f u= +∑ 130 * ( )  
where: mpared with 
ated as described above; 
d f, r are as described in Section 2.2. 
he formula for EEF is then: 
 
.3)  EEF  =   B - I + 0.25PVF   
f PVF, in FATIMA it has been 
pplied to both positive and negative values of PVF. 
Since (B - I) is the Net Present Value (NPV) equation 2.3 can also be written 
 EEF = NPV + 0.25PVF  
 
the do-minimum scenario, calcul
an
  
T
(2
 
Equation 2.3 expresses the EEF as consisting of net present benefits to travellers, 
operators and government. A shadow price of public funds of 0.25 has been added. 
This reflects the efficiency loss involved in raising extra taxes.  The shadow price is 
identical to that used in OPTIMA and is justified there (OPTIMA 1997).  However, 
while OPTIMA only applied it to negative values o
a
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2.4 Economic Efficiency Objective Function with external costs 
 (EEFP) 
EEFP is an extension of the economic efficiency objective function EEF including 
external costs for pollution, noise and accidents.  
 
( 2.4 ) EEFP = EEF - EC 
 
where EC = Change in external costs from the do-minimum  
 
The external cost indicator for each mode is the sum of accident cost, noise cost and 
pollution costs per vehicle kilometre, times the number of vehicle kilometres for that 
mode. It is calculated for each strategy based on the vehicle kilometres of the mode in 
question as it is output from the transport model. Tinch (1995) is taken as the basis for 
the unit cost of accidents, noise and pollution of each mode. It is however necessary 
to adjust these values to the specific conditions of each city, such as population 
density (determining the number of people exposed to noise and pollution) and 
meteorological conditions (determining the stock of pollutant in the air of the city that 
results from a particular level of emission). The overall risks of accidents per vehicle 
kilometre may also differ between the cities, depending on average speed, the 
separation of walking and cycling from other modes etc.  Summing over all modes 
gives us the external cost indicator EC for each strategy. Walking and cycling are 
however not assumed to have external costs. 
 
Expressing the external costs of each mode as a function of vehicle kilometres or total 
fuel consumption means that we are unable to model the benefits of rerouting traffic 
to less densely populated streets or parts of the city, or of separating motorised and 
non-motorised traffic. It may even be that such measures increase total kilometerage, 
and will count as disbenefits in our calculations. However, as traffic calming in 
residential areas is supposed to be carried out in all strategies, we consider that such 
rerouting effects can be ignored at the strategic level of the FATIMA study. 
 
Our external cost indicator does not take into account the changes in average driving 
conditions brought about by a transport strategy, such as lengthening or shortening of 
peak hours, increase or decrease of average speed etc. As fuel consumption per 
vehicle kilometre, and thereby also pollution, is dependent on speed, this is a 
limitation. 
 
Our indicators of pollution costs are only indicators of the costs of the city-wide or 
regional air pollution levels that result from a total level of transport and a certain 
modal split within the city, and cannot mirror changes at the level of particular 
locations within the city. The same applies to noise, but as noise is a very local 
impact, and strictly speaking has no city-wide effects, our noise indicator will have 
further limitations.  Finally, accident costs are obviously not a simple function of 
kilometerage only, but depend very much on various accident prevention measures 
and on speed. It will have to be assumed that appropriate accident prevention 
measures are taken in all strategies.  
 
While there are thus limitations in relating the costs of pollution, noise and accidents 
solely to changes in vehicle-kilometres, we concluded that, at a strategic level, this 
was a reasonable approximation.  It was in any case imposed on us, since not all 
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mi= ∑δ γ  
models were able to predict these impacts directly. 
 
Let γam, γnm and γpm be the city specific costs per vehicle kilometre in mode m from 
accidents, noise and pollution respectively. Let kmi be the vehicle kilometres by mode 
m in strategy number i in the test year. Our external cost indicator EC for strategy 
number i is: 
 
(2.5) EC ki m
m
 where γ γ γ γm am nm pm= + +  
 and δ = +=∑
1
11
30
( )r ii
 
Thus we form a composite external cost per vehicle kilometre for each mode, and sum 
costs over modes. Finally, we use the discount factor δ to make EC a present value. 
 
The γ*δ
 
r cities.  The accident data for Eisenstadt 
rch. The low car noise can be explained 
latively few big 
y  Eriksen og Hovi (1995).  The noise 
alue for Oslo is low as the area  is predominantly rural with low population density 
which therefore lowers the mean noise values.  
 
 values are shown in the following table. Edinburgh, Merseyside, Helsinki, 
Torino and Salerno used the Tinch-values (Tinch, 1995).  For accidents, Vienna and 
Eisenstadt used their own calculated values with veh-km as the basis and for noise 
and pollution the Tinch-values as in othe
showed a much higher rate was required compared to Vienna for car but that the 
reported rate for bus tended towards zero. 
 
In Table 1 Helsinki has used its own values mainly for car noise and bus accidents 
(also tramway, train and metro differ slightly).  Otherwise, the Tinch values were used 
because they were so close to the values that could be obtained from Helsinki’s own 
research on pollution and accidents. The differences are due to relational effects 
between the modes based on that own resea
with the low population density outside the city and the bus accident cost happens to 
be low because normally injuries are minor. 
 
The relatively low noise and pollution values for Tromsø are because of the weather 
conditions in the town and because Tromsø is not densely populated.  People also 
mainly live quite a distance from the main roads. Tromsø also has re
and complicated intersections.  It is considered quite safe to be a pedestrian and 
cyclist in Tromsø. This is reflected in the accident figure for Tromsø. 
 
The Gamma values for Oslo and Tromsø are generally some average of the Tinch 
values and some values from a Norwegian stud
v
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 Edinburgh, 
M’side, 
Salerno, Torino 
Vienna Eisenstadt Helsinki Oslo Tromsø 
Dimension [ECU/veh-km]  [ECU/veh-
km] 
[ECU/veh-
km]  
[ECU/veh-km] [ECU/veh-km] [ECU/veh-km] 
Pollution       
Car 0.0275 0.0275 0.0275 0.027  0.016 0.0024 
Bus 0.2176 0.05471 0.2176 0.218  0.064 0.0096 
Tramway 0.0 0.05471 n.a 0.0  0.0 n.a. 
Noise       
Car 0.0373 0.0373 0.0373 0.019  0.004 0.002 
Bus 0.0746 0.06431 0.0746 0.075  0.024 0.012 
Tramway 0.0622 0.06431 n.a. 0.075  0.028 n.a. 
Train    0.063  0.032  
Metro    0.05  0.028  
Accidents       
Car 0.0222 0.0404 0.1680 0.023  0.016 0.012 
Bus 0.0453 0.01351 0.0001 0.023  0.0528 0.0396 
Tramway 0.0453 0.01351 n.a. 0.045  0.1024 n.a. 
Train     0.0008  
Metro     0.00056  
1    Includes all public transport for Vienna 
Table 1: Pollution, noise and accident costs per veh/km (γ-values) used in different 
 cities 
 
2.5 Sustainability Objective Function (SOF) 
The sustainability objective function (SOF), which was fully defined in the OPTIMA 
project, is given by: 
 
(2.6) SOF = (1+λ)* f  +  u  -  y  +  hard penalty   (if fuel 
consumption 
        exceeds do-minimum) 
   (1+λ)* f  +  u  -  y   (otherwise)  
 
where: y is a “soft penalty” on fuel consumption in the target year, calculated 
by multiplying the fuel consumption cost (relative to the do-minimum 
strategy) by a shadow price of 4; 
 “hard penalty” is a large negative number that ensures that optimal 
SOF policy will have less fuel consumption than the do-minimum;  
u, f and λ are as defined above. 
 
The main intention of the soft and hard penalties on fuel consumption is to generate 
 14
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
                                                
“optimal” transport policies that preserve natural resources.  The use of a hard penalty 
effectively ensures that such policies must use less fuel than those envisaged by the 
do-minimum transport strategy. 
 
The SOF does not explicitly take into account external costs of the type calculated by 
EC above.  The rationale for this approach is that the issue of external costs is catered 
for by the soft and hard penalties on fuel consumption.  However, it could 
alternatively be argued that the sole purpose of these constraints is to preserve natural 
resources, and that air pollution, noise and safety should be considered separately.  
This issue is examined in the section on sensitivity tests on γ in Section 8. 
 
The use of λ in SOF is entirely analogous to its use in EEFP as described above. 
  
 
2.6 Benchmark Objective Function (BOF) 
BOF (Benchmark Objective Function) is a combination of EEFP and SOF which 
balances the perspectives of current and future generations. 
 
It is defined as: 
 
(2.7) BOF  = αEEFP  + (1 - α) SOF      
  
For the main tests in FATIMA, α was set at 0.1. Since SOF is only concerned with a 
single target year whilst EEFP is concerned with a (discounted) period of 30 years, it 
follows that the size of EEFP will be approximately ten times1 the size of SOF.  Thus 
a value of 0.1 for α was chosen to ensure that the perspective of a future generation 
have approximately the same weight as the perspective of the present generation. 
Since α was a “new parameter” created by the FATIMA project, no previous 
literature can be cited as to its “best” value. 
 
In some respects, the use of BOF (with a suitable value of α) is analogous to setting 
the discount rate r at 0, in the sense that both approaches put greater emphasis on the 
benefits and costs of future generations (than in a standard cost benefit analysis). 
However, BOF has the extra element of restricting fuel consumption (from its SOF 
component), and in particular specifies that fuel consumption should be less than in 
the do-minimum strategy.  
 
2.7 Constrained Objective Function (COF) 
COF (Constrained Objective Function) is an extension of BOF that takes into account 
that there is a fixed constraint on public money.  For the sake of simplicity, it is 
assumed that public finance is constrained to the level implied in the do-minimum 
scenario. 
 
(2.8)  COF   =  BOF  if  PVF > 0      
 
1  In fact, EEFP will be approximately δ times the size of SOF, where δ is defined by 
Equation 4. 
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  =  BOF  + hard penalty if PVF < 0 
 
  
 
2.8 Regulated Objective Function (ROF) 
ROF (Regulated Objective Function) is an extension of COF, and recognises that 
extra (private) finance can be input to the transport system through value capture 
(VC).  The transport system is regulated in the sense that the private finance has no 
direct control over the levels at which fares, frequencies, road pricing etc are set, 
which remain firmly under overall public control. 
 
VC is defined as a proportion β of user benefits, which are seen as a measure of 
overall accessibility.  The logic here is that companies in the city should (collectively) 
be prepared to pay for overall city-wide accessibility due to the benefits that they gain 
from this in terms of: efficiency of commuter trips and business trips, inward 
investment (due to city attractiveness) and general city regeneration. The political 
issue as to whether VC should be raised by compulsory means (through taxes) or 
voluntary means was not dealt with in FATIMA.   
 
(2.9)  ROF = BOF    if PVF  + VC > 0  
  = BOF + hard penalty   if  PVF + VC < 0 
 
where:  
 
(2.10)  VC =  β * δ * u  if u > 0   
  =  0     otherwise 
and where δ is as defined above. 
 
For the main tests in FATIMA, β was set at 0.1.  Since β was another “new” 
parameter defined by the FATIMA project, there has been no previous literature about 
a “best” value. 
 
 
2.9 Deregulated Objective Function (DOF) 
DOF (Deregulated Objective Function) is an extension of COF.  It assumes that 
control of public transport is handed over to the private sector, who are free to set 
fares and frequencies, and to take any profits that result.  On the other hand, there are 
no public subsidies for running public transport.  The other measures in the transport 
system (road pricing, parking charges and road capacity changes) are assumed to stay 
under public control. 
 
The public transport market is assumed to be an imperfectly contestable market (i.e. 
somewhere between a perfect market and a monopolistic situation).  Under these 
conditions, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the public transport market is 
assumed to be close to 15%. 
 
 
(2.11) DOF = BOF  +  (penalty(IRR) if IRRPT is not 15%)          if  PVF* > 0 
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  = BOF  +  hard penalty             if  PVF* < 0 
 
where: PVF* is the PVF for all publicly controlled transport sectors; 
         IRRPT  is the Internal Rate of Return for public transport; 
         penalty(IRR) increases as IRRPT diverges from 15%. 
   
2.10 Half regulated Objective Function (HOF) 
HOF (Half-regulated Objective Function) is an extension of DOF, loosening the rule 
on subsidy for public transport.  Under HOF, subsidies can be paid for public 
transport when in private control, subject to PVF* being positive. The precise 
purpose/mechanism for providing subsidy will vary between each city.  However two 
examples are: 
 
• Subsidy is paid for off-peak public transport 
• Subsidy is paid to help finance the investment costs of public transport 
infrastructure 
 
The assumption about profits to the private sector is the same as in DOF. Thus 
subsidy is not being used to increase private profits but (hopefully) to improve social 
benefit. 
 
(2.12) HOF = BOF  +  (penalty(IRR) if  IRRPT is not 15%)      if  PVF*-S  > 0 
  = BOF  +  hard penalty         if  PVF*-S < 0 
 
where: S is a subsidy paid to the private sector for running public transport.  
PVF*,  IRRPT  and penalty(IRR) are as defined above. 
 
2.11 City specific definitions of HOF 
• Edinburgh, Vienna, Eisenstadt, Oslo, Tromsø, and Helsinki : 
 
In the subsidised half regulated regime (function HOF) the subsidy was 
assumed to be available for increasing frequency, reducing fares and 
implementing infrastructure. 
 
The subsidy requirement was calculated such that the public transport sector 
received a return of 15%, this subsidy was however subject to public funds 
being available i.e. the public PVF must be greater than or equal to zero after 
paying the subsidy.   
 
• Merseyside: 
 
Two HOF objective functions were used in the Merseyside case study: 
 
1. The standard HOF as used in other case studies. 
 
2. HOF1 is a Merseyside-specific definition of HOF for the Merseyside case study.  
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To understand HOF1 (in Merseyside), it must be remembered that public transport 
provision in all FATIMA case studies must be at least at a level of 50% of the do 
minimum scenario (i.e. the maximum decrease is 50%).  HOF1 is then defined in 
Merseyside to be the same as DOF except that there is a possibility of public 
subsidy to operators if they run a higher frequency than the minimum level.  This 
subsidy is calculated as the cost of the “extra” frequency, subject to the condition 
that the public PVF must always be positive.  
 
• Torino and Salerno: 
 
In HOF it is supposed that the government will pay for the infrastructure (M and 
H) mainly if there is the construction of an underground. Furthermore a positive 
PVF* can be used freely as subsidy i.e. there is no restriction on subsidising 
operating costs as under COF and ROF. 
 
2.12 Non-modelled benefits and disbenefits 
Having described the regimes for regulated and deregulated systems it is necessary to 
note areas which are not modelled in FATIMA and which in reality may bring 
benefits or disbenefits to each regime.  Those elements purposely not modelled are :- 
 
• changes in efficiency (e.g. operating costs) 
• attitudes towards risk in finance terms 
• non-uniform changes to PT services 
• payment of interest on loans 
• quality of service 
• incentives 
• possible changes in vehicle size. 
 
Each of the above was either difficult to implement within the models used or there 
was not sufficient evidence in the literature about the effects of private operation and 
deregulation to form assumptions for modelling the effects.  For a fuller discussion 
see Minken (1998). 
 
 
3. POLICY MEASURES 
3.1 Summary of measures 
There is a categorisation of measures into: infrastructure measures, management 
measures and pricing measures1.  An initial list of all possible measures was 
generated from an international review in the previous project OPTIMA, which 
included also practice in EU countries not included in the project. The FATIMA list 
of policy measures is a refinement of the OPTIMA list, taking into account the 
response from city authorities in OPTIMA. From this list of measures, a condensed 
 
1 Information measures were considered briefly.  However, since it is not feasible to model them on the 
level required by the FATIMA project, they are not considered further. 
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common set of measures was identified for use in the optimisation process.  This set is 
presented in Section 3.2, along with the cost assumptions made for the measures. 
 
3.2 Measures tested in the optimisation process 
Table 2 shows the measures used in the optimisation process and the maximum 
ranges considered (some cities used narrower ranges where it was felt that the 
maximum range was simply infeasible).  The criteria for selection of measures were 
that the measures: 
 
  - were common to all nine case study cities (either already used or planned) 
  - could be modelled by all the nine city-specific transportation models  
  - were likely to be used or planned in a large number of cities throughout 
 Europe 
  - were (or arguably could be) controlled by the city authorities. 
 
In most of the cities a subdivision into long-term and short-term parking charges and 
peak and off-peak values was made.  The ranges for all these measures were as given 
in Table 2. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the assumed costs used in the calculation of the objective 
functions.  These costs are based upon currently used costs in the cities for the 
purposes of cost benefit analysis and are improvements on the OPTIMA estimates. 
 
Table 3 shows the assumed capital costs (in each of the nine cities) for road capacity 
changes, public transport infrastructure, and road pricing. It can be seen that there was 
wide variation across cities for both public transport infrastructure and road capacity 
changes.  In the case of public transport infrastructure, this is not surprising since the 
infrastructure measures being considered varied widely between cities.  In the case of 
road capacity changes, there might have been expected to be some correlation 
between cost and city size.  In the sense that the “small cities” (Eisenstadt, Tromsø 
and Salerno) all had negligible costs for road capacity changes, this expectation is 
borne out.  However, there is clearly wide variation amongst the larger cities. 
 
Table 4  shows the annual operating costs (in each of the nine cities) for public 
transport frequency changes and road pricing.  It can be seen by comparing Table 3 
and Table 4 that (with the exception of Merseyside) road capacity increases were 
generally costed at a much lower level than public transport infrastructure.  
Furthermore, it can be seen that in some cities (notably Oslo and Helsinki) the cost of 
increasing public transport frequency (which must be paid out year after year)  was 
high compared with the cost of a one-off increase road capacity.  The operating costs 
of road pricing are based on city assumptions with the exception of Oslo where the 
figures are actual. 
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Abbreviation Name Minimum  
Value 
Maximum  
Value 
IH High public transport infrastructure investment 
(rail or light rail based) 
0 1 
IM Medium public transport infrastructure 
investment (bus based) 
0 1 
CAP  Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (whole 
city/town) 
-20% +10% 
FREQ Increasing/decreasing public transport 
 frequency 
-50% 
-30% for Torino 
+100% 
+30% for Torino 
RP  Road pricing # 0 5 ecus 
PCH  Increasing/decreasing parking charges -100% +300% 
+100% for Torino 
FARE Increasing/decreasing public transport fares  -100% 
-50% for Helsinki 
+100% 
# The value of the measure Road Pricing refers to the cost per trip incurred to the car driver (typically 
into a city centre) 
 
Table 2: Measures tested 
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Road capacity changes 
Edinburgh M’side Vienna Eisen-
stadt 
Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno 
-20% 34 55 80 7 12 93 20 24 0.04 
-10% 15 28 20 2 6 46 10 12 0.02 
-5% 2 14 6 0.5 3 23 5  0.01 
+5% 2 28 54 0.1 6 46 15 24 5 
+10% 15 55 218 0.4 12 93 30 48 10 
          
P.T. infrastructure          
 
  
 High p.t. infrastructure 
564 360 4254 * * * 550 3459 45 
 
  
 Medium p.t. 
infrastructure 
35 40 2127 * * 185 * 671 0.5 
          
Road pricing 2 4 33 3 0 0 7 3 1 
P.T. Frequency with no 
infrastructure 
         
-50 0 -3.75 -387 -0.07 -5.6 0 -248  0 
-30          
+30          
+50 3.99 3.75    44 275  5 
+100 7.97 7.5 3015 1.77 13.2  550   
P.T. Frequency with 
Medium infrastructure 
         
-50  16.25     -300   
-30        614  
+30        791  
+50       325   
+100  87.5     650   
P.T. Frequency with High 
infrastructure 
         
-50          
-30        3052  
+30        3532  
* indicates “not costed” 
 
Table 3: Capital costs of new measures (in million ecus) 
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Change in p.t. frequency 
Edinburgh M’side Vienna Eisen-
stadt 
Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno 
-50%   -19 -1  -170  -69# -3.6 
+50%   +163 +1  +168  +54# +3.6 
+100%   +326 +2  +340  * * 
p.t. frequency (peak)  
with IM6
         
-50%  -14     -20   
+50%       +43   
+100%  +29     +85   
p.t. frequency (off-peak)  
with IM6
         
-50%  -55     -45   
+100%  +110     +190   
p.t. frequency (peak) 
without IM6
         
-50% -87 -14   -1.31  -27   
+100% +15 +29   2.62  +60   
p.t. frequency (off-peak) 
without IM6
         
-50% -97 -55   -2.48  -70   
+100% +17 +110   4.96  +135   
          
Road pricing +1 +1.25 +1 +0.1 +0.89 +9 +0.73 +0.3 +0.1 
Road capacity          
-20%         0.02 
-10%         0.01 
+5%         1.25 
+10%         2.4 
Parking     0.625     
* indicates “not costed” 
# The cost of a  pt frequency decrease/increase of 30%, where this was the minimum/maximum 
considered. 
6 Infrastructure Medium  
7 the operating costs are based upon vehicle-km in the do-minimum peak and off-peak periods 
 
Table 4: Operating costs of new measures (in million ecus per annum).  
 
4. OVERVIEW OF  TRANSPORT MODELS USED 
The FATIMA project has used several different transportation models. Some of them 
are implemented with commercial software whilst some are implemented in software 
packages developed by the FATIMA partners themselves (and already used in 
OPTIMA). A full description of the models used is given in Appendix A of  FATIMA 
(1998). 
 
The approach taken by FATIMA has been to use city-specific transportation models 
which had already been set up, calibrated and used by the city authorities before the 
start of FATIMA.  This has allowed the project to make the working assumption that 
the models used are properly calibrated and, on an appropriate level of aggregation, 
transferable. 
 
Broadly speaking, the models fall into two main categories: strategic and tactical 
models. 
 
Strategic models are used for running simulations at a very high level of aggregation. 
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The physical transport network is not directly represented and the number of spatial 
zones is low (typically less than 40). Travel costs are either calculated in terms of 
“area speed-flow” curves or (at the highest level of aggregation) are fixed inputs for 
each origin-destination zone pair. 
 
The main advantage of using these models is that they are very fast to run, which can 
be an important factor if a large number of runs are required.  Furthermore, the 
preparation time for creating the input files is typically short. 
 
Even though strategic models are well suited for optimisation work (such as in 
OPTIMA), their use is restricted because few cities have a strategic model ready for 
use. 
 
In FATIMA, Edinburgh, Merseyside, Vienna, and Eisenstadt all used strategic 
models.  
 
Tactical models are more detailed than strategic models. Typically they represent 
each (significant) road and public transport link in the network.  The output of tactical 
models is more complex than the output of strategic models.  For FATIMA purposes, 
there is a need for much aggregation of this output, which can be extremely time-
consuming if done manually. 
 
Tactical models are widely available in a large number of European cities to help to 
design and assess various specific transport schemes. 
 
The cities of Tromsø, Oslo, Helsinki, Salerno and Torino all used tactical models. 
 
5. RESULTS FOR THE NINE CITIES 
5.1 Overview of the Optimisation Method 
5.1.1 Edinburgh 
 
The optimisation process for BOF was carried out successfully making use of the 
regression method as in OPTIMA.  There were no major problems in finding 
regression models for BOF although the regression models did not give information 
on parking charges and these were adjusted via sensitivity tests. 
 
For Edinburgh the optimal BOF solution has a positive public PVF and therefore the 
constrained public regimes COF and ROF are also optimal for this set of measures as 
the budget constraints are not broken.  It follows that there was need to calculate 
separate COF and ROF optimal policies. 
 
In the subsidised private regime (function HOF) the subsidy was calculated so that the 
public transport sector received a maximum of 15% return if and only if the public 
purse could afford this from other measures i.e. the subsidy is paid until PVF*=0 or 
until the PT sector return is 15%.  Again the optimal BOF measures provided enough 
public funds under the private regime to subsidise the private PT sector so that the 
optimal HOF value is for the same combination of measures. 
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In the case of DOF it was impossible to form an initial regression model after 27 runs 
as all except one DOF value were negative and most runs incurred the maximum 
penalty for deviation from the required 15% internal rate of return.  The rates of 
return were either too high or negative indicating loss making services.  Rescaling of 
the penalty function was attempted but the DOF surface was such that it was either 
too flat, dominated by high penalties, or with lower penalties the loss making 
combinations dominated as they have higher BOF values but were infeasible in IRR 
terms.  To overcome these problems another form of penalty was used and introduced 
in DOF2, based upon the present value of finance of the PT sector calculated at a 
discount rate of 15%.  This penalty is basically a way of searching for more DOF runs 
with more reasonable rates of return.  The PVF(PT) penalty used was a quadratic so 
that when the PVF(PT) equals zero the penalty is zero which coincides with the zero 
point of the original IRR penalty function used in DOF.  In this way DOF2 was 
maximised not to find the optimal DOF2 but rather to find more positive DOF values.  
As can be seen from the results the DOF2 runs have provided a means of locating 
positive DOF values and eventually enough values were produced so that a regression 
model for DOF was possible. 
 
5.1.2 Merseyside 
 
The formal optimisation process worked successfully for BOF, while the “formal” 
optimisation process for COF and ROF was unsuccessful: i.e. it was impossible to 
find adequate linear regression models.  It is likely that this is because the maximum 
values of COF and ROF are to be found when PVF =0 (in the case of COF) and PVF 
= -VC (in the case of ROF). When PVF goes below zero, a penalty of -1000 MECU is 
added to COF; the same penalty is added to ROF when it goes below -VC.  It is 
impossible to find regression functions that can cope with this discontinuity.   
 
The method in fact used to optimise COF and ROF was  subjective judgement on the 
basis of the experience of optimising BOF, since both the former objective functions 
are based on BOF.  The optimisation of BOF showed which transport measures drove 
the objective functions up or down the hardest.  Coupling this information with an 
awareness of the extra constraints in COF and ROF (on PVF) it was reasonably 
straightforward to carry out a successful subjective optimisation. 
 
The problems of discontinuities discussed with COF and ROF above are further 
accentuated in the case of DOF and HOF.  Although a formal optimisation approach 
was initially used, it was abandoned after being unsuccessful.  Instead a subjective 
optimisation approach was used. 
 
5.1.3 Vienna and Eisenstadt 
 
The optimisation of the regulated objective functions did not cause any problems in 
the optimisation method. The regression models were not difficult to build up and the 
convergence progress was rather quick. Unlike the regulated objective functions the 
deregulated objective functions caused some trouble in the optimisation process. 
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One main problem in optimising DOF and HOF is that the penalising and 
constraining of the discussed objective functions results in a very jagged 
multidimensional  surface. This makes it hard and with an increasing amount of 
penalties and constraints even impossible to find an optimum with the regression 
method alone. Because of the jagged surface the regression model often predicts the 
optimum in a region which is in reality penalised and therefore highly negative. Thus 
it is possible that the convergence criteria never could be fulfilled. 
 
A second problem is that the objective function, which should be optimised, and the 
objective functions of the previous runs (the BOF related ones for DOF and the BOF 
and DOF related ones for HOF) have their optima in different areas. Therefore the 
initial runs for DOF and HOF contain many points in useless regions and often it is 
hard to convince the regression model that the optimum it searches for has a 
completely different set of policy measures than the previous one. 
 
These problems are arose in both cities. It was in both cities impossible to optimise 
the objective function DOF with the usual method. Also it was impossible for HOF in 
Eisenstadt. For the city of Vienna it was still possible to use the regression based 
method for HOF. Concerning the problems mentioned in the previous paragraph only 
the 26 initial runs and the runs with positive or nearly positive values for HOF found 
so far were used as initial runs for the HOF optimisation. For the other cases other 
methods to find the optimum were used (e.g. with Excel-solver and grid scans). 
 
5.1.4 Oslo 
 
The optimisation process worked successfully for BOF, making use of the regression 
method as in OPTIMA. The optimum policy was found after use of two regression 
models, and the convergence criteria were met rather quickly.  
 
Because of the positive PVF in the BOF optimum, the COF and ROF optima are the 
same as the BOF optimum and so there is no need for separate optimisation of COF 
and ROF.  
 
The formal optimisation process for DOF was partially successful. The prediction for 
the mix of policy measures for the DOF optimum after the initial runs was the same as 
the forecast for the BOF optimum.  An internal rate of return of –6 was used for those 
runs where the calculation of IRR was impossible. After careful study of the previous 
results, a set of runs were devoted to finding the DOF optimum.  A few feasible DOF-
optima were found all having internal rates of return close to 15%, but they all have 
different characteristics regarding public transport fares, frequency and investment.  
 
The runs devoted to the HOF regime were more like sensitivity tests than part of an 
optimisation process. There is subsidy for fares, frequency and the investment. A 
number of measure combinations that give lower IRR(DOF) than 15% and that were 
expected to improve on the policy were tried. The subsidy was set to give 15% 
IRR(HOF).  
 
5.1.5 Tromsø 
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The overall optimisation process worked well for the BOF solution.  However as the 
optimum BOF solution resulted in negative PVFs there were few solutions which did 
not incur the penalty for COF and ROF.  This meant that extra runs were used to 
locate valid COF and ROF solutions, these runs being designed from analysis of 
previous runs. 
 
A similar problem occurred for DOF and HOF in that there were few runs which were 
not penalised and so extra runs were again constructed to give positive values. 
 
5.1.6 Helsinki   
 
The results of the optimisation process of three of the five objective functions of the 
project, namely BOF, COF and ROF for Helsinki MA are given in this document. It 
was not possible to optimise either DOF or HOF for Helsinki MA because no positive 
values for the present value of finance of publicly-controlled money (PVF*) was 
obtained under the constraint of fuel consumption not exceeding the do-minimum 
level. This is mainly due to the present and do-minimum situation with the high level 
of subsidised public transport services on the other hand and, on the other hand, to the 
model structure of the Helsinki tactical model which allows users to change 
destination in consequence of general cost changes between the destination zones and 
thus avoid parking fees or road pricing. 
 
The optimisation of BOF was carried out by using the regression method quite 
successfully. However, some exceptions from the correct use were made on the 
significance of either of the terms of a variable, either first or second power term, 
when the other term was strong, to get a hint of some possible intermediate values of 
the variable concerned. The main direction of the optimisation was not affected by 
using this method. 
 
Because the optimal BOF solution is highly based on reduced public transport fares 
and big monetary savings for the users and thus has a big negative PVF the ROF and 
COF optima had to be found separately.  With the inial set of runs the regression 
showed only to a total zero solution i.e. the present situation. The situation did not get 
better with any BOF runs made. By coincidence, trying some of our previous runs 
from a round of optimisation with faulty model behaviour we got positive values for 
ROF and COF. Using both sensitivity tests and optimisation process confirmed us of 
the optimal solution. 
 
 
5.1.7 Salerno 
 
The optimisation process of the city of Salerno follows the “basic method” described 
in the main part of the report. There is only one change about the criteria of penalising 
high values of the required government subsidy to public transport.  
 
Italian law requires that the subsidy for the public transport company should not be 
greater than the 65% of the operational cost of the company (this law is not yet totally 
applied but will be strictly applied in the future), so a further penalty has been used 
when such a requirement is not obeyed. 
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Moreover over-crowding of public transport is taken into account as additional 
waiting time. If the increase in the public transport demand is not coupled by a 
sufficient increase of the frequency, some public vehicles can become overcrowded 
and the users of the lines corresponding to the overcrowded vehicles have to wait for 
other vehicles spending additional waiting time. 
 
The optimisation process for all the objective functions was carried out using the 
regression method used in OPTIMA.  
 
At the beginning of the process some problems arose as the objective function values 
deriving from the regression functions were very high considering the results obtained 
modelling the first set of runs by means of the transportation model MT.MODEL. 
Probably these high estimations were due to the fact that the majority of the 18 initial 
runs had a negative value for all the objective functions and that these values were 
also strongly negative. 
 
After modelling more runs to find additional scenarios with positive values for the 
objective function BOF, the optimisation process was re-started and was applied 
successfully for BOF.  The other functions being found by sensitivity tests and partial 
use of the regression method. 
5.1.8 Torino 
 
The optimisation process worked successfully for BOF, COF and ROF, making use of 
the regression method used in OPTIMA, with the same particular penalty for COF 
and ROF used for Salerno. 
As the PVF is highly positive and the further Italian penalty is equal to zero, the BOF 
optimum is also the optimum for COF and ROF. 
At the beginning of the process some problems arose as the objective function values 
deriving from the regression functions were all negative; probably this happened 
because the presence of the road pricing forces the car users to change their route, in 
such a way greatly to increase their travel time, so the car user benefits are negative 
and this forces the BOF to a negative value. Another reason for these negative values 
in some scenarios is the increase of fuel consumption compared to the do-minimum 
scenario: in these cases the penalty in the SOF function is invoked. 
After modelling more runs to find additional scenarios with positive values for the 
objective function BOF, the optimisation process was re-started and was applied 
successfully. 
For DOF and HOF, on the other hand, the optimum value was found by a partial use 
of the regression model and by some sensitivity tests, so as to obtain an internal rate 
of return close to 15%. 
5.2 Results 
This section presents tables showing the optimal policies under the BOF, COF, ROF, 
DOF and HOF regimes.  Furthermore, various output indicators are given which show 
the trade-offs involved with optimal policies.  These indicators are: 
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• Mode split of trips by car, public transport and other modes (where available) 
• Percentage change in car-km (which serves as a proxy indicator for pollution, fuel 
consumption, congestion and accidents) 
• Values of the objective functions 
• PVF for the government sector (giving information about the finance implications 
of the policy) 
• PVF for the private sector under deregulated regimes (showing the benefit to the 
private sector of deregulation) 
• Value capture  (which is defined as 10% of user benefits if these are positive) 
 
In general, these indicators are defined as being relative to the do-minimum set of 
policies in each city.  The exception here concerns mode splits, which are absolute 
figures.  It follows that, in order to assess change, the figures for mode splits need also 
to be presented for the do-minimum strategies.  This is done in Table 5.  Also 
included in Table 5 are figures for mode split by distance and the absolute level of 
car-kms in the do-minimum.  
 
 
 
Modal splits 
Edinburgh M’side Vienna Eisenstadt Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino1 Salerno1
MS (trips)-car 63% 62% 39% 45% 73% 68% 46% 57% 59% 
MS(trips)-public transport 37% 15% 34% 3% 11% 22% 32% 43% 14% 
MS (trips)-others n/a 23% 27% 52% 16% 10% 22% n/a 27% 
MS-(distance) car 72% 67% 48% 57% 80% 69% 49% 63% 71% 
MS-(distance)public 
transport 
28% 15% 43% 4% 12% 25% 43% 37% 19% 
MS-(distance) others n/a 18% 9% 39% 8% 6% 8% n/a 10% 
Car-kms           
Car-km p.a. (millions) 2902  3016 14.3 228 5237 2118 4283 272 
1: Italian city results are based upon the peak period only. 
 
Table 5: Modal splits in the do-minimum case 
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Measures Edinburgh*        M’side Vienna* Eisenstadt* Tromsø Oslo* Helsinki Torino* Salerno
Infrastructure Investment high (IH) 0 0 0 - - 0 0 
Infrastructure Investment medium (IM) 1 1 0 - 1 - 0 0 
Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (CAP) 10% 10% -10% -15% 10% 10% 0 10% 0% 
PT frequency (PTC) - - 0% -50%  - - 30% 80% 
PT frequency peak (PTCP) 85% 50% - - 46% -15% 25% - - 
PT frequency off-peak (PTCOP) 70% -40% - - 0% 0% 13% - - 
Road pricing (RP) - - 0 0  - - 0 0 
Road pricing peak (RPP) 1.6 0 - - 2 5 0 - - 
Road pricing off-peak (RPOP) 1.6 0 - - 1.6 5 0 - - 
Parking charges (PCH) - - - - -100% 0% - 100% 300% 
Parking charges long term (PCHL) ~ -100% 0% -50%  - 0 - - 
Parking charges short term (PCHS) 300% 100% 245% 115%  - 0 - - 
PT fares (PTF) - - 77% -50%  - - 100% 25% 
PT fares peak (PTFP) -90% -100% - - -100% -5% -50% - - 
PT fares off-peak (PTFOP) -35% -100% - - -50.5% -15% -50% - - 
Modal Split          
MS (trips) private car 52% 58% 36% 41% 66% 60% 36% 56% 57% 
MS (trips) public transport 48% 22% 32% 2% 18% 28% 46% 44% 14% 
MS (trips) others - 19% 32% 57% 17% 12% 18% - 29% 
Percentage change in car-km -16% -5% -8% -10% -14% -15% -24% -1% -1% 
Cost model output          
BOF [mio. ECU] 492 687 142.4 3.92 21.8 696 183 128 24 
COF [mio. ECU] 492 -313 142.4 3.92 -78 696 -817 128 -976 
ROF [mio. ECU] 492 -313 142.4 3.92 -78 696 -817 128 -976 
DOF [mio. ECU] -457 -1056 -1977 -16.41 # 657 -1765 -690 -973 
HOF [mio. ECU] 490 -1056 -1977 -16.41 N/A 657 -1765 -690 24 
PVF Government sector [mio. ECU] 233 -2120 3903 9.46 -84 5976 -1779 710 88 
PVF Private sector [mio. ECU] N/A         N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0
Value Capture [mio. ECU] 166 574 0 0.30 28 0 233 0 1.2 
- not included, ~ indicates irrelevant around the optimum;  * BOF=COF=ROF 
# no feasible solution with IRR close to 15% 
Table 6: Summary table - best BOF 
 29
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
Measures Edinburgh        M’side Vienna Eisenstadt Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino* Salerno
Infrastructure Investment high (IH) 0 0 0 -  - 0 0 
Infrastructure Investment medium (IM) 1 1 0 -  1 - 0 0 
Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (CAP) 10% 10% -10% -15% 5% 10% 0 10% 0 
PT frequency (PTC) - - 0% -50%  - - 30% 50% 
PT frequency peak (PTCP) 85% 20% - - 25% -15% 0 - - 
PT frequency off-peak (PTCOP) 70% -50% - - 15% 0% -10% - - 
Road pricing (RP) - - 0 0  - - 0 0 
Road pricing peak (RPP) 1.6 1 - - 2 5 0 - - 
Road pricing off-peak (RPOP) 1.6 1 - - 3 5 0 - - 
Parking charges (PCH) - - - - -100% 0% - 100% 300% 
Parking charges long term (PCHL) ~ 0% 0% -50%  - 20% - - 
Parking charges short term (PCHS) 300% 200% 245% 115%  - 0 - - 
PT fares (PTF) - - 77% -50%  - - 100% 50% 
PT fares peak (PTFP) -90% -65% - - -50% -5% -10% - - 
PT fares off-peak (PTFOP) -35% -40% - - +40% -15% -7% - - 
Modal Split          
MS (trips) private car 52% 59% 36% 41% 68% 60% 45% 56% 57% 
MS (trips) public transport 48% 19% 32% 2% 13% 28% 33% 44% 13% 
MS (trips) others - 22% 32% 57% 19% 12% 22% - 30% 
Percentage change in car-km -16% -4% -8%    -10% -11% -15% -7% -1% 0% 
Cost model output          
BOF [mio. ECU] 492 404 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
COF [mio. ECU] 492 404 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
ROF [mio. ECU] 492 404 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
DOF [mio. ECU] -457 -566 -1977 -16.41 # 657 -1959 -690 -975 
HOF [mio. ECU] 490 394 -1977 -16.41 # 657 -1959 -690 24 
PVF Government sector [mio. ECU] 233 32 3903 9.46 9 5976 52 710 129 
PVF Private sector [mio. ECU] N/A        N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0
Value Capture [mio. ECU] 166 147 0 0.30 4 0 1 0 0 
Percentage subsidy for PT balance        34% 65% 
- not included, ~ indicates irrelevant around the optimum, # no feasible solution with IRR close to 15% 
Table 7: Summary table - best COF 
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Measures Edinburgh        M’side Vienna* Eisenstadt* Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino* Salerno
Infrastructure Investment high (IH) 0 0 0 -  - 0 0 
Infrastructure Investment medium (IM) 1 1 0 -  1 - 0 0 
Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (CAP) 10% 10% -10% -15% 5% 10% 0 10% 0 
PT frequency (PTC) - - 0% -50%  - - 30% 50% 
PT frequency peak (PTCP) 85% 20% - - 25% -15% 0 - - 
PT frequency off-peak (PTCOP) 70% -50% - - 15% 0% -10% - - 
Road pricing (RP) - - 0 0  - - 0 0 
Road pricing peak (RPP) 1.6 1 - - 2 5 0 - - 
Road pricing off-peak (RPOP) 1.6 1 - - 3 5 0 - - 
Parking charges (PCH) - - - - -100% 0% - 100% 300% 
Parking charges long term (PCHL) ~ 0 0% -50%  - 20% - - 
Parking charges short term (PCHS) 300% 100% 245% 115%  - 0 - - 
PT fares (PTF) - - 77% -50%  - - 100% 50% 
PT fares peak (PTFP) -90% -75% - - -50% -5% -10% - - 
PT fares off-peak (PTFOP) -35% -40% - - +40% -15% -7% - - 
Modal Split          
MS (trips) private car 52% 59% 36% 41% 68% 60% 45% 56% 57% 
MS (trips) public transport 48% 19% 32% 2% 13% 28% 33% 44% 13% 
MS (trips) others - 22% 32% 57% 19% 12% 22% - 30% 
Percentage change in car-km -16% -4% -8% -10% -11% -15% -7% -1% 0% 
Cost model output          
BOF [mio. ECU] 492 425 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
COF [mio. ECU] 492 -575 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
ROF [mio. ECU] 492 425 142.4 3.92 17 696 46 128 24 
DOF [mio. ECU] -457 -526 -1977 -16.41 # 657 -1959 -690 -975 
HOF [mio. ECU] 490 -526 -1977 -16.41 # 657 -1959 -690 24 
PVF Government sector [mio. ECU] 233 -152 3903 9.46 9 5976 52 710 129 
PVF Private sector [mio. ECU] N/A        N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0
Value Capture [mio. ECU] 166 180 0 0.30 4 0 1 0 0 
Percentage subsidy for PT balance        34% 65% 
- not included, ~ indicates irrelevant around the optimum, # no feasible solution with IRR close to 15% 
Table 8: Summary table - best ROF 
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Measures Edinburgh       M’side Vienna Eisenstadt# Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno
Infrastructure Investment high (IH) 0 0 0   0  0 0 
Infrastructure Investment medium (IM) 1 1 0   1  0 0 
Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (CAP)       10% 10% -9% 5% 10% 10% 0%
PT frequency (PTC) - - 3%   -  30% 50% 
PT frequency peak (PTCP) 50% 10% -  -21% -15%  - - 
PT frequency off-peak (PTCOP) 0% -50% -  0% -30%  - - 
Road pricing (RP) - - 0   -  0 1 
Road pricing peak (RPP) 3.3 1 -  3 5  - - 
Road pricing off-peak (RPOP) 3.2 1 -  3 5  - - 
Parking charges (PCH) - - -  -100% 0%  100% 300% 
Parking charges long term (PCHL) ~ 0 0%   -  - - 
Parking charges short term (PCHS) 300% 100% 250%   -  - - 
PT fares (PTF) - - 4%   -  70% 100% 
PT fares peak (PTFP) -35% -50% -  +1% 20%  - - 
PT fares off-peak (PTFOP) 0% -25% -  +40% 20%  - - 
Modal Split          
MS (trips) private car 53% 60% 35%  69% 62%  56% 56% 
MS (trips) public transport 47% 17% 35%  11% 26%  44% 12% 
MS (trips) others - 22% 30%  20% 13%  - 32% 
Percentage change in car-km -13% -3% -9%  -9% -11%  -1% -2% 
Cost model output          
BOF [mio. ECU] 442 346 111.9  12 683  107 16 
COF [mio. ECU] 442 346 111.9  12 683  107 16 
ROF [mio. ECU] 442 346 111.9  12 683  107 16 
DOF [mio. ECU] 440 337 107.6  12 653  99 14 
HOF [mio. ECU] 440 337 107.2  N/A 653  99 14 
PVF Government sector [mio. ECU] 1864 309 1193  58 6757  313 144 
PVF Private sector [mio. ECU] 29 35 55  19 1176  83 4 
Value Capture [mio. ECU] 0 87 0  - 0  3 0 
- not included, ~ indicates irrelevant around the optimum 
 
Table 9: Summary table - best DOF 
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Measures Edinburgh M’side Vienna Eisenstadt Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno
Infrastructure Investment high (IH) 0 0 0 -  -  0 
Infrastructure Investment medium (IM) 1 1 0 -  1  0 
Increasing/decreasing of road capacity (CAP)      10% 10% -9% -12% 10% 10% 0%
PT frequency (PTC) - - 3% -20%  -  30% 80% 
PT frequency peak (PTCP) 85% 20% - -  -15%  - - 
PT frequency off-peak (PTCOP) 70% -50% - -  -15%  - - 
Road pricing (RP) - - 0 0  -  0 0 
Road pricing peak (RPP) 1.6 1 - -  5  - - 
Road pricing off-peak (RPOP) 1.6 1 - -  5  - - 
Parking charges (PCH) - - - -  0%  100% 300% 
Parking charges long term (PCHL) ~ 0% 0% -56%  -  - - 
Parking charges short term (PCHS) 300% 200% 250% 107%  -  - - 
PT fares (PTF) - - 4% -90%  -  70% 25% 
PT fares peak (PTFP) -90% -65% - -  20%  - - 
PT fares off-peak (PTFOP) -35% -40% - -  20%  - - 
Modal Split          
MS (trips) private car 52% 59% 35% 41%  61%  56% 57% 
MS (trips) public transport 48% 19% 35% 3%  26%  44% 14% 
MS (trips) others - 22% 30% 56%  13%  - 29% 
Percentage change in car-km -16% -4% -9% -9%  -12%  -1% -1% 
Cost model output          
BOF [mio. ECU] 492 404 111.9 3.19  691  107 24 
COF [mio. ECU] 492 404 111.9 3.19  691  107 -976 
ROF [mio. ECU] 492 404 111.9 3.19  691  107 -976 
DOF [mio. ECU] -457 -566 107.6 -16.74  665  99 -973 
HOF [mio. ECU] 490 394 107.2 3.19  658  99 24 
PVF Government sector [mio. ECU] 203 0 1185 0.65  6603  313 82 
PVF Private sector [mio. ECU] 30 32 63 0  1161  83 6 
Value Capture [mio. ECU] 166 147 0 1.12  0  3 1.2 
- not included, ~ indicates irrelevant around the optimum 
Table 10: Summary table - best HOF 
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5.3 Comments on results 
5.3.1 Regulated regimes 
In general, due to the way that the objective functions are constructed, the following 
relationships must always apply to optimal values of each function (optima denoted 
by an asterisk): 
 
(5.1) BOF* ≥ ROF* ≥ COF* 
 
It is useful to distinguish classes of city according to whether equalities or inequalities 
apply in (5.1).  These city classes correspond to those set out in Section 2.2 of Part 1 
of this report: 
 
Class 1: Cities where BOF optimal strategies are supportive of both car and public 
transport users, so that the city must provide finance, and where there is significant 
possibility for value capture in COF optimal strategies.  These give: 
 
(5.2) BOF*   >    ROF*  >   COF*   ⇒ PVF(BOF*)<0, and VC(COF*) > 0 
 
Class 1 includes only Merseyside. 
 
Class 2: Cities where BOF optimal strategies are supportive of both car and public 
transport users, so that the city must provide finance, but where there is no significant 
possibility for value capture in COF optimal strategies.  These give: 
 
(5.3) BOF* >  ROF*  = COF* ⇒ PVF(BOF*)<0   and VC(COF*)=0 
 
As in Class 1, the PVF for the BOF optimum BOF* is negative, but the value capture 
at COF* is zero, implying no or negative user benefits. Any positive value capture 
element would make it possible for ROF* to improve upon the COF* solution, 
moving towards the optimum BOF* solution with a negative PVF but not breaking 
the ROF constraint of PVF+VC>0.  Helsinki and Tromsø are included in Class 2 
since their value capture elements under COF* were very small (i.e. approximately 
zero). 
  
Class 3: Cities where BOF optimal strategies place financial restrictions on cars but 
are supportive of public transport users, so that the former are subsidising the latter.  
In this case the city is unlikely to make either a large surplus or deficit.  For these: 
 
(5.4) BOF* = ROF* =  COF* and PVF(BOF*)>0 (but small surplus only) 
 
Class 3 includes Edinburgh, Eisenstadt and Torino and applies if PVF is positive for 
the BOF-optimum BOF*. 
 
According to the standard FATIMA definition of COF, Salerno is also a Class 3 city 
as the PVF for BOF* is positive.  However, due to the Italian rules on subsidy (the 
subsidy cannot exceed 65% of the public transport operating costs) there is a special 
COFIT defined, and COFIT * < BOF*. 
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Class 4: Cities wherre BOF optimal strategies place restrictions on both cars and 
motorised public transport, and the city raises revenues from both user types through 
road user charges and increased public transport fares.  For these: 
 
 (5.5) BOF* = ROF* =  COF* and PVF(BOF*)>0  (large surplus) 
 
Class 4 includes Vienna and Oslo. 
 
5.3.2 Deregulated regimes 
 
For deregulated regimes (see Section 2) the following must apply given optimal 
solutions which have a return of 15% for the public transport sector for DOF* and 
HOF*:- 
 
(5.6) DOF*  ≤  HOF*  <  BOF*  
 
this condition applies to all cities in the FATIMA project (except Eisenstadt and 
Helsinki which have no solutions for DOF*). 
 
A further condition which also holds under the FATIMA assumptions for optimal 
solutions is that :- 
 
(5.7) DOF*  ≤  HOF*  <  COF* ≤ ROF* ≤ BOF* 
 
which implies that under the FATIMA modelling assumptions there are no social 
benefits of deregulation in any case study city1.  The only benefits modelled in this 
project come from finance made available from value capture in the case of Class 1 
cities where ROF* > COF* and, more generally, from the reduction in public sector 
financial costs.   
 
There are also other benefits which may arise, as described by Minken (1998), but 
which have not been modelled.  These include: 
 
• changes in efficiency (i.e. through reduced operating costs, see sensitivity tests) 
• attitudes towards risk in raising finance 
• payment of interest on loans  
• non-uniform changes to PT services across routes 
• quality of service (which could rise or fall). 
 
5.4 Comparison of policies by city and objective function 
Table 11 summarises the policy measures for each city by objective function in terms 
of strength and direction/sign of change for each measure.  (N.B. where a measure 
was modelled as all-day, it was recorded with the peak measures.)  This table allows a 
comparison in general terms of measures across cities for each function and across 
 
1 with the possible exceptions of Torino and Salerno where extra money is available for the HOF 
regime to finance large infrastructure projects. 
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functions for each city.  The following sections take each city in turn and make 
observations about the changes in measures due to  each function. 
 
5.4.1 Edinburgh 
 
The BOF policy is to increase capacity, increase frequencies all day, reduce fares in 
the peak with a lower reduction in the off-peak, implement road pricing at 1.6 ECU 
all day, increase parking charges (short) by 300% and to implement the medium level 
of infrastructure (guided bus). 
 
Edinburgh is a Class 3 city as defined above and so BOF*=ROF*=COF* and for 
Edinburgh the HOF* solution has the same set of measures for its optimum.  The only 
changes are for DOF* which has no increases in frequencies in the off-peak and less 
of an increase in the peak, lower fare reductions in the peak and no reductions in fare 
in the off-peak.  Also for the DOF* solution the road pricing charge is doubled to 
around 3.2 ECU, this is required to produce the mode switch from car to public 
transport to ensure a return of 15%. 
 
The DOF* solution is 11% worse in terms of social objectives (as measured by BOF) 
than BOF*. 
 
5.4.2 Merseyside 
 
The BOF* solution is to increase capacity, increase peak frequency, decrease off-peak 
frequency, provide free fares all day, no road pricing, reduce long stay parking 
charges whilst increasing short stay charges and to implement the medium level of 
infrastructure (SMART Bus). 
 
The ROF* policy lies between the BOF* and COF* policies, although it is closer to 
the latter.  The two differences between ROF* and COF* are:  ROF* has a larger 
decrease in peak fares and a smaller increase in short-stay parking charges. 
 
DOF* is similar to COF* but has lower increases in peak frequencies, smaller fare 
reductions and with smaller increases in parking charges. 
 
In terms of the social objective function (BOF), ROF* is 40% lower than BOF* (the 
PVF of ROF* is -152 MECU, which is clearly much more acceptable than the -2120 
MECU of BOF*).  The BOF-value of COF* (which has, by definition, a positive 
PVF) is 5% lower than that for ROF*.  Since the COF* set of measures led also to 
HOF*, the latter is also 5% lower than ROF* (in terms of BOF), whilst DOF* is 19% 
lower than ROF*. 
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5.4.3 Vienna 
 
The BOF* solution for Vienna is to reduce capacity, increase short stay parking 
charges, no change in long stay parking charges, with no changes to public transport 
frequencies, but with an increase in fares of 77%. 
 
This increase in fares gives a high public PVF and is generated by the shadow price 
effect on revenue generation.  The 77% fares increase has obviously reduced the need 
for subsidy to public transport and generated a high PVF. Sensitivity tests were 
conducted for the value of shadow price in Vienna and decreases in fares were found 
for a shadow price of zero. 
 
Vienna is a Class 3 city and so BOF*=ROF*=COF*. 
 
The DOF* solution is similar to BOF* but includes small increases in frequencies 
with much smaller increases in fares as the private sector is limited to a 15% return. 
 
The HOF* solution is identical to DOF* for Vienna  in terms of measures and the 
subsidy is used to increase the private sector return from 14% under DOF* to 15% 
under HOF*.  No improvements in services are implemented with subsidy as the 
value of revenue generation outweighs the benefits to users of improved services.  
This effect is due to the shadow price of 0.25 as discussed for BOF*. 
 
The DOF* solution is 24% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF*. 
5.4.4 Eisenstadt 
 
The BOF* solution for Eisenstadt is to reduce capacity as in Vienna, reduce 
frequencies and fares, reduce long stay parking charges whilst increasing short stay 
charges. 
 
For Eisenstadt BOF*=COF*=ROF*.  HOF* is similar but has a lower reduction in 
capacity, smaller reductions in frequencies, greater fare reductions and greater 
reductions in parking charges for long stay. Eisenstadt is a special case and has no 
feasible DOF* solution. 
 
The HOF* solution is 19% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF*. 
5.4.5 Tromsø 
 
The BOF* solution for Tromsø is to increase road capacity, increase peak frequencies 
(with no change to off-peak), introduce free fares in the peak and halve the fares in 
the off-peak with road pricing of 2 ecu in the peak and 1.6 ecu in the off-peak 
substituting for the free parking.   This BOF* solution yielded a negative PVF. 
 
For Tromsø COF*=ROF* as there was only a small element of value capture under 
COF* and no improvements were possible by further expenditure.  This seems to be 
contrary to the BOF* solution and given time other runs may have been able to 
improve upon ROF*.  The COF* solution has smaller decreases in peak fares and 
increases in off-peak fares coupled with smaller increases in peak frequencies and 
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increases in the off-peak frequency.  The road pricing charges for peak and off-peak 
have also increased and the capacity increase is lower than for BOF*. 
 
The DOF* solution is based upon COF* but has no fare reductions and frequency 
decreases in the peak rather than increases.  The road pricing charges have increased 
in the peak to give a charge of 3 ecu all day under DOF*. There is no HOF* for 
Tromsø.  
 
The DOF* solution is 45% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF* which was 
financially infeasible but only 29% worse than COF*. 
5.4.6 Oslo 
 
The BOF* solution is to increase capacity and reduce peak frequencies and fares 
slightly, with a greater fare reduction in the off-peak than in the peak.  It features  
road pricing at the maximum level of 5 ECU all day (as explained below, using 
variable demand in the optimisation process later showed that 3 ECU would have 
been a better value,).  There is no change to parking charges and medium 
infrastructure is implemented. Overall there are no user benefits in Oslo under BOF* 
due to the high road pricing charges which are used primarily to give benefits from 
reduced veh-km and hence increased SOF values rather than from the removal of 
congestion which could have been achieved with lower charges.  The high charges 
also yield a highly positive PVF. 
 
Oslo is a Class 3 city and so BOF*=ROF*=COF*. 
 
The DOF* solution has further decreases in off-peak frequencies, increases rather 
than decreases in the peak and off-peak fares and has medium infrastructure as in 
BOF*.  
 
HOF* is similar to DOF* but has lower reductions in off-peak frequency due to the 
subsidy option. 
 
The DOF* solution is only 6% worse than BOF* in terms of social objectives. 
 
5.4.7 Helsinki 
 
The BOF* solution for Helsinki increases public transport frequencies in both peak 
and off-peak and reduces fares by 50% in the peak and off-peak (which is the lower 
limit for Helsinki due to modelling constraints).  Parking charges are not changed.  
No capacity changes, road pricing or infrastructure measures are implemented.  This 
set of measures yields a highly negative PVF. 
 
The COF* solution is to reduce frequencies in the off-peak and to reduce fares 
slightly in the peak and off-peak.  There is a modest increase in long stay parking 
charges but no changes to all other measures. 
 
For Helsinki COF*=ROF* as under COF* there is only a very small value capture 
element.  The COF* solution is 75% worse in terms of social objectives than the 
financially infeasible BOF* solution. 
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DOF* and HOF* were not calculated for Helsinki because no correct and sensible 
capital cost was available.  
 
However, it is very unlikely that the public transport could make a much better profit 
under the DOF* or HOF* regimes, because: 
 
• the present subsidised fares are too low to cover the cost of any viable solution 
(this rules out investing in increased frequency)  
• the model is quite sensitive to cost changes: because there is so little congestion in 
Helsinki, considerably increased fares would cause mode change from PT to car. 
(This would lead to a penalty from increased fuel consumption) 
• using road pricing or parking charges to increase car costs to  encourage a switch 
to public transport system would be unsuccessful because, according to the model, 
users would either change mode (if feasible) or change destination to zones where 
car costs are less or zero. (Parking charges are implemented only in the inner city, 
where the public transport is always very good, and in a few suburban centres).  
• if, due to mode change from car to PT, extra capacity is needed, the problem of 
operating costs versus fare revenue again arises.   
5.4.8 Torino 
 
The BOF* solution for Torino features a strong increase of both road capacity and 
public transport frequency, no change in public transport infrastructure, no presence 
of road pricing and the highest possible increase of both public transport fares and 
parking charges (100% in both the cases). These changes yield a highly positive PVF. 
 
Because of the positive PVF and the absence of the subsidy penalty  BOF* = COF* = 
ROF* for Torino. 
 
The HOF* solution is identical to DOF* as the IRR=15% for DOF* and 
improvements in service are outweighed by revenue losses when multiplied by the 
shadow price.  The solution is quite similar to the BOF* solution.  It consists of an 
improvement of both the public and private supply (increase of the private capacity of 
10% and increase of the public transport frequency of about 30%) coupled with an 
increase of public transport fare by 70% and of the parking charge by 100%.  The 
fares increase is limited to reduce the rate of return of the public transport sector to 
15%. 
 
The DOF*=HOF* solution is 16.5% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF* 
(=COF*=ROF*). 
5.4.9 Salerno 
 
The BOF* solution for Salerno is also the HOF* solution. It consists of no changes in 
road capacity, large increases in frequency (+80%) with 25% increases in fares, no 
road pricing but a 300% increase in parking charges and no infrastructure.  The 
increased revenue yields a positive PVF. 
 
For Salerno although the BOF* solution resulted in a highly positive PVF the COF* 
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penalty on the subsidy allowed to the public transport sector (subsidy should be less 
than 65% of operating costs) was invoked and thus the BOF* public transport 
measures were not optimal for COF*. 
 
Thus the COF* solution has slightly lower increases in frequency with 50% increases 
in fares and all other measures as for BOF*.  AS BOF has a positive PVF, Salerno 
belongs to the special case of Class 3 cities in which COF*=ROF*. 
 
The HOF* solution has the same set of measures as the BOF* solution as the 
constraint on subsidy to the public transport sector is not binding and the measures are 
self-financing. 
 
The DOF* includes increases in frequencies of 50% with fares increased by 100%.  It 
also introduces all day road pricing of 1 ECU and increase parking charges of 300%.  
It should be noted that the DOF* given here has an internal rate of  return of 16%. 
 
The DOF* solution is 42% worse than BOF* (and HOF*) in terms of social benefit.  
The COF* solution is 2% worse than BOF* in terms of social objectives. 
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City Funct
ion 
Cap Freq 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
Freq 
(off-
peak) 
Fares 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
Fares 
(off-
peak) 
RP 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
RP 
(off-
peak) 
PCH 
Long/ 
all day 
 
PCH 
Short 
INF 
 
Ed BOF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
 ROF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
 COF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
 DOF ++++
+ 
++ 0 -- 0 ++ ++ +++++ +++++ M 
 HOF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
Mer BOF ++++
+ 
+++ --- ----- ----- 0 0 ----- ++ M 
 ROF ++++
+ 
++ ----- ---- -- + + 0 ++ M 
 COF ++++
+ 
++ ----- --- -- + + 0 +++ M 
 DOF ++++
+ 
+ ----- -- - + + 0 ++ M 
 HOF ++++
+ 
++ ----- --- -- + + 0 +++ M 
Vien BOF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
 ROF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
 COF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
 DOF --- +  +  0  0 ++++ 0 
 HOF --- +  +  0  0 ++++ 0 
Eise BOF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
 ROF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
 COF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
 DOF NS NS  NS  NS  NS NS  
 HOF --- --  ----  0  --- ++  
Trom BOF ++++
+ 
++ 0 ----- --- +++ ++ -----   
 ROF ++ + + --- ++ ++ +++ -----   
 COF ++ + + --- ++ ++ +++ -----   
 DOF ++ -- 0 0 ++ +++ +++ -----   
  HOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS   
Oslo BOF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
 ROF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
 COF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
 DOF ++++
+ 
- -- + + +++++ +++++ 0  M 
 HOF ++++
+ 
- - + + +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Hels BOF 0 ++ + --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 
 ROF 0 0 - - - 0 0 + 0 0 
 COF 0 0 - - - 0 0 + 0 0 
 DOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
 HOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Torin BOF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
 ROF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
 COF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
 DOF ++++ ++  ++++  0  ++  0 
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+ 
 HOF ++++
+ 
++  ++++  0  ++  0 
Saler BOF 0 +++  +  0  +++++  0 
 ROF 0 ++  +++  0  +++++  0 
 COF 0 ++  +++  0  +++++  0 
 DOF 0 ++  +++++  +  +++++  0 
 HOF 0 +++  +  0  +++++  0 
Table 11 : Summary of policies by city and objective function 
+ indicates increase, - decrease, 0 no change, M medium, shaded= not modelled, NS=no solution 
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5.5 Comparison across cities by function 
This section compares the policy measures across cities by each objective function in 
turn, aided by Table 12. 
5.5.1 BOF* solutions 
Class 1 cities include only Merseyside and have a negative PVF for the optimum 
BOF* solution.  The characteristics of the optimal policies are to provide large 
decreases in fares (-100% for Merseyside) with improvements in frequency in the 
peak (though not in the off-peak for Merseyside) and improvements via the 
introduction of some form of infrastructure.  In other words the public transport 
system gives large user benefits.  The private car measures are generally favourable to 
the car user with increases in capacity, decreases in long stay parking charges and no 
road pricing.  However the short stay parking charge is increased in Merseyside. 
 
Overall Class 1 cities are dominated by user benefits at the expense of revenue 
generation.  The user benefits outweigh the revenue losses even when factored by the 
shadow price λ. 
 
Class 2 cities include Tromsø and Helsinki.  Here the BOF* solution has a negative 
PVF and the user benefits once again outweigh any revenue losses even when 
factored by the shadow price.  The frequencies are increased and fares reduced for 
public transport with neutral measures for the private car user.  Tromsø can introduce 
road pricing whilst increasing the BOF* value. 
 
Class 3 cities include Edinburgh,  Eisenstadt and Torino and Salerno, and produce a 
small positive PVF for the optimum BOF* solution.  Revenue generation is balanced 
against user benefits with the exception of Torino, where user benefits are negative 
and revenue generating measures dominate the solution; thus Torino generates 
revenue through increased fares at the expense of the users, the solution probably 
being dictated by the shadow price λ.  Those cities which provide user benefits do so 
through overall improvements in the public transport system and balance these with 
revenue generating measures for private car such as road pricing or parking charges.  
Those cities which reduce user benefits overall and instead generate revenue do so 
through a high road pricing charge or a combination of high fares and high parking 
charges. 
 
Eisenstadt is a special case as only 2% of trips are made by public transport.  In 
general the public transport systems make a loss compared to the do-minimum, with 
the exception of Eisenstadt, which implies that revenue loss from changes to the 
system are out-weighed by user benefits for loss making systems. 
 
For the private car however the measures are designed to increase revenue where 
possible (with the exception of increases in road capacity). Edinburgh can introduce 
road pricing whilst increasing the BOF* value.  All cities increase short stay parking 
charges where this option is modelled.  The long stay/all day parking charges have no 
pattern, but it is interesting to note that some cities reduce long stay parking charges 
whilst increasing short stay parking charges which merits further investigation. 
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The capacity measure favours the car for most cities but is decreased in Eisenstadt.  
This difference is due to the benefits of reduced delay to pedestrians in the Eisenstadt 
model as road capacity is reduced. 
 
Class 4 cities include Vienna and Oslo and produce a large positive PVF for the 
BOF* solution.  User benefits are negative and revenue generation dominates the 
strategy.  These cities thus raise revenues from both public transport (higher fares, 
with no frequency increases) and private transport (road pricing and/or parking 
charges) user charges.   Oslo provides no user benefits and sets road pricing to the 
maximum of 5 ECU.  Like the Class 2 city Tromsø, Oslo can introduce road pricing 
whilst still increasing the BOF* value. Vienna generates revenue through increased 
fares at the expense of the users, with (like Torino) the solution probably being 
dictated by the shadow price λ. 
5.5.2 ROF* and COF* solutions 
For Class 1 cities such as Merseyside the ROF* solution is similar to the BOF* 
solution with revenue losses reduced by smaller reductions in fares, smaller increases 
in frequency, no decreases in parking charges and the introduction of revenue 
generation by road pricing.  For ROF* a balance is required between user benefits 
which determines the value capture which in turn determines the amount of revenue 
which can be lost in providing the user benefits. 
 
The COF* solution is an extension of the ROF* solution requiring a positive PVF.  
Hence revenue loss making measures are restricted further while revenue generation 
is increased slightly in the form of short stay parking charges. 
 
For Class 2 cities the COF*=ROF* and is a restricted version of BOF* which trades 
user benefits for revenue generation to such an extent that user benefits are now 
negative or near zero compared to positive user benefits under BOF*. 
 
For Class 3 and 4 cities the ROF* and COF* solutions are equal to the BOF* solution 
as the PVF is positive.  Salerno is a special case of Class 3 cities where the 
COF*=ROF* solution is a restricted version of BOF* not because of the PVF but 
because of the special penalty on subsidies implemented for Italian cities.  Thus the 
frequency is reduced and fares increased compared to BOF*. 
5.5.3 HOF* solutions 
The HOF* optimum measures for all cities lie between the COF* and DOF* optimum 
set of measures (with the exception of Salerno where HOF*=BOF* set of measures as 
the subsidy penalty is invoked for these measures under COF*).  The use of the 
subsidy falls into two categories as follows :- 
(a)  Loss making public transport systems under COF* optimum  
Edinburgh, Merseyside, Oslo and Salerno have loss making public transport systems 
under the COF* optimum and so the subsidy is used primarily to increase the rate of 
return to 15%.  For Edinburgh and Merseyside the PVF available is sufficient to 
subsidise the same set of measures for HOF* as were used for COF*.  For Salerno the 
subsidy is used freely to subsidise the same set of measures as BOF* which for 
Salerno is greater than COF*.  In Oslo the solution moves from the COF* set of 
measures towards the DOF* set with increases in fares and reductions in frequency 
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applied in the off-peak.  The subsidy is used to prevent even further frequency 
reductions as under DOF* and is therefore subsidising an otherwise loss making 
system. 
 (b)  Profit making public transport systems under COF* optimum 
Vienna and Eisenstadt have profit making public transport systems under the COF* 
optimum and so the subsidy could be used to improve the system compared to the 
COF* measures with lower fares and increased frequencies whilst maintaining the 
15% return to operators as in Eisenstadt. 
Vienna and Torino are special cases where the measures for HOF*=DOF* and no use 
of subsidy to improve the system gives overall benefits as the user benefits do not 
outweigh the loss in revenue when factored by the shadow price λ. The subsidy is 
used to raise the IRR under DOF* from 14% to 15% for Vienna whilst no subsidy is 
used in Torino as the IRR is already 16% under DOF*.  
There were no HOF* solutions for Tromsø and Helsinki. 
5.5.4 DOF* solutions 
There is no DOF* solution for Eisenstadt as there is only a small public transport 
system with only 2% of the trips.  Theoretically there may be a solution but the 
resolution of the modelling does not allow the solution to be found i.e. the IRR is 
ultra-sensitive to changes in measures. 
 
There is no DOF* solution available for Helsinki as explained in Section 5.4.7. 
 
For other cities the optimum DOF* solutions are based upon the HOF* or COF* 
optima with restrictions in changes to frequencies and fare reductions.  In Edinburgh 
and Merseyside the fare reductions and frequency increases remain but at lower 
levels, also in Edinburgh the road pricing charge is doubled to create the demand 
necessary for the return of 15%. 
 
In Oslo further frequency reductions are made in the off-peak period compared to 
HOF*. 
 
In Vienna however the frequencies are increased compared to COF* and this is paid 
for by the modest fare increases.  These fare increases are lower than in COF* as they 
are limited to give a 15% return, whereas under COF* this is not the case and the 
shadow price on revenue generation induces high fare increases. 
 
In Salerno the frequencies are the same as for COF* but high fares are used to pay for 
these increase. Salerno introduces road pricing as a key element in DOF* to induce 
the mode switch given the 100% increase in fares.  
 
In Torino the frequencies are the same as for COF* but the public transport fare 
increase is limited to +70% which yields user benefits overall.  
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City Funct
ion 
Cap Freq 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
Freq 
(off-
peak) 
Fares 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
Fares 
(off-
peak) 
RP 
(Peak/ 
all day) 
RP 
(off-
peak) 
PCH 
Long/ 
all day 
 
PCH 
Short 
INF 
 
Ed BOF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
Eise BOF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
Hels BOF 0 ++ + --- --- 0 0 0 0 0 
Mer BOF ++++
+ 
+++ --- ----- ----- 0 0 ----- ++ M 
Oslo BOF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Saler BOF 0 +++  +  0  +++++  0 
Torin BOF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
Trom BOF ++++
+ 
++ 0 ----- --- +++ ++ -----   
Vien BOF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
Ed ROF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
Eise ROF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
Hels ROF 0 0 - - - 0 0 + 0 0 
Mer ROF ++++
+ 
++ ----- ---- -- + + 0 ++ M 
Oslo ROF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Saler ROF 0 ++  +++  0  +++++  0 
Torin ROF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
Trom ROF ++ + + --- ++ ++ +++ -----   
Vien ROF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
Ed COF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
Eise COF ---- -----  --  0  -- ++  
Hels COF 0 0 - - - 0 0 + 0 0 
Mer COF ++++
+ 
++ ----- --- -- + + 0 +++ M 
Oslo COF ++++
+ 
- 0 - -- +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Saler COF 0 ++  +++  0  +++++  0 
Torin COF ++++
+ 
++  +++++  0  ++  0 
Trom COF ++ + + --- ++ ++ +++ -----   
Vien COF --- 0  ++++  0  0 ++++ 0 
Ed HOF ++++
+ 
++++ +++ ---- -- + + +++++ +++++ M 
Eise HOF --- --  ----  0  --- ++  
Hels HOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Mer HOF ++++
+ 
++ ----- --- -- + + 0 +++ M 
Oslo HOF ++++
+ 
- - + + +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Saler HOF 0 +++  +  0  +++++  0 
Torin HOF ++++
+ 
++  ++++  0  ++  0 
Trom HOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS   
Vien HOF --- +  +  0  0 ++++ 0 
Ed DOF ++++
+ 
++ 0 -- 0 ++ ++ +++++ +++++ M 
Eise DOF NS NS  NS  NS  NS NS  
Hels DOF NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
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Mer DOF ++++
+ 
+ ----- -- - + + 0 ++ M 
Oslo DOF ++++
+ 
- -- + + +++++ +++++ 0  M 
Saler DOF 0 ++  +++++  +  +++++  0 
Torin DOF ++++
+ 
++  ++++  0  ++  0 
   
Trom 
DOF ++ -- 0 0 ++ +++ +++ -----   
Vien DOF --- +  +  0  0 ++++ 0 
Table 12 : Summary of policies by city and objective function 
+ indicates increase, - decrease, 0 no change, M medium, shaded= not modelled, NS=no solution  
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5.5.5  Other feasible DOF solutions 
Some of the cities had the opportunity to identify other feasible DOF solutions i.e. 
where the IRR = 15% for the private sector operation of public transport.  Following 
Webster et al (1980), it would be expected that there would be a large number of 
combinations of fare and frequency  that would be feasible: these combinations would 
vary depending upon other measures (such as road pricing) being implemented.  
Some general solutions arising from the FATIMA case studies were as follows :- 
 
• there is usually a feasible solution which has small increases in fares from the do-
minimum (with small increases in frequency) (Vienna) 
• large fare increases with large increases in frequency (with or without new 
infrastructure) (Edinburgh, Merseyside) 
• fare decreases with a decrease in frequency (Vienna) 
• for fare decreases and frequency increases (with or without new medium 
infrastructure) other measures such as road pricing or parking charges must be 
used to increase car costs and so create the demand necessary for the public 
transport system to give a return of 15% (Edinburgh, Merseyside) 
• for frequency increases and new high infrastructure fares must be increased along 
with other measures such as road pricing or parking charges which must be used 
to increase car costs and so create the demand necessary for the public transport 
system to give a return of 15% (Edinburgh) 
 
In theory there are a vast number of solutions for different combinations of measures 
which will satisfy the IRR=15% condition.  In all cities (except Eisenstadt and 
Helsinki) the regression method with sensitivity tests was able to find the optimum 
DOF solution.  The optimum DOF* solution used other measures to create the 
demand for an otherwise loss making public transport system.  In other words the 
optimum system was to invest in public transport and in some cases to reduce fares 
slightly but to have other “stick” measures to ensure a 15% return. 
 
However in some cases it was thought that the optimum DOF solution was not 
necessarily the most likely DOF solution to be implemented.  One such case is that of  
Oslo where the optimum DOF solution was to provide the rail based infrastructure as 
this provided the best system in terms of social benefits.  However it was shown that 
to provide this infrastructure the fares had to be increased  and a sensitivity test 
showed that the provision of infrastructure was unprofitable for the private operator.  
Another feasible solution existed where no infrastructure was implemented with fare 
decreases which was thought to be more feasible. 
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5.6 Financial Implications of Value Capture and PVF 
5.6.1 General 
 
Firstly there is no value capture under any regime for Vienna and Oslo.  For Vienna 
this is due to the shadow price on public funds effectively out-weighing user benefits 
whilst for Oslo the high road pricing charges are used to reduce fuel consumption and 
hence reduce external costs in EEFP and increase the fuel benefit in SOF at the 
expense of user benefits.  For other cities it can be seen from tables 6-10 that the 
value capture is highest for the BOF* solution with the exception of Eisenstadt where 
it is highest for HOF*.  The value capture is always lowest for the DOF* solution and 
only Merseyside has a positive value capture element under DOF* which implies 
negative user benefits for all other cities. 
 
Coupled with this is the fact that, for all cities except Vienna, the PVF for the 
Government sector is always lowest for the BOF* solution and greatest for the DOF* 
solution (where one exists).  Hence from a Government sector financial point of view 
the DOF* solution becomes the most attractive and in all cases provides substantial 
revenue which could be spent elsewhere.  At first sight this seems like a tax on travel 
without consideration of the user, however the DOF* solutions imply reductions in 
the COF* values of only 11% (Edinburgh), 17% (Merseyside), 6% (Oslo), 29% 
(Tromsø) and 42% (Salerno).  This coupled with benefits from revenue spent 
elsewhere could form a basis for accepting the DOF* solution in these cities.  The 
shadow price λ models the value of revenue in taxation terms but it does not include 
benefits of spending that revenue elsewhere. 
 
Vienna is a notable exception to this rule and the PVF under BOF* is higher than 
under  DOF*.  This is due to the shadow price effect under BOF* encouraging 
revenue generation from increased fares which under DOF* is limited to a return of 
15% which in any case is not factored by the shadow price. 
5.6.2 Availability of finance in year zero 
 
In the FATIMA models the budget restrictions have been for the 30 year period with 
no limits on initial expenditure.  One of the key reasons stated for involving private 
finance is due to the lack of capital in year zero.  The following table shows the initial 
year zero investment for the Government sector and the Private sector investment 
under COF*, DOF* and HOF* solutions for each city.  BOF* is implicitly included 
for Class 3 cities where BOF*=COF*, however COF* was thought to be more 
representative of a realistic strategy for Class 1 and Class 2 cities. 
Note that under DOF* and HOF* the Government sector only pays for capacity and 
road pricing in year 0.  Table 13 shows that if year zero capital restrictions were 
applied to COF at certain city specific levels e.g. 20 million in Edinburgh, 60 million 
in Merseyside, 100 million in Oslo, 17 million in Vienna, 3 million in Eisenstadt, 2 
million in Salerno, and 50 million in Torino then a good case for using either HOF* 
or DOF* solutions may exist.  Add this to the earlier point that Government sector 
PVF under DOF* is higher than under COF* optima for all cities where DOF* 
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solution is calculated and a strong case for DOF* may exist. 
 COF* year 0 capital 
(Million Ecu) 
DOF* year 0 capital 
(Million Ecu) 
HOF* year 0 capital 
(Million Ecu) 
City Government Private Government Private Government Private
Edinburgh 59.6 0 17.5 39.3 17.5 42.1 
Merseyside 124.5 0 58.75 56.25 58.75 65.75 
Vienna 20 0 16 90 16 90 
Oslo 265 0 92.6 172 92.6 172 
Eisenstadt 4.08 0 N/A N/A 2.66 -0.03 
Tromsø N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Helsinki 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Salerno 5 0 1 5 5.5 2.5 
Torino 145 0 48 97 48 97 
Table 13 : Year Zero Capital for each city by function. 
5.7 Changes in car-km by function 
Table 14 shows the percentage changes in car-km for each function (taken from tables 
6-10).  This indicator shows how the functions perform with respect to reducing fuel 
consumption by car and therefore also how they perform with respect to reducing 
external costs (assuming that a majority of external cost reductions are brought about 
by reductions in car-km). 
 
Function Edinburgh Mersey-
side 
Vienna Eisenstadt Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno 
BOF* -16 -5.3 -8.3 -9.6 -14.4 -15 -24 -1 -1 
ROF* -16 -4.4 -8.3 -9.6 -10.5 -15 -7 -1 +0 
COF* -16 -4.2 -8.3 -9.6 -10.5 -15 -7 -1 +0 
HOF* -16 -4.2 -9.2 -8.6 # -12 # -1 -1 
DOF* -13 -2.9 -9.2 # -8.8 -11 # -1 -2 
# no feasible solution with IRR close to 15% 
 
Table 14: Percentage changes in car-km by function. 
 
The greatest reductions in car-km are under BOF* with the exception of Vienna 
(where DOF* includes increases in frequency relative to BOF* and a slightly lower 
reduction in road capacity) and Salerno where DOF* introduces a road pricing charge. 
 
Of note are the relatively small changes in car-km in Torino and Salerno, in Salerno 
there are no significant changes in car-km under ROF* and COF*. 
 
For Helsinki there is a much larger change for BOF* than for COF*=ROF*.  This is 
due to a combination of reduced fares and increased frequency both in the peak and 
off-peak which proves financially infeasible for BOF*.  The restricted measures under 
COF* provide a much smaller reduction in car-km. 
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6. OPTIMA : EEF AND SOF OPTIMA 
6.1 Changes between OPTIMA and FATIMA 
All cities performed a re-run of the OPTIMA project optimum strategies for EEF and 
SOF regardless of the input ranges for variables.  In this way a direct link between the 
OPTIMA strategies and the FATIMA strategies is provided and the BOF value is 
evaluated for the OPTIMA measures.   
 
A number of significant changes were made during the course of FATIMA partly in 
response to the city authorities’ comments on the OPTIMA results and partly due to 
the objectives of FATIMA. 
 
These changes include : 
 
• the introduction of external costs into EEFP 
• the application of the shadow price to positive and negative PVF  
• weighted sum of EEFP and SOF used for BOF 
• changes made to costs of measures 
• reducing the range of valid  input measures  
• the introduction of time of day measures by peak and off-peak in some cities 
• changes to values of time 
• changes in some transport models 
 
The re-runs of the OPTIMA strategies produced BOF values which were in all cases 
lower than the new FATIMA optimum BOF combination or which were no longer 
valid input measures.  The differences in the two sets of measures could be attributed 
to one or more of the above list of changes made in the modelling approach. 
 
Table 15a shows the optimal EEF and SOF measures from OPTIMA, whilst Table 
15b shows the values of BOF for these optima.  The tables also give information 
about BOF* for comparison.  The text following these tables gives general details 
about the changes from OPTIMA to FATIMA, on a city-by-city basis. 
 
A summary description of OPTIMA is provided at Annex 3. 
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City Function Infra 
structure 
Road 
Cap 
% 
PT 
Freq 
% 
PT 
Fare 
% 
Road 
Price 
ecu 
Park 
Charge 
% 
 
Edinburgh EEF M +20 +85 -60 1.6 - 
Edinburgh SOF H +20 +100 -100 2.8 - 
Edinburgh BOF M +10 +85 
+70* 
-90 
-35* 
1.6 
1.6* 
+300L 
+300S 
Eisenstadt EEF - +10 +100 -100 0 +149 
Eisenstadt SOF - +10 +100 -100 0 +149 
Eisenstadt BOF - -15 -50 -50 0 -50L 
+115S 
Helsinki EEF - +10 -30 +25 0 0 
Helsinki SOF - 0 0 -100 0 +92 
Helsinki BOF - 0 25 
13* 
-50 
-50* 
0 
0* 
0L 
0S 
Merseyside EEF M +5 +60 -100 0 -100 
Merseyside SOF M +20 +59 -100 0 -100 
Merseyside BOF M +10 +50 
-40* 
-100 
-100* 
0 
0* 
-100L 
+100S 
Oslo EEF - +20 -26 -70 1.2 -100 
Oslo SOF H +20 -20 -100 7.0 -100 
Oslo BOF M +10 -15 
0* 
-5 
-15* 
5 
5* 
0 
 
Salerno EEF - +10 +50 -50 1.0 -50 
Salerno SOF H +10 +50 -100 2.0 -100 
Salerno BOF - 0 +80 25 0 +300 
 
Torino EEF - +10 0 -25 0 +500 
Torino SOF H +10 -30 -50 0 +500 
Torino BOF - +10 +30 +100 0 +100 
 
Tromsø EEF - +20 -35 -50 0 0 
Tromsø SOF - +20 -28 -100 2.5 -100 
Tromsø BOF - +10 +46 
0* 
-100 
-50* 
2 
1.6* 
-100 
 
Vienna EEF - +10 +100 +31 0 +226 
Vienna SOF H +1 +100 +1 0 +250 
Vienna BOF - -10 0 +77 0 0L 
+245S 
*= off-peak L=Long Stay S=Short Stay  
Table 15a: Optimal EEF and SOF measures from OPTIMA 
 
 
Function Edinburgh Mersey-
side 
Vienna Eisenstadt Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Salerno 
BOF* 492 687 142 3.9 22 696 183 128 24 
OPTIMA 
EEF 
optimum 
458 651 -875 -7.0 19 271 -969 91 15 
OPTIMA 
SOF 
optimum 
412 736 -1195 -7.0 13 541 -62 -271 12 
Table 15b    BOF-values of OPTIMA EEF and SOF optima 
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6.2 Edinburgh 
Changes (a)-(f) above were made for Edinburgh with cost changes for decreases in 
capacity and operating costs split by time of day.  Also the introduction of short stay 
parking charges was new in FATIMA. 
 
The EEF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reductions of 60% 
(compared to FATIMA optima of -90% and -35% in peak and off-peak), frequency 
increases of 85% (compared to 85% and 70% in peak and off-peak), capacity 
increases of 20% (compared to new 10% limit), road pricing of 1.625 ECU (compared 
to 1.6 in the peak and off-peak), parking charges short stay were not modelled 
(compared to a 300% increase), long stay charges were irrelevant and guided bus was 
implemented as in FATIMA.  This set of measures produced a BOF value of 458 
compared to 492 for the optimum BOF*. 
 
Filtering the effect of each change was not feasible given the time constraints of the 
project.  However the distinction between peak and off-peak measures and the 
introduction of short stay parking charges is beneficial in terms of BOF even with a 
limited capacity increase of 10%. 
 
The best SOF combination from OPTIMA consisted of free fares, 85% increases in 
frequency, capacity increase of 20%, road pricing charge of 3.3 ECU, no change in 
short stay parking charges (not modelled) and implementation of the LRT system.  
This set of measures produced a BOF value of 412. 
 
The FATIMA optimum is a combination of the EEF and SOF optima with slight 
adjustments for peak and off-peak measures particularly for fare changes and the 
implementation of guided bus as investment carries a weight of 0.1 in BOF.  The 
introduction of peak and off-peak road pricing compared to all day pricing is of no 
benefit as the prices are equal in peak and off-peak.  This is due to the high weight 
given to SOF measures which results in trip suppression through fuel reduction 
benefits in both peak and off-peak rather than benefits due to congestion relief which 
might suggest higher charges in the peak relative to the off-peak. 
 
6.3 Merseyside 
Changes (a) to (f) were made for Merseyside.  OPTIMA had already made a 
distinction between peak and off-peak for public transport frequency, and had 
distinguished between long stay and short stay parking charges.  An important 
difference in costs between OPTIMA and FATIMA has been that road capacity 
increases are costed much less in FATIMA.  On the other hand, to make quite clear 
that these increases arise from low cost schemes, the maximum capacity increase in 
FATIMA is 10% (compared to 20% in OPTIMA). 
 
The EEF optimum from OPTIMA  had only a 5% increase in road capacity, due to the 
high costs of capacity increase.  It is therefore not surprising that that the BOF value 
of the (OPTIMA) EEF optimum (at 651) is below the BOF value of BOF* (687). 
 
On the other hand, the two SOF optima in OPTIMA both had a road capacity increase 
of 20% (since capital costs are not featured in SOF), which is outside the FATIMA 
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limits.  The BOF values for these runs (736 and 734) are higher than the BOF value of 
BOF* (687).  This is an important result since it shows that, if it were possible to 
achieve road capacity increases of 20% through telematics and traffic management, 
such increases would be highly desirable. 
 
6.4  Vienna 
Changes (a)-(h) were all made for Vienna. 
 
The EEF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare increases of 31% 
(compared to 77% in FATIMA BOF*), frequency increases of 100% (compared to no 
change in FATIMA), capacity increases of 10% (compared to -10% in FATIMA), no 
road pricing (as in FATIMA), parking charges are increased by 226% (compared to 
245% short stay and no change long stay in FATIMA) and no infrastructure 
investment was implemented (as in FATIMA). This set of measures re-run in 
FATIMA produced a BOF value of -875 compared to 142 for the best run.  
 
The best SOF combination from OPTIMA consisted of a 1% increase in pt fares, 
100% increases in pt frequency, capacity increase of 1%, no road pricing, 226% 
increases in parking charges and implementation of infrastructure high. This set of 
measures produced a BOF value of -1,195. 
 
The main reason for this difference can be found in changes of the transport model 
used. The biggest effect is produced by the changes in the valuation of time for 
commuting trips (access/egress and travel time from 17 ECU/h to 5.6 ECU/h and 
waiting time from 21.8 ECU/h to 11.1 ECU/h). Also the cost function for investments 
for road capacity have been changed. The newly introduced distinction between long 
and short term parking also had significant effects on the optimum results. 
 
6.5 Eisenstadt 
Changes (a)-(h) were all made for Eisenstadt. 
 
The EEF and SOF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reduction of 
100% (compared to -50% in FATIMA), frequency increases of 100% (compared to -
50% in FATIMA), capacity increases of 10% (compared to -15% in FATIMA), no 
road pricing (as in FATIMA), parking charges are increases by 149% (compared to -
50% long stay and +115% short stay in FATIMA). This set of measures re-run in 
FATIMA produced a BOF value of -7.0 compared to 3.9 for the current best run. 
 
The main reason for this difference can be found in changes of the transport model 
used. The biggest effect is produced by the changes in the valuation of time for 
commuting trips (access/egress and travel time from 17 ECU/h to 5.6 ECU/h and 
waiting time from 21.8 ECU/h to 11.1 ECU/h). Also the cost function for investments  
 
for road capacity have been changed. The newly introduced distinction between long 
and short term parking also had significant effects on the optimum results. 
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6.6 Tromsø 
For Tromsø changes (a)-(f) above were made with public transport sector operating 
and capital cost split by time of day. Tromsø did not make a distinction between long 
and short term parking. 
Common features of the best BOF policy and the best OPTIMA EEF policy are that 
fares should be reduced, road capacity increased to the maximum and land use 
development should take the dense direction. Peak period frequency is increased in 
FATIMA while in OPTIMA it is reduced. The new cost function opportunity to 
differentiate changes with respect to time periods and the new objective function 
might explain this. The optimisation both in OPTIMA and FATIMA for Tromsø 
indicated that RP and PCH are alternative measures. The RP in the optimum BOF* of 
FATIMA implies roughly 2 times the effect on traffic compared to do-min PCH and 
lies between the RP from the EEF and the SOF optimum of OPTIMA. Bearing in 
mind that BOF is a weighted average of these two objectives this is reasonable. The 
BOF value of the best EEF run from OPTIMA is relatively close to the BOF* run of 
FATIMA.  
6.7 Oslo 
For Oslo changes (a)-(f) above were made with public transport sector operating and 
capital cost split by time of day. Oslo did not make a distinction between long and 
short term parking. 
The best EEF set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reduction of 70% 
(compared to -5% peak and -15% off-peak in FATIMA), frequency reduction of 26% 
(compared to -15% peak and no change off-peak in FATIMA), capacity increase of 
20% (compared to +10 % in FATIMA), road pricing of 1.2 ECU (compared to 5 ECU 
in FATIMA in both peak and off-peak), a 100% parking charge reduction (compared 
to no change in FATIMA) and no infrastructure investment (compared to the medium 
level in FATIMA). This policy mix was re-run in FATIMA and produced a BOF 
value of 271 compared to 696 for the best BOF run in FATIMA. 
 
The SOF optimum from OPTIMA had 100% reduction in public transport fares, 20% 
reduction in pt frequency, road pricing of 7 ECU, capacity increase of 20%, parking 
charge decrease of 100% and the infrastructure investment was included. Re-run in 
FATIMA this measure combination produced a BOF value of 541. 
 
Filtering the effect of each change was not feasible given the time constraint of the 
project. However the new operating and capital cost for the public transport sector, 
the shadow price of public money for positive PVF and the split between peak and 
off-peak all contributed significant to the new optimal measure mix and new values of 
the objective functions. For example, the shadow price of public money pushed the pt 
fares and parking charge up in FATIMA compared to OPTIMA. And it is of course 
important that we are now maximising a new objective function in FATIMA, i.e. 
some mix of EEF (EEFP) and SOF. 
6.8 Helsinki 
Changes (a)-(h) above were all made for Helsinki MA of which the most important 
were the improvement in the accuracy of calculating the rule of the half values using 
the unaggregated matrix of 117 zones, model update to basic year 1995 and using 
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EVA time values with weighted waiting time instead of lower national values used in 
OPTIMA. Also the introduction of long and short stay parking charges, frequency and 
operating costs split by time of day as well as fares and road pricing was new in 
FATIMA. The public transport overcrowding was handled in the same way as in 
OPTIMA: introducing larger vehicles as the first measure and giving a waiting time 
penalty for the people still left out as the second measure. 
 
The SOF optima from OPTIMA had free fares for the whole day compared to a 50% 
reduction (limited for the new model) in both peak and off-peak in the FATIMA BOF 
optima. Frequency was unchanged in OPTIMA SOF compared to an increase of 25% 
and 13% in peak and off-peak in FATIMA. Parking fares were increased by 92% in 
OPTIMA SOF compared to no change for long stay and for short stay in FATIMA 
BOF.  All other measures stay unchanged both in OPTIMA SOF and FATIMA BOF 
solution. The OPTIMA SOF set of measures gave a BOF value of -62 compared to 
183 for the optimum BOF*. 
 
The EEF optima from OPTIMA had a more opposite set of measures than the SOF 
optima compared to BOF optima. The public transport fares were increased by 25% 
and frequency decreased by -30%. Parking charges had zero change and road capacity 
was increased by 10%. This set of measures led to an increase in car kilometres and 
thus to a penalty in FATIMA objective functions. The BOF=COF=ROF value is -969, 
but the EEF optima is ranked much higher regarding COF and ROF than BOF in 
FATIMA. 
 
The optimal BOF solution is not far away from the OPTIMA SOF solution. 
Separating peak and off-peak measures and thus also public transport overcrowding 
calculations make the results more detailed in FATIMA and show exactly where the 
changes are feasible and beneficial. This applies to both public transport measures and 
parking. The  effect of giving more value to the public transport waiting time can be 
seen in the change from the reduction of frequency in OPTIMA EEF  and no change 
in OPTIMA SOF to an increase in FATIMA BOF solution.  
 
6.9 Torino 
In FATIMA changes (a) to (h) were made except for (f). Concerning (d), the costs of 
capacity variations were changed: compared to OPTIMA there was a costs reduction 
for implementing the decrease of capacity, due to the used technology for obtaining it 
(asphalt instead of paving). 
 
Concerning (e) the upper limit for parking charge was changed; it was decreased from 
+500% to +100%, considered more realistic by the Torino Municipality. 
 
 
Concerning (h) there were changes in the mobility data: availability of 1996 
motorised (public and private) new matrices instead of 1995 ones, so the re-
calibration of modal split was necessary. 
 
The EEF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reduction of 25% 
(compared to FATIMA optima +100% in BOF*), no frequency changes (compared to 
+30%), capacity increase of 10% (same as for BOF*), parking charges increase to the 
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maximum value +500% (compared to +100% which is the limit for FATIMA), while 
the values for road pricing and the public transport infrastructure are the same as in 
OPTIMA (no change compared to the do-minimum scenario). This set of measures re-
run in FATIMA produced a BOF value of 91 MECU  compared to 128 for the best 
BOF run. 
 
The SOF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reduction of 50%, 
frequency decrease of 30%, capacity increase of 10%, parking charges increase to the 
maximum value, 0 for road pricing and the presence of High public transport 
infrastructure. This set produces a positive SOF value, but negative value for all the 
FATIMA objective functions (-271 MECU for BOF, -2271 MECU for COF and 
ROF). 
 
6.10 Salerno 
Changes (a) to (h) (excluding the change (f)) above were made for Salerno. 
 
The EEF optimum set of measures from OPTIMA included fare reduction of 50% 
(compared to FATIMA optima of +25), frequency increase of 50% (compared to 80% 
in FATIMA), capacity increase of 10% (compared to no variation in FATIMA), road 
pricing of 1 ECU (compared to no road pricing policy), parking charges decreases of 
50% (compared to a 300% increase), and no public infrastructures as in FATIMA. 
This set of measures produced a BOF value of 15 M ECU compared to 24 for the 
optimum BOF* in FATIMA. 
 
The best SOF combination from OPTIMA consisted of free fares, 50% increase in 
frequency, capacity increase of 10%, road pricing charge of 2 ECU, elimination of 
parking charge and implementation of the high public infrastructure.  This set of 
measures produced a BOF value of 12.4 M ECU. 
 
Therefore the re-run of the OPTIMA strategies produced BOF positive values, but 
obviously these values were lower than the FATIMA optimum BOF combination, 
because of the list of changes showed above. The biggest effect could be produced by 
the change in the valuation time costs (travel time and waiting time), by the change in 
some capital and operating costs and by the penalty in time due to the public vehicle 
overcrowding. In fact in FATIMA the loading of public transport vehicles was taken 
into account as additional waiting time to be added to the standard waiting time for 
the public vehicles.  
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6.11 Summary and conclusions 
A number of interesting issues follow from the results given above: 
 
• It would generally be expected that the EEF- and SOF-optima from OPTIMA 
would have smaller BOF values than the FATIMA BOF-optimum BOF*.  This is 
in fact shown to be the case in all cities except Merseyside, where the OPTIMA 
SOF-optimum had a higher BOF value than BOF*.  The explanation for this 
apparently odd result is that the range allowed for road capacity increases was 
lower in FATIMA than in OPTIMA: the OPTIMA SOF-optimum had an increase 
of 20% in road capacity, which was not allowed in FATIMA.  The conclusion from 
this result is that great care should be taken to find out exactly how much road 
capacity increase can be gained through traffic management and telematics 
measures. 
 
• The “benchmark” aspect of BOF is important.  It represents the latest “scientific” 
view of how to assess a set of measures, given a continuing interaction between 
scientist and politician over how to make such assessments.  It is thus useful to 
assess the optimum results from OPTIMA in the light of the improved assessment 
methods devised in FATIMA: 
 
• For Edinburgh and Merseyside, both (OPTIMA) EEF- and SOF-optima 
scored highly in terms of BOF (i.e. they achieved BOF values within 20% 
of  BOF*).    
• In Vienna and Eisenstadt the OPTIMA optima scored very badly in terms 
of BOF, gaining high negative results.  The main explanation for this is a 
large reduction in the value of time for commuting trips.  This result 
illustrates the importance of having standard values of time, or at least a 
standard approach to valuation, agreed across Europe. 
• In Oslo, the EEF-optimum had a BOF-value 60% lower than BOF* whilst 
the SOF-optimum was 20% lower.  One reason for the low score of the 
EEF-optimum was that a shadow price was not put on positive PVF in 
OPTIMA and the EEF-optimum has a relatively low level of finance 
generation.  The importance of the shadow price parameter will be 
examined further in Section 7. 
• In Tromsø, Torino and Salerno, the reverse situation occurs to that 
described immediately above for Oslo.  The EEF-optimum scores, in terms 
of BOF, approximately 10% less than BOF* in Tromsø, 30% less in Torino 
and 38% less in Salerno, whilst the SOF-optimum scores 40% less than 
BOF* in Tromsø, 48% less in Salerno and negative in Torino due to the 
presence of high infrastructure in the SOF optima. 
• In Helsinki although the SOF optimum had similar measures to the BOF 
optimum it scored a negative BOF value.  The EEF optimum had 
completely different measures to the BOF optimum and thus had a highly 
negative BOF value.  These results are mainly due to the introduction of 
external costs, the changes in values of waiting time and the more accurate 
modelling in FATIMA. 
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7. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
This section reports on a set of sensitivity tests performed by each city to investigate 
the effects of various key parameters and assumptions and also to provide a direct link 
to the OPTIMA project optimal runs for EEF and SOF. 
 
Table 16 shows the sensitivity tests performed by each city. 
 
Sensitivity 
Tests / City 
α in BOF β for VC λ shadow  
price 
γ External 
costs 
Operating 
cost tests 
Value 
Capture 
Tests 
Edinburgh done   -  done done   -  done 
Merseyside   -  done done done done done 
Vienna done   -  done done done Not possible 
Eisenstadt done   -    -  done   -  done 
Oslo done   -  done   -    -  done 
Tromsø   -    -    -    -    -  N/A 
Salerno done   -  done   -    -  Not possible 
Torino   -    -    -    -    -  Not possible 
Helsinki   -    -    -    -    -  Not possible 
N/A =not available, Not possible indicates no value capture under COF*. 
Values not needed are indicated by - 
Table 16 : sensitivity tests conducted by each city 
 
7.1 The shadow price λ 
The shadow price on public money is set at 0.25 for FATIMA and applied to both 
positive and negative PVFs as opposed to negative values only in OPTIMA.  For 
Edinburgh, Oslo, Vienna and Salerno the optimum strategies for BOF produced 
relatively large PVFs indicating a possible bias to strategies which generate revenue.  
The sensitivity test used in these cities was to lower the shadow price to λ=0.0 and 
investigate whether non-revenue generating strategies become optimum.  In 
Edinburgh and Oslo reducing λ (alone) does not generate a new optimum strategy 
which indicates that the revenue generation is part of the optimum strategy for other 
reasons such as increasing the mode switch from car to public transport and reducing 
fuel consumption and vehicle-km which increases SOF and reduces external costs. 
 
However in Vienna and Salerno a different optimum appears which reduces revenue 
to operators and provides benefits to users. This means that for some cities, the 
revenue generation is only part of the best strategies for BOF if the shadow price λ is 
high enough.  In the case for Salerno the sensitivity test suggests that the optimum 
BOF strategy may in fact have a negative PVF. 
 
Merseyside produces a highly negative PVF for the optimum BOF strategy and the 
sensitivity test here is to increase the shadow price to λ=0.5 to penalise large negative 
PVFs and hence produce a more viable strategy.  The results were insensitive to this 
increase in shadow price and it was shown that λ=1.2 would be required to avoid 
large negative PVFs and result in strategies similar to the COF optimum. 
 
These tests on λ show that the choice of shadow price may be critical in specifying 
the optimum strategies, and reopens the discussion on whether a shadow price is 
necessary or desirable.  Even if it is agreed that a shadow price should be used, there 
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is the subsequent question as to what level it should be set. 
 
The obvious concern behind setting λ too high is that extreme revenue-generating 
strategies will appear optimal, and this result at first sight appears undesirable.  
However, two qualifications should be made here: 
 
(i) All strategies being tested in FATIMA are relative to a do-minimum scenario. 
If the do-minimum scenario is in heavy deficit, high revenue generating 
strategies are clearly much more attractive than if the do-minimum scenario 
was in surplus. 
 
(ii) An important concern with high revenue strategies is that the surplus is 
somehow “lost” since it is not specified exactly where it has gone.  Thus the 
argument runs that if City A has a BOF-optimum which generates 1000 
MECU, this revenue is lost to the transport sector.  However, if City B has a 
BOF-optimum with a 1000 MECU deficit, there is clearly some advantage to 
at least considering the transfer of the surplus from City A to City B, thus 
keeping finance within the transport sector and achieving an overall optimum 
set of city policies.  This argument in fact applies whether or not a shadow 
price is used.  However, an important interpretation of λ is that it determines 
how much surplus finance is available for redistribution: the higher the value 
of λ, the greater the availability.  Clearly, redistribution between cities is 
potentially politically controversial.  However, given the impending access to 
the EU of lower income states from the CEEC, such issues should be given 
careful consideration.   
  
7.2 α in BOF 
A number of cities performed sensitivity tests on the weight α between EEFP and 
SOF in BOF.  The range of tests was for α=0.0 to 0.25.  The current choice for α=0.1 
was based upon equality of present and future generations as explained in Minken 
(1998).  The aim of the sensitivity test is to see how robust the ranking of the 
optimum strategies is to this choice of α. 
 
In Vienna an α value of zero is required before the infrastructure becomes part of the 
optimum strategy whereas in Edinburgh α=0.015 results in the high infrastructure 
replacing the medium one as part of the optimum strategy.  In Eisenstadt and Salerno 
the ranking of the runs is insensitive to changes in α whereas in Oslo increasing α has 
the effect of increasing the road pricing to its maximum charge. 
 
In general, there is an interesting relationship between α and λ which affects the 
discussion on shadow pricing immediately above.  Lower values of α encourage 
higher infrastructure investment and hence higher public spending, which is also 
encouraged by lower values of  λ.  It would be interesting to examine further this 
relationship in future research. 
  
7.3 β for Value Capture 
This test was carried out for the Merseyside model only. 
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ROF2 results from setting β (the “value capture” parameter) at 0.2 instead of 0.1 in 
ROF, thus introducing a greater relaxation of the constraints on PVF than ROF. 
 
The ROF2-optimum has a value of 456. Compared to the ROF-optimum, it has: a 
decrease in peak fares of 80% (rather than 75%); a decrease in off-peak fares of 50% 
(rather than 40%); an off-peak frequency reduction of 40% (rather than 50%); and no 
off-peak road pricing (rather than 1 ECU).  All other measures were the same. It can 
thus be seen that the ROF2 is closer to the BOF-optimum than the ROF-optimum, 
which is in turn closer than the COF-optimum. 
 
Interestingly it can be shown that if a “ROF3” were to be calculated with  β set at 0.4, 
all the expensive policies (such as the BOF-optimum) would be acceptable in terms of 
spending constraints.  This is an important result since it shows that optimal transport 
policies can be attained if value capture can be set at 40% of user benefits, which is 
not an impossible scenario.  
 
7.4 The external costs basis γ 
Vienna,Eisenstadt, Merseyside and Edinburgh tested increases and/or decreases in the 
γ values applied to the external costs in EEFP.  In both cities the changes made to γ 
did not significantly change the ranking of  the BOF strategies.  This is because in 
general the external cost accounts for approximately 20-30% of EEFP which is then 
factored by α=0.1 in forming BOF, coupled with the observation that external costs 
did not vary significantly between strategies in Vienna and Eisenstadt.  
 
 In Merseyside, three sets of tests were carried out: 
 
(i)  with γ = 0  
(ii) with γ doubled from the values given in Table 1  
(iii) with γ multiplied tenfold from the values given in Table 1 
 
It was found that tests (i) and (ii) made no difference to the BOF optimum and the 
order of ranking of best sets of measures.  However, tests (iii) produced some 
interesting results.  Although, the “old” BOF optimum (BOF*) fared reasonably well 
when γ was given much more importance, a new optimum (BOF**) was formed by a 
rather different set of measures.  BOF** involves: free fares (as in BOF*); a smaller 
increase in peak frequency than BOF*, road capacity increase of 5%; all-day road 
pricing charge of 3.5 ecus; no change in long stay parking charges and an increase of 
200% in short stay parking charges. 
 
The new BOF value of BOF* (with γ multiplied tenfold) is 1045, of which 
approximately 40% is due to the “external cost” benefit.  The new BOF value of 
BOF** is 1111, of which approximately 60% is due to the external cost benefit. 
     
In Edinburgh the γ values were doubled.  This had the effect of making the previous 
second best BOF solution now optimum.  The only difference between this new 
optimum and the previous optimum is the increased road pricing charges from 1.6 
ECU all day to 3.5 in the peak and 3.2 in the off-peak.  The higher charges reduce 
vehicle-km further which give benefits in external cost reductions.  This change in 
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measures for Edinburgh was partly due to the fact that the BOF solution was 
insensitive to changes in road pricing measures as mentioned previously and so any 
extra benefits from external cost reduction outweigh the slight disbenefits of increased 
charges. 
 
7.5 Operating costs 
The sensitivity tests on operating costs of public transport are assumed to be 
applicable to all regimes, the operating cost reductions assumed to be due to improved 
organisation if publicly owned  and/or competition if privately owned and therefore 
could feature in any regime, whether regulated or deregulated. 
 
Merseyside carried out sensitivity tests on public transport operating costs, examining 
how a 20% reduction in operating costs would affect the value of BOF.  These tests 
could be seen in two lights.  Firstly, they are simply tests to try to ascertain the 
importance of accuracy in input data.  Secondly, they could be seen as representing 
measures that actually do reduce operating costs. 
 
The 20% reduction in operating costs led to a new BOF-optimum being created which 
had a 100% increase in peak frequency (compared to 50%) and a 30% reduction in 
off-peak frequency (compared to 40%), and so is much more friendly to the public 
transport user. 
 
One effect of reducing operating costs is, ironically, to reduce BOF values (around the 
BOF optimum).  This is explained because BOF* includes an overall reduction in 
frequency from the do-minimum: if operating costs are reduced, there is not so much 
to gain by reducing frequency.  However, the BOF value (with reduced operating 
costs) of the new optimum is 678 and thus is not too different from the “old” BOF-
value of BOF* (687). 
 
These tests show that if genuine operating cost reductions can be made (which do not 
reduce quality/safety levels), large increases in peak frequency can be justified. 
   
Vienna also carried out sensitivity tests on operating costs and capital costs of public 
transport varying between 50% and 100% of the current standard values. 
   
Figure 2 shows the Vienna values of BOF for varying levels of additional pt 
frequency, under six different assumptions of changes in operating costs from the 
standard value. The top curve in Figure 2 represents a 50% decrease in operating 
costs, whilst the bottom curve represents the standard costs.  The other policy 
measures are set constant at the values attained for the best BOF run. It can be seen 
that if the operating costs are reduced by 50%, the pt frequency is 30% for the optimal 
BOF solution, compared with 0% with standard operating costs. The BOF value of 
BOF* increases by about 40% from 142.4 to 197.8.  On the other hand, a 20 % 
reduction in operating costs (shown by the third lowest curve in Figure 2) results in no 
additional frequency and no increase in BOF.  
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Figure 2: Sensitivity test operating costs for increased public transport frequency 
BOF 
 
 
 
HOF 
 
Figure 3 shows the values of HOF for varying levels of additional pt frequency, under 
six different assumptions of changes in operating costs from the standard value (as in 
Figure 2).  The other policy measures are set constant at the values attained for the 
best HOF run.  The main effect of the reduction of pt operating costs is that the range 
for “nearly optimal” HOF values is greatly extended.  Thus with a 50% cost 
reduction, all increases in pt frequency from +10% to +35% deliver nearly optimal 
HOF values. 
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Figure 3: Sensitivity test operating costs for increased public transport frequency 
HOF 
 
 standard value.  
 
DOF 
 
Figure 4 shows the values of DOF for varying levels of additional pt frequency, under 
six different assumptions of changes in operating costs from the
Compared to Figures 2 and 3, the units of frequency along the horizontal axis are 
much more restricted (ranging from a frequency increase of 2% to an increase of 9%).  
The other policy measures are set constant at the values attained for the best DOF run. 
It can be seen that the reduction in operating costs leads to a slight increase in DOF-
optimal frequency. 
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pp   Value Capture (A
 main value capture tests (carried out by optim ost cities 
 invo an a tiv  approach to value capture (AVC).  The main 
ce in AVC is “extr lu captur
 part ar pub n rt me ( he o nal c cept o alu
mp ted F value e uld c  at w eve
t). 
 raised (through 
ither voluntary agreements or tax) from shop-keepers and other commercial interests 
e government sector, which is then used to pay for the improved public 
transport service. 
• Compare the new COF value with that obtained by merely transferring the value 
F
DOF 
 
7.6 An alternative a roach to VC) 
Further to the ising ROF) m
carried out tests
differen
lving 
 that 
lterna
a” va
e
e e finance is directed specifically to the 
improvement of icul lic tra spo asures in t rigi on f v e 
capture (VC, as i lemen in RO ), captur  co be dire ted hat r 
measures would lead to overall social improvemen
 
The underlying assumption in ROF was that value capture would be
e
who would benefit from the city “being a more attractive place” (as represented by 
increased user benefits).  On the other hand, in AVC, the underlying scenario is of 
employers paying out for improved public transport schemes specifically to bring 
their employees to work. 
 
The sensitivity tests for AVC have the following form: 
 
• Take the optimum constrained strategy defined by the optimum COF* set of 
measures. 
• Use the value capture (0.1*user benefits) from this run to invest further in the 
public transport sector than is done in the optimum COF* measures. 
• Perform a transport model run for this improved strategy. 
• Evaluate this run by transferring the value capture element from the user benefits 
to th
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cap t sector without service 
improvem
and percentage change in car-km with COF* 
ptimum BOF* and by definition PVF>0 for COF* i.e. 
nly in Merseyside could improved public transport services financed by 
 
lerno 
ture element from user benefits to the governmen
ents. 
• Compare the modal split indicators 
 
As with VC, there will be no benefit to having AVC if PVF > 0 in the BOF optimum 
(since there is no financial constraint to restrict optimal transport policies being 
implemented). 
 
owever, if the PVF<0 for oH
Class 1, then this implies that some form of extra capital would be able to improve the 
COF* optimum towards that of the BOF* optimum.  The AVC test as implemented 
here has a limited capital element which is directed specifically at the public transport 
sector and so the extent to which the capital brings about improvements in COF* is 
imited. Ol
AVC bring about benefits greater than those associated with spending the AVC 
elsewhere. 
 
Changes in the modal split indicators are shown below in Table 17 for each city based 
n an AVC test which increased public transport frequency only at a cost equal to theo
AVC.  The changes shown are for (AVC run)-(COF* run).  
 
 
Modal splits 
Edinburgh M’side Vienna Eisen-
stadt 
Tromsø Oslo Helsinki Torino Sa
MS (trips)-car -0.2% -0.3% # -0.01% ## -0.04% # ## # 
MS(trips)-public transport +0.2% +0.5% # +0.03% ## +0.15% # ## # 
MS (trips)-others n/a -0.2% # -0.02% ## -0.16% # ## # 
MS-(distance) car -0.4% -0.4% # -0.02% ## -0.06% # ## # 
MS-(distance)public 
transport 
+0.4% +0.6% # +0.04% ## +1.34% # ## # 
MS-(distance) others n/a -0.2% # -0.02% ## n/a # ## # 
Change in Car-km p.a.  -0.4% -0.4% # -0.01% ## -0.06% # ## # 
# no value capture for Vienna,  Helsinki and Salerno COF* 
## no test carried out in Tromsø and Torino 
Table 17: Changes in modal split indicators for value capture tests 
 
As Oslo did not have a positive user benefit in the optimum COF strategy, a slightly 
different AVC test was chosen for this city. Instead of taking 10% of the total user 
enefit, 10% of the user benefit from the infrastructure investment was taken. This 
changes are of the same magnitude as 
ose for Edinburgh, however as stated above the changes for Edinburgh were not 
b
was calculated by running the COF optimum without the investment. 
 
Using AVC, the changes for all cities are small as expected as these indicators are 
reflected through the COF* measure.  It is difficult to say whether the changes in 
indicators are significant as in Merseyside the 
th
enough to merit the expenditure under the COF measure.  (The indicators cannot be 
compared across city as they are percentage changes from different initial conditions).  
Indeed for Edinburgh it is possible to get greater changes in car-km and mode splits 
by simply doubling the road pricing charge without affecting the COF value too 
much.  
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portant to analyse 
the feasibility of the proposed strategies and the potential for them to be implemented 
portant that those involved in policy 
d.  
ch it was also possible to give a numerical 
core that represented the level of agreement or satisfaction with the item referred to. 
nex to FATIMA (1998b).   
ibility and 
cceptability heading. 
 repetition. 
ntain a summary of the main features of the optimisation 
sults for each city, to avoid the need to refer back. 
8. FEASIBILTY AND ACCEPTABILITY 
8.1 The consultation process 
After the modelling and optimisation process it clearly becomes im
in reality. At this stage it was therefore im
decisions became involve
 
At the end of the strategy analysis process, the FATIMA team consulted the 
authorities involved in transport decision making and operation in city, in order to 
obtain a practical view on the results obtained from the modelling and optimisation 
process.  
 
Each city was provided with a standard questionnaire in order to summarise their 
comments on the whole project and its final results. The questionnaire consisted of a 
series of open questions, for most of whi
s
  
The questions related to the technical, financial and legislative feasibility of the 
optimum strategies under each objective function regime and their likely acceptability 
to the public, politicians and the private sector.  There were also general questions on 
the objective functions and the overall methodology of the project.  The completed 
questionnaires are included as an an
 
The completed questionnaires provided the basis for analysing the feasibility and 
acceptability of the various optimum strategies, for each city and objective function, 
and to identify any potential barriers to their implementation.  Responses were 
received from all cities except Oslo and Tromsø, who had no criticisms of the results. 
 
The sections below summarise, for each city, the results obtained for the different 
objective functions examined during the project. They present also the main 
engineering comments and general observations which emerged during the 
consultation process together with remarks from the respective modellers who took 
part in the project.  The city results are then drawn together under each feas
a
 
As in OPTIMA, it was found during the consultations that there was a degree of 
overlap between the feasibility, public acceptability, political acceptability and 
barriers to implementation, with particular issues or problems (e.g. ‘too expensive’) 
recurring under more than one heading.  This is reflected in the structure of this 
section, in order to help reduce any
 
This section is structure as follows: first there follows a series of sub-sections which 
summarise the results of the consultations with each city in turn, for each of the 
optimum strategies.  In these subsections the focus tends to be on the BOF optimum, 
with the other optima, where different from BOF, being discussed subsequently.  
These subsections also co
re
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pared with the previous results from 
he DOF optimum), peak and 
IMA questionnaire: however, 
nstalling new infrastructure (such as 
The final subsections then take the consultation results for all the cities together and 
analyses them systematically under the various feasibility and acceptability headings.  
The full city results are reported in FATIMA (1998b). 
 
8.2 Feasibility and acceptability for individual cities 
8.2.1 Edinburgh  
 
Edinburgh City Council were interested in the methodology of the FATIMA study in 
eneral, the results produced and how they comg
OPTIMA. The fact that the model used in OPTIMA and FATIMA was the same as 
that used in the Edinburgh-area JATES study some years ago enabled the process and 
results to be more readily understood. The FATIMA results for Edinburgh were also 
relatively straightforward in that the same optimum strategy emerged for all the 
objective function regimes, apart from some comparatively small deviations in the 
Deregulated Objective Function regime.  
 
Edinburgh has BOF*=ROF*=COF* and the HOF* solution has the same set of 
measures for its optimum. The only changes are for DOF* which has a higher road 
pricing charge, no increases in frequencies in the off-peak and less of an increase in 
the peak, lower fare reductions in the peak and no reductions in fare in the off-peak. 
These optima were considered by the city authority to be reasonable results, against 
the respective objective functions. 
 
All the Edinburgh optima included medium infrastructure (guided bus), a 10 per cent 
increase in road capacity, major increases in peak and off-peak public transport 
frequency (no off-peak increase in the DOF optimum), major fares reductions, 
specially in the peak (no change in off peak fares in te
off-peak road pricing of 1.6 ecu (3.2 ecu for the DOF optimum) and 300 per cent 
increases in both long and short term parking. This was considered to be a reasonable 
optimum policy, provided that the revenue raised from motorists in road pricing and 
parking charges can be seen to be invested in a more frequent and much cheaper 
public transport system.  In this respect, the DOF optimum was less satisfactory as it 
has higher charges on motorists but less improvement to public transport.   
 
The comments made below in this section mainly relate to main points made by the 
ity of Edinburgh, particularly from the completed FATC
the optimal strategies for Edinburgh from OPTIMA were in many respects similar to 
those from FATIMA, so comments made in an earlier, similar questionnaire about the 
OPTIMA strategies have been included here where it is believed that they are also 
pertinent to the FATIMA results. 
 
It was considered that the optima were without any serious technical barriers to 
mplementation, other than the difficulty of ii
guided bus) in the historic urban environment of Edinburgh, and it was felt that this 
could be overcome provided the facility exists for new infrastructure to be ‘tailored’ 
into the historic setting.   
 
Financially, the optima are broadly neutral in terms of feasibility.  Obtaining 
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 from the system. 
It is unlikely that there would be any major legislative barriers, though it is too early 
e, it may prove that the proposed charging systems may be 
gally challenged. There is also a need for legislation to enable road pricing to be 
 for public transport to enable fares and 
equency policies to be implemented and this is likely to be a much larger constraint 
tima) would become unacceptable. (Note that the highway 
apacity increase in FATIMA was limited to 10 per cent, compared to 20 per cent in 
ges with a road pricing charge much higher than in the other 
um (with the higher 
itically unacceptable. 
i ity of the optimum strategies to the private 
ld be that the strategies would allow the 
p ffic. It is also difficult to predict political 
c  improvements to the public transport system being offset by 
fits to private motoring (especially the higher road pricing charge 
t ) which would be opposed by the motoring lobby.  However, 
e a because of the shorter travel times and the 
sport. 
um strategies 
hould enhance quality through shorter travel times and improved infrastructure, 
 successful elsewhere before implementation in Edinburgh. 
sufficient capital to finance schemes at their outset could pose difficulties together 
with recovery time for the initial investment. The problems could perhaps be 
overcome by borrowing against expected future receipts
 
to be sure as, for exampl
le
implemented, though this is unlikely to be a serious barrier: however, there is also a 
need for changes to the regulatory regime
fr
in the current political and commercial climate. 
 
Politically, any policy involving highway construction is unacceptable to Edinburgh 
and it was assumed that the highway capacity increase of 10 per cent could be 
achieved without this. If this proved not to be the case then these optima (or this 
component of the op
c
OPTIMA). 
 
The public as a whole are likely to be fairly content with the optima as they are likely 
to give faster travel times for most travellers, improve the quality of public transport 
nd improve the journeys for essential traffic. Against this would need to be weighed a
the negative opinions of some road users (principally car travellers) because of the 
extra costs which would accrue to them, and the ‘subsidy’ which would be required 
for public transport services. The single exception to the likely acceptance of the 
ptima to the public is the DOF optimum strategy, in which the combination of the o
increased parking char
ptimum strategies would be unacceptable. Also, the DOF optimo
road pricing charge) would be pol
 
It s difficult to predict the acceptabil
sector, though one benefit to this group cou
im rovement of travel times for essential tra
ac eptability, with the
the financial disbene
in he DOF optimum
op rators are likely to support the optim
expectation of fairer competition with private tran
 
Quality is of importance to Edinburgh. It was felt that, though the optim
s
quality issues should have been given explicit emphasis in the project. Edinburgh City 
Council suggested that the maintenance of quality in the system could be enhanced by 
‘quality partnerships’, public/private funding for some public transport routes and 
better marketing by public transport operators. 
 
In terms of acceptability in general, the main constraints on the optimum strategies 
are that there could be no road construction, and road pricing would have to have 
been shown to be
 
Regarding information from the process, Edinburgh would have liked more 
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king, cycling and the environment, more data on motorised/non-
otorised modal split and on environmental indicators. 
d in FATIMA and its results and the development of the 
rocess from the earlier OPTIMA project.  
 also pertinent to 
 
e optimum strategies are different from one another, except the 
•
•
pu
increase in short stay parking charges are included, to pay for the public transport 
ystem and at the same time maintain a positive PVF. 
he DOF optimum is similar to that for COF/HOF but with lower increases in peak 
disaggregation of results (city centre and non central policies) and, given their 
emphasis on wal
m
 
8.2.2 Merseyside  
 
Merseyside were intereste
p
 
The comments made below in this section mainly relate to main points made by 
Merseyside in the completed FATIMA questionnaire: however, the optimal strategies 
for Merseyside from OPTIMA were in some cases similar to those from FATIMA, so 
comments made in an earlier, similar questionnaire about the OPTIMA optimum 
strategies have been included here where it is believed that they are
the FATIMA results. 
Generally speaking, the optimum strategies identified under each objective function 
were regarded as being reasonable, with the possible exception of the inclusion of 
d capacity increases in a strategy (BOF) which is at least partly roa designed to 
provide a sustainable transport system for future generations. 
 
All the Merseysid
HOF and COF optima which are identical (the PVF is large enough to provide the 
subsidy required to give a return of 15 per cent to public transport operators). 
 
The BOF optimum is: 
 
• to increase capacity (+10%); 
• to increase peak frequency(+50%); 
• to decrease off-peak frequency (-40%); 
• all-day free fares; 
• no road pricing; 
 cheaper long stay parking (-100%); 
 more expensive short stay parking (+100%); 
• medium infrastructure (SMART bus). 
 
The COF and HOF optima are the same as each other and similar to BOF, but the pro-
blic transport measures are less strong than in BOF. Road pricing and greater 
s
 
The ROF optimum is between BOF and COF/HOF, though closer the latter: ROF has 
a larger decrease in peak fares and a smaller increase in short-stay parking charges 
than COF/HOF. 
 
T
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 terms of the social objective function (BOF), the ROF optimum is 40% lower, but 
s together with free public transport 
res, though in the right direction, would be too extreme: though fares should be 
periods should be increased to com
MA project, and the need to develop objective functions in 
ATIMA to take affordability specifically into account was suggested by Merseyside 
-owned car parks: 
 Increasing short term parking charges might encourage shoppers to visit out-of-
town locations where parking is free: local Chambers of Commerce and their 
members would resist this.  
hese problems are sufficient to make the BOF optimum unacceptable financially: 
frequencies and small fare reductions and with a smaller increase in short-stay 
parking charges. 
 
In
has a PVF of only - 152 Mecus, making it far more affordable than the BOF optimum 
(PVF = -2120 Mecus) – affordability is a major issue in Merseyside, as discussed 
below. The lowest optimum in terms of BOF is DOF, which is a further 19 per cent 
below the ROF optimum. 
 
Regarding the optima in general, Merseyside considered that any policy involving 
very large increases in short term parking charge
fa
reduced, they should not be free and short term parking charge increases should not 
exceed, say, 50 per cent (the reasons are discussed below, under public acceptability).  
Merseyside suggested that better optimum strategies would include: 
• Parking charges in town centres to be increased sufficiently to reduce car 
dependency but not enough seriously to affect trade; 
• Public transport charges should be reduced and public transport frequency at peak 
pete with the convenience of a car. 
In order to achieve the latter, either public transport needs to be subsidised by Central 
Government or an increase in fuel tax could be hypothecated to subsidise the public 
transport system. 
 
Technically, all the optima will experience problems due to the implementation of 
road pricing, except the BOF optimum, which is the only optimum strategy with no 
road pricing component. 
 
The question of affordability of optimum strategies was a prime concern of 
Merseyside in the OPTI
F
towards the end of the OPTIMA project. Affordability continues to be crucial, 
causing the FATIMA BOF option to be unacceptable as it stands, because of the large 
negative PVF.  Regarding specific financial issues relating to the optimum strategies, 
the following problems exist, particularly for the BOF optimum: 
• Parking charges can be controlled only in Local Authority
• Free peak and off peak fares would be resisted by the Local Authorities; 
• Substantially reduced fares would place an unacceptable financial burden on the 
Local Authorities; 
•
 
T
only considerable additional funding from Central Government could overcome these 
problems. As was found in the OPTIMA project, the questions of finance and 
funding, though important everywhere, are particularly crucial to policy formulation 
in Merseyside. 
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pected for the various optimum 
trategies included the need for legislation for road pricing (all optima except BOF) 
olitically, the optimum policies would tend to polarise voters: non car owners would 
 road pricing, especially in a 
latively uncongested city such as Merseyside.  
 The problems are as follows: 
 Free long term parking in town centres would encourage commuter traffic to the 
 Increasing short term parking charges would discourage shoppers. 
e public transport, which could exert unacceptable financial 
urden on council tax payers.  
mes would reduce significantly if fare collection ceased.  The optimum 
trategies would also be wholly unacceptable to taxi operators, who would suffer 
bus operators to 
ompete on quality. As a means to help overcome this, Merseyside suggested that 
een the Passenger Transport Executive (the 
transport body) and the bus operators. 
ed in the policy options, as well as parking charges, and that 
reater attention should be given to the benefits of walking and cycling. 
hanges to public transport frequencies, but an increase in fares of 77%. 
he increase in fares gives a high public PVF and is generated by the shadow price 
e subsidy given 
In terms of legislation, the main difficulties ex
s
and the need to review the regulatory system for public transport.  
 
P
benefit greatly and give support to the political party promoting such a  strategy, but 
car owners would probably vote against the party because of the significant increase 
in motoring costs.  What would be completely unacceptable politically would be to 
raise local taxes to support free public transport. There was also some concern about 
the political (and public) acceptability of introducing
re
 
The public would find all the optima to be barely acceptable – they would be broadly 
neutral on the BOF and ROF optima, but would generally be somewhat less happy 
with the COF, DOF and HOF optima.
•
detriment of shoppers (but if located at rail and bus stations would have the 
benefit of encouraging park and ride); 
•
 
The particular element of the strategy that might be unacceptable to the public is the 
supplementing of fre
b
 
For the private sector, the optima would be broadly neutral as, though the increases in 
short term car parking charges would discourage shoppers, this would be offset by 
free peak and particularly off peak fares. The only benefit to the p.t. operators is that 
bus journey ti
s
severe loss of revenue.  
 
In respect of ensuring transport service quality, it is possible that free or much 
reduced peak and off peak fares would remove the incentive for 
c
there should be ‘quality partnerships’ betw
local authority public 
 
Regarding the analytical process as a whole, Merseyside considered that the supply of 
parking should be includ
g
 
 
 
8.2.3 Vienna  
 
For Vienna the BOF* solution is also the ROF* and COF* solution. It includes 
reduced capacity, increased short stay parking charges, no change in long stay parking 
charges, no c
T
effect on revenue generation. The high PVF could be used to reduce th
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 the public transport system in the do-minimum.  
t includes small increases in frequencies 
ith much smaller increases in fares as the private sector is limited to a 15% return. 
With reference to BOF, COF and ROF regimes, the consultant sees no technical 
enting the proposed combination of measures.  
ems arose about this issue.  However, it was pointed out that a wide 
nge of  scientific disciplines, like social science, economic impact analysis and so 
n, should be involved in the formulation of the objective functions. 
rom 
ATIMA for their city. 
 reduction in 
apacity, smaller reductions in frequencies, greater fare reductions and greater 
ves 
an BOF*. 
isenstadt  is a special case in that it has no feasible DOF* solution.  
to
 
The DOF* solution is similar to BOF*, but i
w
 
The HOF* solution is identical to DOF* in terms of measures and the subsidy is used 
to increase the private sector return from 14% under DOF* to 15% under HOF*. No 
improvements in services are implemented with subsidy as the value of revenue 
generation outweighs the benefits to users of improved services.  The DOF* solution 
is 24% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF*. 
 
The person interviewed in Vienna was also involved in the OPTIMA consultation 
process. He pointed out that the inclusion of more external transport related costs, like 
accidents, air and noise pollution, in the objective functions and regimes was an 
important step in the right direction.  
 
problems in implem
 
Financially, two of the key measures are pricing measures (fares and parking 
charges), which are inexpensive to realise. The reduction in road capacity is seen not 
to be cost intensive.  
 
From the public and political point of view there might be troubles due to the fact that 
the suggested optima generate disbenefits to public transport users and car users. On 
the other hand, from the strategic point of view the proposed policy combination will 
move the modal split share towards the target set out by the local authority in the 
early 1990’s. 
 
Generally, Vienna were familiar with the optimisation method and therefore no 
questions or probl
ra
o
 
8.2.4 Eisenstadt 
 
The Eisenstadt authorities interviewed were interested in the final results f
F
 
The BOF* solution for Eisenstadt is to reduce capacity, reduce frequencies and fares, 
reduce long stay parking charges whilst increasing short stay charges. 
 
For Eisenstadt BOF*=COF*=ROF*.  HOF* is similar but has a lower
c
reductions in parking charges for long stay. This has the effect of transferring users 
from the walk and bicycle mode to public transport, so the subsidy removes users 
from the slow modes. The HOF* solution is 19% worse in terms of social objecti
th
 
E
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ty itself. Due to the poor public transport system, price 
creasing measures for car users automatically increases the number of trips made by 
 the public transport system economically 
teresting for private investors.  
roject FATIMA throughout the project in 
elsinki MA. The group comprised representatives of the Ministry of Transportation 
 reported the collaborative opinion of his office 
nd the other answer came from the representative of Espoo.  In addition to these 
 the COF* solution there are only some small changes in the optimum measures. 
he public transport frequency is reduced in the off-peak (-10%) thus saving on the 
 
From the technical point of view there exist no problems at all and from the financial 
side any problems are only minor in nature.  
 
From the public and political point of view there would be some problems with all the 
suggested optima, especially the public transport related measures.  The public 
transport system is very underdeveloped compared to the other cities. The main 
reasons for that are on one hand the high number of cars per capita and on the other 
hand the structure of the ci
in
foot or by bicycle. Generally this effect is desired, but to attract trips to the public 
transport system a lot of investment would be needed and no private investor would 
be capable of investing the large sums needed.  However, improved quality in the 
public transport is the only way to cause a desirable trip shift to public transport.  
Such a shift is also necessary to make
in
8.2.5 Helsinki 
 
There has been a local follow-up group for p
H
and Communications, Transport Planning Office in Helsinki Metropolitan Area 
Council, the City Planning Office of Helsinki, The City Planning Centre of Espoo and 
the Planning Office of the City of Vantaa. The consultation process in Helsinki MA, 
in general, has been successful and the response has been positive, as all the 
authorities involved have shown interest in the project. Two of the above mentioned 
authorities returned the interview form; the head of Transport Planning Office in 
Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council
a
activities, a half-day seminar of the final results of the study was arranged for the 
follow-up group. 
 
 
The BOF* solution for Helsinki increases public transport frequencies in both peak 
(+25%) and off-peak (+13%) periods and reduces fares by 50% both in the peak and 
off-peak (which is the lower limit for Helsinki due to modelling constraints). Parking 
charges are not changed. No capacity changes, road pricing or infrastructure measures 
are implemented. This set of measures yields a highly negative PVF. 
 
In
T
operating costs. However, for to keep the passengers also fares are slightly reduced 
both in the peak and off-peak (-10% and -7%). For cars there is a modest increase in 
long stay parking charges (+20%), and no change in any other measure. 
 
For Helsinki ROF* equals COF* including a very small value capture element that 
does not change the ROF* function. The COF* solution is 75% worse in terms of 
sustainable objectives than BOF*. (which was financially infeasible – see below). 
 
DOF* and HOF* were not calculated for Helsinki.  
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group severe doubts about 
plementation of the strategies emerged.  Regarding the BOF* strategy the 
nd best solution is a nearly similar strategy with a smaller 
reduction in fares resulting in a slightly worse BOF-value. This strategy is somewhat 
 terms but also here all financial savings are on the users’ side and 
ore subsidies are needed. 
al problems may arise from 
e implementation of the strategy because of the need for a new fleet of buses and 
rom the public point of view, The BOF* strategy would be welcomed as it is in 
he COF*=ROF* solution may also cause some problems especially from the 
ff-peak period 
nd opposition to the increase of long-term parking charges could arise among 
In the discussion at the half-day seminar of the follow-up 
im
Transport Planning Office in Helsinki MA Council pointed out that although it would 
attract more people to use public transport, the strategy is financially impossible to 
implement because, as a whole, the fare revenue decreases and there is a need for 
more subsidy. The seco
better in financial
m
 
From the legislative point of view there are no problems in the implementation of the 
BOF* strategy.  It is, however, financially unviable (as discussed above) except with 
increased taxes (as discussed below).  Also, some technic
th
trains due to the increase in frequency. 
 
From the political point of view, the Left and the Greens are likely to back the BOF* 
strategy because it improves the quality of public transport and enhances the image of 
the public transport as a part of the sustainable development of the area. However, the 
parties on the right would line up against it. 
 
F
favour of both public transport users and car drivers who will have more space due to 
people’s transfer from car to public transport. On the other hand, especially because 
the level of subsidy is already very high, the municipalities in Helsinki MA could not 
in the present economic situation afford a higher subsidy, and thus the only way to 
finance the strategy would be to  increase municipal taxes.  Car users would not 
accept a tax increase for this reason. 
 
Though no technical or legislative problems in implementation of the COF*=ROF* 
strategy were found, this optimum nevertheless aroused suspicion as it is against 
present policy in two respects: firstly the fares are cheaper in the peak than off-peak 
period of the day (intuitively Helsinki felt it should be the other way around) and 
secondly the off-peak frequency level should not be made worse compared to the 
present.  The decrease in public transport fares is obviously in favour for public 
transport users but the off-peak frequency reduction is against them. The increase in 
parking fees, although small, will not easily be accepted by car users or by the private 
sector entrepreneurs in the city centre although it would make it easier to find a 
parking place. Politically, the Left and the Greens should support the strategy. 
 
 
T
political point of view. In fact it may be difficult to get a political decision to decrease 
public transport fares and to find a real justification in increasing parking charges. 
From the legislative point of view some difficulties could arise from changing parking 
charges in general, as neither the state nor the municipalities can determine the 
charges for the private parking operators, only for places under their control which 
represent the minority of the supply.  The reduction of the PT frequency could cause 
problems of public acceptability, even if it is suggested only for the o
a
drivers. In general the strategy may improve the performance of the transport system 
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he BOF* (= COF* = ROF*) solution for Torino foresees a strong increase of both 
 yields 
 positive and quite high PVF (710 million ECU). 
rivate 
upply (increase in the private capacity of 10% and increase in the public transport 
ire an increase of the road capacity by 10%. This, in a 
ity like Torino, can be achieved first of all increasing the traffic control by the 
rgin to build some new parking where the increase of the road capacity 
is obtained by eliminating on-street parking. There are no additional operating costs 
(with respect to the do minimum) as the municipality budget for road maintenance is a 
fixed sum per year. Obviously the increase of road capacity would lead to a general 
benefit for road practicability, but would at the same time give a disbenefit to the 
users of the on-street parking and for  pedestrians (capacity increase partly obtained 
by reducing the width of pavements). 
 
In general, the city authorities agreed that probably the suggested optimum strategies 
include some measures (in particular, strong increases in PT fares and parking 
charges) that would be too heavy a burden on the users, both public and private.  So 
an alternative strategy was suggested, broadly in the same direction as the optima, but 
with a more gentle increment of measures.  In particular, an approach was suggested  
with a smaller increase in fares and in which the additional income deriving from the 
increased parking charge could be used to fund the frequency increase. 
 
From a technical point of view, the variation of charges can be implemented without 
but because the changes are very small the effect is minor. 
 
As an alternative for both optimal strategies the Transport Planning Office in Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area Council proposed a strategy consisting of a congestion charge or 
tax, an increase in parking fees and only small improvements in public transport fares 
and frequencies, if any. 
8.2.6 Torino 
 
With reference to the consultation process, the responses were, in general, positive as 
all the interviewed people (the technicians of the City Council and the technicians of 
the Transport Company-Transport Planning Sector) showed interest and curiosity in 
the FATIMA project and in the final results of the study.  
 
T
private and public (increased frequency) supply, no change in public transport 
infrastructure, road pricing and the highest permitted increase of both public transport 
fares and parking charges (100% in both cases). The scenario reduces user benefits 
overall and the combination of high fares and high parking charges leads to a strong 
increase in revenue that should at least balance capital and operating costs. This
a
 
The HOF* solution is identical to DOF* and it is quite similar to BOF* (= COF* = 
ROF*) .  In particular, it suggests an improvement in both the public and p
s
frequency of about 30%), an increase in public transport fare by 70% and in the 
parking charge by 100%.  The DOF*=HOF* solution is 16.5% worse in terms of 
social objectives than BOF* solution.  
 
All the optimum strategies requ
c
improvement or the extension of intelligent transport systems and secondly reducing 
the on-street parking zones, widening some cross-roads. To implement this measure, 
costs have been overestimated (about 48 Million ECU) in order to have an 
economical ma
 76
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
problems, since the implementation and operation costs are zero. However, the 10% 
increase of road capacity could be technically problematic, if implemented by 
reducing the pavement width or eliminating parking place on streets, but might be 
possible by improving or extending intelligent traffic systems, such as intelligent 
traffic lights, so that the traffic movement may be facilitated without changing road 
characteristics.  Technical problems could also arise from the increase in public 
transport frequency which might need improvements in production and maintenance 
facilities. But it was pointed out that these problems should be soluable. 
 
From a political point of view difficulties in acceptability would arise as politicians 
who accept a strong increase of PT fares and parking charge would become 
unpopular.  Other political problems could arise because the public transport fare is 
suggested by the Transport Company, but the final decision is taken by the 
municipality (who also decide parking charges).  
 
The increase in PT fares and parking charges would not be acceptable to the public. 
These increases might be acceptable in other European cities where the gross 
domestic product is higher, but not in Italy where the average salary is not sufficiently 
high to support similar costs. Moreover shopkeepers will be  probably against the 
increase of parking charge because this could reduce the number of customers. 
 
It was also suggested that the additional income deriving from the optimum strategy 
implementation should be used to improve the global quality of  transport and 
especially of the public transport (in terms of cleanliness, air conditioning, etc). 
 
With regard to the DOF and HOF objective functions, doubts were expressed about 
the privatisation of some public services. It was asserted that for every kind of 
service, a certain quality level must be maintained. As in general operating costs are 
quite high, an adequate service level can be kept only by a public company that can 
count on the help of the State.  
 
Finally it was affirmed that for the city of Torino a new public infrastructure system is 
necessary and its capital costs should not be part of the cost benefit analysis.  In this 
way it might be possible to find better optima that don’t weigh so heavily on transport 
service users. 
 
Regarding the FATIMA method, it was suggested that it would be useful to try to find 
a formulation of the objective functions that takes into account some “quality 
indicators”, such as cleanliness, comfort and so on. 
8.2.7 Salerno 
 
With reference to the consultation process, in general the responses were positive as 
all the interviewed Salerno authorities, both the technicians of the Transport Company 
and the politicians of the city council, showed interest and curiosity in the FATIMA 
project and in the final results of the study. They already knew the optimisation 
method and the measures examined, as they had followed with interest the previous 
project OPTIMA.  They found the FATIMA optimum strategies sensible in terms of 
the defined objective functions. 
 
For the city of Salerno, the BOF* solution (=HOF* solution) requires no new 
 77
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
infrastructure, no changes in capacity and no road pricing, but a large increase in 
frequency (+80%), a 25% increase in fares and a 300% increase in parking charges. 
The increased revenue yields a positive PVF. 
 
The best runs for COF and ROF, like in the BOF case, all require an improvement of 
the quality of the public transport (but with a lower increase in frequency than BOF: 
50%), an increase in fares of 25%, no change to capacity and an increase in central 
parking charges of 300%. 
 
The best run for DOF includes an increase in public transport frequency of 50%, the 
maximum increase in fares (100%), no variation in network capacity, and the 
implementation of a low road pricing policy (1 ECU), coupled with the maximum 
increase of the parking charge (300%). 
 
The DOF* solution is 36% worse in terms of social objectives than BOF* and HOF*, 
while the COF* solution is 4.5% worse. 
 
Overall, it can be seen that all optima for Salerno require improvement in the public 
transport supply and an increase in costs for the user of the private network.  The 
latter can be achieved either by the implementation of road pricing or by an increase 
in the parking charge, or both. 
 
Technically, there would be difficulty in increasing the public transport frequency by 
the required  percentages (50%-80%) as this would imply the redesign of all the lines 
and perhaps also need many modifications to the public network. Moreover, in order 
to increase the public transport supply in this way, financial problems could arise, as 
it would be necessary to find funds to buy new buses and trams and for new 
employees. 
 
In order to pursue measures that require tariff increases, political approval is needed.  
But it was agreed that there is a balance between, on the one hand, the tariff increases 
and the improvement of the public transport service (involving more financial and 
management burdens) and on the other, greater income.  Politically, it was felt that 
road pricing policy for the city centre (suggested in the DOF optimum strategy) is not 
yet suitable for Salerno. 
 
The public regard the long waiting times caused by crowded buses and low frequency 
as being a problem in Salerno. The improvement of the supply of the public transport 
can lead to an increase of fare that would probably be accepted by the users because 
of the high benefits of the new public transport.  
 
Both politically and publicly,  the increase in road capacity is not favourable for two 
reasons. First of all it requires quite high capital costs that would weigh on cost-
benefit analysis and secondly it increases the private modal split increasing fuel 
consumption at the same time.  
 
Other comments made during the consultations were, that although the BOF function 
safeguards important aspects such as environmental sustainability, it was judged not 
to reflect reality, as it did not consider budget bonds.  The COF function, however, as 
it takes into account financial restrictions, was considered to be closer to the present 
Italian situation. 
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Finally, it was agreed that the involvement of some private businessmen or private 
companies in financing or managing services that at the moment are under the control 
of the government would be a good thing.  However the private sector will be 
interested in such investments only if they can obtain a big economic advantage. 
 
8.3 Overall feasibility 
8.3.1 Financial feasibility 
 
As in OPTIMA, the financial feasibility of the optimum strategies was the most 
frequent concern of the city authorities.  However, financing the whole package was 
considered to be an overwhelming concern only for Merseyside, and to a lesser extent 
for Salerno and Helsinki.  Specific financial concerns expressed included the 
difficulty of obtaining enough capital to finance schemes at the outset (Edinburgh), 
the need for an unacceptable increased public transport subsidy for the BOF solution 
(Helsinki) (which could be slightly eased in the alternative, sub-optimal, solutions) 
and the need to finance extra buses and staff (Salerno).  
8.3.2 Technical feasibility 
 
Overall, the optimum strategies were viewed as being broadly feasible by nearly all 
the authorities – certainly more feasible than in OPTIMA.  One reason for this is the 
reduction in the range of some of the policy measures, making certain components of 
the optima, particularly the highway capacity increases, more technically achievable.  
Specific concerns which remained included the difficulty of designing new 
infrastructure to fit in with a historic setting (guided bus in Edinburgh), the 
introduction of road pricing (Merseyside), the methods of providing extra road 
capacity and increasing public transport frequency (Torino) and the need to redesign 
public transport routes (Salerno). 
8.3.3 Legislative feasibility 
 
With the exception of Salerno and Vienna, which were broadly neutral in this respect, 
there were no major legislative barriers to the acceptability of any of the optima.  
Edinburgh (and Merseyside) pointed out the need for legislation for road pricing, but 
did not consider this to be a major barrier.  In these two cities, however, there would 
be a need for changes to the regulatory framework for public transport to enable fares 
and frequency changes to be implemented.  The difficulty of controlling parking 
charges other than in local authority car parks was also mentioned by Merseyside), 
 
8.4 Overall acceptability 
In FATIMA, the consultation process was extended beyond that applied in OPTIMA, 
to include private sector acceptability and acceptability to the public transport 
operator, rather than just public and political acceptability.  A question was also asked 
concerning the contribution of the optimum strategies towards transport sector service 
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quality.  The results of all these consultations are set out in the sub-sections which 
follow. 
8.4.1 Public acceptability 
 
In gauging public response to the optimal strategies, it is important to stress that the 
views in this section are based on the views of city officials, rather than on a poll of 
the public as a whole. 
 
In only one of the cities (Edinburgh) was the optimal solution considered to be  
publicly acceptable; in three others (Merseyside, Helsinki and Salerno) public 
reaction would be broadly neutral (balanced between perceived benefits and 
disbenefits); while in three (Vienna, Eisenstadt and Torino) the optima would on the 
whole be unacceptable.  
 
Particular problems of  public acceptability resulted from the need for (increased)  
subsidy to public transport which would need to be funded from local taxes 
(Merseyside and Helsinki).  In this respect, Helsinki pointed out that the alternative to 
increased subsidy could be the re-allocation away from other spending sectors. 
Increases in charges to motorists, in the form of road pricing and parking charges, 
were also of general public concern.   For Torino, the combination of  increased fares 
and parking charges becomes unacceptable to all sectors of the public.  In the case of 
Eisenstadt, reduction of public transport frequency, with consequent longer waiting 
times, was the main cause of public unacceptability to the minority who use public 
transport.   
8.4.2 Political acceptability 
 
In three cities (Edinburgh, Helsinki and Salerno) the optima were regarded as being 
broadly politically neutral, with benefits roughly balancing disbenefits, while in the 
remaining four (Merseyside, Vienna, Eisenstadt and Torino), the optima were on 
balance not acceptable.  The political problems were in the main similar to those cited 
for public acceptability, with burdens upon local taxes being of major concern as well 
as increases in charges to motorists, in the form of road pricing and parking charges.  
In Eisenstadt, the reduction in public transport services, especially in service 
frequency, is seen by politicians as being a key problem.   
8.4.3 Private sector acceptability 
 
With the exception of Torino, the optima were considered to be broadly neutral from 
the point of view of private sector acceptability.  In almost all cases this was due to a 
perception that increases in parking charges, especially short term, would cause a loss 
of custom to retail businesses, particularly by encouraging shoppers to choose new 
destinations away from the city centres.  A related point was that higher charges on 
travellers leaves them less money for consumer purchases (Helsinki).  An interesting 
point from Salerno was the suggested possibility that this disadvantage might be 
overcome by reimbursing customers the cost of parking or of shuttle bus access to the 
centre.  The neutral result for private sector acceptability came about because the 
disbenefits listed above are seen as being offset by other improvements to the 
transport system.  This was not the case in Torino, however, where the anticipated 
loss of shoppers made the strategy unacceptable to the private sector. 
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8.4.4 Operator acceptability 
 
There was wide divergence among cities on the acceptability of the optima to the 
operators.  In three of the cities (Edinburgh, Salerno and Torino) the optima were 
acceptable to the operators.  The main reasons given or this were the encouragement 
of faster and more reliable travel times (Edinburgh) and higher incomes from fares 
(Salerno and Torino), reducing the need to find alternative sources of finance.  In the 
cases of  Merseyside and Eisenstadt, the optima were deemed to be unacceptable 
because of loss of revenue to the taxi service (Merseyside) and the low public 
transport revenue (Eisenstadt).  In Helsinki, opinions were divided, with the Espoo 
Planning Centre considering the optimum to be acceptable to the operator but the 
Helsinki Transport Planning Office taking the opposite view. Vienna offered no 
opinion on this aspect of acceptability.  A point made by Merseyside was that in 
optima with free fares, the removal of fare collection procedures would reduce bus 
journey times significantly.  
8.4.5 Quality issues 
 
The authorities were asked whether, under each optimal strategy, it would be possible 
to assure the quality of the public and private transport service.  Two cities 
(Edinburgh and Helsinki) believed that it would, four cities were broadly neutral 
(Merseyside, Vienna, Salerno and Torino), while one (Eisenstadt) emphatically said 
no.  Those who answered positively gave reasons which included better quality as a 
result of faster and more reliable journey times and improved infrastructure.  Those 
who were neutral pointed out that a problem with reduced or free fares is that they 
would reduce the incentive of the operator to compete on quality (Merseyside). It was 
also pointed out that quality would only improve if traffic flow is made more smooth 
by increases in speed (Salerno) or by using the increased revenues to improve the 
physical conditions of public transport (comfort, cleanliness, air conditioning, etc.) 
(Torino).  
 
8.5 Comments on the methodology 
Of those interviewees who expressed any opinion on the methodology, most were 
generally happy with the approach.  There were one or two suggestions for 
improvement, however. 
 
Regarding information from the process, Edinburgh would have liked more 
disaggregation of results (city centre and non central policies) and, given their 
emphasis on walking, cycling and the environment, more data on motorised/non-
motorised modal split and on environmental indicators. 
 
Regarding the analytical process as a whole, Merseyside considered that the supply of 
parking should be included in the policy options, as well as parking charges, and that 
greater attention should be given to the benefits of walking and cycling.  
 
The Torino City Engineer suggested  a formulation of the objective functions should 
be found that specifically takes into account some “quality indicators”, such as 
cleanliness, comfort, air condition and so on. 
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There were also some comments which followed from the earlier OPTIMA 
consultations.  For Merseyside, the question of affordability of optimum strategies 
had been a prime concern in the OPTIMA project, and the development of  objective 
functions in FATIMA to take affordability specifically into account was therefore 
welcomed.  The person interviewed in Vienna was also involved in the OPTIMA 
consultation process and he pointed out that the inclusion of more external transport 
related costs, like accidents, air and noise pollution, in the FATIMA objective 
functions and regimes is an important step in the right direction.  For Helsinki, all the 
major concerns expressed during OPTIMA, particularly combining EEF and SOF, 
including external costs and considering peak and off-peak separately, had been taken 
care of in FATIMA. 
 
8.6 Applicability to other member states 
8.6.1 General 
 
As in OPTIMA, it was part of the FATIMA project to consult with other cities in the 
EU in countries other than those covered in the modelling process.  Stockholm again 
agreed to give their opinion on the results and opinions were sought from Berlin 
(which was preferred to the OPTIMA German city, Idstein, which is considerably 
smaller than most of the OPTIMA/FATIMA cities). 
 
The purpose was to gain professional outsiders’ impartial opinions of the FATIMA 
project and the method it employed and particularly of the practicability of the 
FATIMA optimum policies more generally in European cities.  The FATIMA project 
with its preliminary results was therefore presented to the two cities concerned. 
 
Key data for the two cities are as follows: 
 
 Stockholm Berlin 
Population (‘000) 1600 3459 
Area (ha) 345500 89167 
Density (person/ha) 4.63 38.8 
% pedestrian trips 13 - 
% cycling trips 8 - 
% car trips 31 70 
% public transport trips 47 30 
 
8.6.2 Stockholm 
 
The FATIMA method and results were presented to researchers at the Division of 
Traffic and Transport Planning of the Department of Infrastructure and Planning at 
the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) Stockholm. The representative of the 
researchers and developers of transport planning methods at KTH in Stockholm was 
very interested in the FATIMA project, its strategic approach and the methods 
developed. 
Comments on the results:  The Stockholm respondent preferred not to comment on 
 82
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
the results.  This was because Oslo was the only study city known to the respondent 
and the Oslo results had just changed, giving insufficient time to allow considered 
comments to be made.  It was not considered sensible to offer opinions on the other 
study cities because the respondent did not know them well enough.  A number of 
comments were made about the FATIMA method, however. 
 
Comments on the method:.  The formulation of the objective functions to represent 
the targets of the whole transportation system was seen to be a significant step 
forward in the field.  However, it was felt that, in practice, the objective functions 
might still need some development and more detailed definition, depending on the 
city and country to which they were applied.  
 
The objective functions and the social economic calculations were considered to 
cover most issues of importance, as the cost-benefit analysis included basic external 
costs, the requirements of sustainability, revenue generation and privatisation. 
However, it was considered that there were some further impacts that were not 
assessed, such as the effect on income, land use and car ownership, which become 
important when the changes are non-marginal.  In addition to the sensitivity studies it 
was felt that some more research or discussion could usefully take place on the 
balance of the two basic objectives, the economically efficient transport system and 
the sustainable transport system. 
 
There was also some doubt about the general applicability of the unified measures in 
the project to cities which were vastly different in size, characteristics and present 
transport system.  The level of congestion for instance affects the set of measures and 
policies that are feasible.  The FATIMA results of the test cities indicated this, in that  
the response to the measures in the small cities differed from that of the larger cities. 
For the method to be more generally applicable, a different set of measures could be 
chosen, e.g. traffic calming and the use of speed control as policy measures. 
 
It was noted that the FATIMA consortium was already aware that the assumptions 
and simplifications made in the project have practical consequences and that within 
the project’s resources it was not possible to assess these consequences further. The 
differences between the strategic and tactical models, and the benefits and disbenefits 
of each were discussed; from this a doubt was expressed that some of the models used 
produced results which were rather too uncertain.  It was pointed out that Stockholm 
(like the other Nordic cities) only has tactical models in operation. 
 
In principle they would not have any objection to testing the FATIMA method for 
Stockholm but would like to make some changes to the objective functions and 
measures tested. The structure of the Stockholm area differs from the cities tested 
which would make differences in the practical applicability of the measures as well as 
their effects on land use. There are 24 municipalities in the Stockholm Region of 
which around ten form the actual Stockholm Metropolitan Area.  There is no special 
council for the metropolitan area, as is the case for Helsinki MA, but the planning 
function is carried out by the authorities of each municipality including the City of 
Stockholm and the authorities of the Stockholm Region. This raised the question of 
whether the measures should be applied at the municipality level or at the regional 
level.  It might thus also be difficult to convince the individual municipality 
authorities of the optimal set of measures and the benefits they would gain. 
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8.6.3 Berlin 
 
The FATIMA method and results were presented to the head of the Department for 
transport Models and databases of the Berlin City Council. 
 
Comments on the results:   
 
a). The BOF, COF and ROF regime:
 
Berlin suggested that the Vienna optimum was not appropriate for Berlin and 
suggested an alternative set of measures for the BOF, COF and ROF regimes.  Rather 
than specifying actual values they suggested a scale of change from the do-minimum, 
which is compared with the Vienna optimum below. 
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Measure Berlin Vienna 
public transport infrastructure  ++ 0 
public transport + 0 
public transport 0/+ ++ 
road capacity 0/+ -- 
road pricing + 0 
long term parking charge + 0 
short term parking charge ++ ++ 
 
The comments which follow relate to this combination of measures. 
 
It was considered that the starting point for technical feasibility is in political 
consensus, with technical feasibility essentially being a question of the availability of 
funds.  However, the costs of such an optimum strategy were considered to be too 
high for the city authority, especially as it appears unlikely that the modal share of 
public transport would fall short of the level required by the authority.  There 
appeared to be no way in which this financial problem could be overcome. 
 
From the legislative point of view, there is a German law which requires fares to be 
high enough to ensure the public transport enterprise remains profitable.  If this is not 
the case under the optimum strategy, there is a possibility that the difference could be 
made up by the state in the form of a subsidy.   
 
For the public, the private sector and the pubic transport operator, the optimum would 
be generally unacceptable.  Despite the reduction of car traffic causing a reduction in 
noise and air pollution, the public would object to the parallel reduction in personal 
mobility.  It is also likely that road pricing would be unacceptable. (In this respect, 
increases in parking fees are likely to be a more acceptable way of placing an 
additional financial burden of car travel).  The private sector could be expected to fear 
that the significant increase in short term parking charges could persuade shoppers to 
change destination to locations outside the city centre while the public transport 
operator may expect a reduction in earnings due to a smaller than expected shift in 
modal split towards public transport. 
 
Politically, though there may be political disbenefits (road pricing, no new car-related 
infrastructure, higher parking charges), provided the cost of public transport can be 
reduced (perhaps by competition) and the level of public transport service at least 
maintained, the optimum may be regarded as neutral in political terms. 
 
Berlin considered that the only improvement which could be made to this optimum 
strategy would be the introduction of additional measures to increase the modal share 
of environmentally friendly transport modes, but pointed out that this would need a 
consensus on a European scale. 
 
It is difficult to know how to interpret these comments, since the respondent has 
proposed an alternative strategy which he then considers to be unacceptable on 
several grounds. 
 
 
b). The Vienna DOF and HOF regime if applied to Berlin. 
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Overall, this optimum would be generally feasible from the technical, financial and 
legislative points of view.   The only (minor) financial problem foreseen would be the 
need for more rolling stock, which could be overcome by the selection of suitable 
financial instruments. 
 
The public transport operator would benefit from higher profits from a shift to public 
transport modes (though there would be an increase in risk), while the private sector 
would benefit from new orders for rolling stock. 
 
From the public and political points of view, the optimum would be broadly neutral: 
the public would weigh the benefits of better public transport supply against the 
possibility of reduced public transport service quality resulting from lower profits. 
 
Comments on the method:  Unlike Stockholm, who chose to concentrate comments 
on the methods of FATIMA, Berlin chose to concentrate on the results.  However, 
regarding the method, Berlin did make a number of  points, the first of which was  
that the objective functions are very theoretical.  They also pointed out that the 
information available from the FATIMA analyses was insufficient to answer fully the 
various questions asked in the consultation process. 
 
The attempt to quantify the effects of policy measures in combination was welcomed, 
but the difficulty, in research terms, of doing this effectively, was acknowledged. 
 
Finally, it was suggested that qualitative methods may have a role to play in that they 
may more adequately address some of the assessment problems. 
 
8.6.4 Implications of the Stockholm and Berlin consulatations 
The main implications came from the comments made by Stockholm on the method.  
The issues are: 
 
• the objective functions would need to be developed further to reflect the needs of 
other cities; 
 
• a wider range of impacts may need to be modelled when changes are non-
marginal (i.e. when there is a major change in the costs of travel); 
 
• a wider range of policy measures could be tested; 
 
• consideration needs to be given as to whether to apply the methods at a local, city 
or regional level. 
 
All these issues could be incorporated within the FATIMA method. 
 
 
 
8.7 Summary of the consultations 
In OPTIMA, the major barrier to implementation in a number of cities was the 
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availability of finance, particularly for the sustainability optimum strategies.  The 
introduction of a new benchmark objective function in FATIMA has generated 
strategies which overcame this problem for the majority of cities  However, finance is 
still seen as a barrier by some city authorities and the alternative objective functions 
provide means of overcoming this, albeit with lower social benefits. 
Legislation will be needed to enable road pricing to be implemented and for parking 
charges to be controlled.  In Italy and the UK there is also a need for legislation to 
it rt strategies to be implemented. 
Public and political acceptability will be a significant barrier to measures which 
increase costs (especially motoring costs) or reduce service levels.  The successful 
implementation of such measures, demonstrating their overall effectiveness within a 
package of policies, could help overcome this, as could effective marketing.  
Most of the suggestions made in OPTIMA for improving the methodology were 
included in FATIMA, but there were some further concerns that the methodology 
should ideally be capable of addressing directly the issue of transport system quality. 
 
9. POLICY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 The effects of constraints on public finance 
A particularly important result from FATIMA is that in six of the nine cities 
(Edinburgh, Vienna, Eisenstadt, Oslo, Torino and Salerno) an optimal strategy could 
be identified which required no net additional financial support (in addition to the do-
minimum support) over the 30 year evaluation period.  In all of these cases (Classes 3 
and 4 in Section 5.8) the revenue from users more than covers the cost of any changes 
in infrastructure and operation.  Even so, city authorities may be constrained, since 
typically they have to raise finance for investment initially, and only obtain repayment 
from users later.  This represents one of the situations in which private finance may be 
used.  In these situations the private sector can be reimbursed either directly by the 
users or indirectly from the city authority using revenues from users.  In the former 
case, it is important that the charges on the user are consistent with the overall optimal 
strategy.  With the exception of private sector operation of public transport (see 9.3 
below) it has been assumed implicitly in the model tests that the private sector would 
require the same rate of return as the public sector.  Where this is not the case, the 
optimal strategy may well be constrained, resulting in lower social benefits. 
 
In the other three cities (Merseyside, Tromsø and Helsinki), the optimal strategy 
would require a higher level of financial support than the do-minimum (Classes 1 and 
2 in Section 5.8).  That it is not to say that such strategies are unacceptable; the 
shadow price assigned to the financial outlay indicates that use of public finance is 
justifiable when compared with its use in other sectors.  However, city authorities 
may be constrained by national governments not to increase their financial outlay 
(and hence the tax burden).  Where such restrictions apply solely to the initial 
investment, private sector finance can  be used, but part of the cost will have to be met 
by increased taxation (or reduced expenditure in non-transport sectors) in future 
years.  The comments in the preceding paragraph then apply.  Where restrictions 
perm the recommended public transpo
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apply throughout the (30 year) evaluation period, an alternative strategy is required, 
represented here by the Constrained Objective Function (COF). As noted in Section 5, 
these strategies impose higher costs on the user, make reduced investment, and have 
smaller benefits to society.  An alternative which in principle can avoid these 
constraints is to raise additional finance from the (secondary) beneficiaries of the 
strategy, through value capture.  
 
9.2 The role of value capture 
Value capture in Project FATIMA was represented by a percentage (typically 10%) of 
the user benefits and was raised where it could relieve the restrictions on availability 
of public finance.  In practice value capture was only relevant in Class 1 cities, where 
there are substantial user benefits even under a constrained public finance regime.  In 
these circumstances value capture can help towards financing the socially optimal 
strategy (as represented by the Benchmark Objective Function).  In Class 2 cities, 
there are no substantial user benefits under a constrained public finance regime and so 
there is limited scope for value capture.  In Class 3 cities there is no significant 
financial constraint, and availability of additional finance will not lead to an enhanced 
strategy.  In Class 4 cities there are typically no significant user benefits to be 
captured.  Thus value capture appears to have a very limited role in financing optimal 
strategies. 
 
9.3 Private sector operation of public transport 
Private operation of public transport is possible in a regulated regime (as represented 
by the Benchmark Objective Function (BOF)) or in a deregulated regime (as 
represented by the Deregulated, and Half Regulated, Objective Functions (DOF and 
HOF)). 
 
In the former case it is often argued that the operating costs are reduced if public 
transport is operated privately.  We have been unable to find any convincing evidence 
that this is the case, but we have conducted sensitivity tests to assess the impact.  
These suggest that operating cost savings would have relatively small impacts on the 
overall social benefit, or the specification of the optimal strategy.  There may be 
benefits to be gained or adverse effects from private sector operation, as listed in 
Section 5.3, but they need to be more convincingly demonstrated.  As noted in 
Section 5.3, changes in operating costs as a result of private operation were not 
modelled in the main optimisation work, although they were considered in subsequent 
sensitivity tests. 
 
In the case of a deregulated regime, private sector operation carries the additional 
disbenefit that the city authority has no control on the strategy adopted by the private 
sector, and the resulting strategy may as a result be substantially sub-optimal.  This 
essentially results from the loss of the concept of an integrated “package” of 
measures; whilst some measures are set in order to maximise social benefit, others are 
set in order to maximise the separate and possibly contradictory objective of private 
sector profit.  It is not then surprising that the overall optimal combination of 
measures in a deregulated regime is inferior, in terms of net social benfit, to the 
optimal combination of measures in a regime where the public authority has full 
control over all measures.  In fact it was found in the optimisation work that even the 
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best performing DOF solutions produced lower social benefits than the BOF optima.  
However, DOF solutions did have the advantage of substantially reducing the initial 
capital outlay by the city authority. 
 
The problematic nature of complete deregulation led to the consideration of HOF (the 
half-regulated regime) which allowed for subsidy to be paid to the private operator 
whilst still keeping an essentially deregulated regime. Since there are a large number 
of mechanisms for providing subsidy, the half-regulated regime was less clearly 
defined than either the fully deregulated regime or the fully regulated regime.  In spite 
of this imprecision, though, the  FATIMA results showed that whilst the HOF-optimal 
solutions were always preferable to DOF-optimal solutions (over a 30 year time 
horizon), they were never superior to Constrained Objective Function (COF) optima.  
Thus, over a 30 year period, all deregulated regimes (both HOF and DOF) were 
inferior to the constrained regulated regime. 
 
9.4 Recommendations for the design of optimal transport 
strategies 
The following recommendations can be made for policy makers on the design of 
optimal transport strategies: 
 
1. Strategies should be based on combinations of measures, and should draw fully on 
the synergy between successful measures. 
 
2. The key elements of a successful strategy should be public transport measures and 
car user charges. In most cases, the public transport measures should include  
increased service levels and/or reductions in fares.  However, the degree of such 
changes will clearly depend on the service and fare levels in the base case.  Car 
user charges can be applied through road pricing or parking charges. 
 
3. There should generally be a distinction between peak and off-peak 
implementation of public transport and car user charge measures.  
 
4. Low cost road capacity improvements should generally be included in a 
successful strategy.  However, it should be emphasised that such improvements 
should come from measures that genuinely improve traffic efficiency, given a 
fixed level of infrastructure.  Such measures would typically include: traffic signal 
coordination and optimisation; telematics measures; and other traffic management 
measures.  Low cost road capacity improvements should not be introduced if they 
have a negative effect on plans for city centre pedestrianisation, traffic calming in 
residential neighbourhoods, or enhancements to pedestrian mobility or safety. 
 
5. Large-scale public transport infrastructure projects would typically not be part of 
an optimal strategy.  However, medium-scale and small-scale infrastructure 
projects, such as guided bus or improvements to the public transport vehicle fleet, 
may be beneficial. 
 
6. In some circumstances, optimal policies (in terms of net social benefit) may 
include both car user charges and increased fares for public transport users 
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(without a corresponding increase in service levels). The implications of this 
require careful consideration, since they suggest that transport policy can be used 
to subsidise other areas of public policy.”  
 
9.5 Recommendations for the involvement of the private sector  
The following recommendations for policy-makers can be extracted from the 
discussion above: 
 
1. In many cities it will be possible, following the methodology outlined in Section 
9.6, to identify strategies which are optimal, and whose costs over a 30 year 
evaluation period are met in full by payments from users.  Care will needed to 
ensure that the pattern of charges on users is politically acceptable and legally 
feasible. 
 
2. Even in the circumstances in (1), city authorities may not be able to raise the 
finance required for initial investment in the strategy.  In such situations, the 
private sector may be able to finance the strategy, and be repaid either directly by 
users or by the city authorities using payments by users.  In either case, the user 
charges should be consistent with the strategy: fares or charges imposed at higher 
than optimal levels to satisfy the private sector can significantly reduce the 
performance of the strategy.  Furthermore, where the private sector requires a 
higher rate of return than the public sector discount rate, this may result in a more 
constrained, and less beneficial, strategy.  The implications of this for involving 
the private sector need to be carefully assessed. 
 
3. Where the financial costs of the strategy exceed the revenues, it may still be 
acceptable for city authorities to finance them.  The optimal strategies in FATIMA 
have been generated on the basis that the opportunity cost of using finance for 
them is fully justified.  Where city authorities cannot raise the initial finance, it 
may be appropriate to involve the private sector, as in (2).  However, the private 
sector will need to be reimbursed in part from future tax revenue, or from future 
revenue generated by reducing public expenditure on other sectors. 
 
4. Where public finance is limited, the optimisation procedures used in FATIMA can 
identify the appropriate modification to the strategy to achieve the optimal 
performance within the financial constraint.  Such strategies will usually have 
smaller social benefits than those without such constraints. 
 
5. In the situation in (4), value capture may offer an opportunity for raising 
additional finance to help support the transport system.  Such finance, which 
would not involve (later) repayments by transport users or the city authority, 
should be distinguished from the private finance arrangements in (2), which do 
involve such repayments.  However, within the range of conditions tested, value 
capture appears not to offer the potential for significantly improving the overall 
strategy. 
 
6. Whether or not the private sector is involved in financing a strategy, there may be 
interest in private sector operation of the public transport service.  Such 
involvement may possibly increase managerial efficiency which would enhance 
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the performance of an overall strategy or alternatively it may lead to a reduction in 
net social welfare: evidence on the scale of these benefits or losses is unclear. 
 
7. Private sector operation has been implemented through deregulation, in which 
operators are free to determine service levels and fares, and through franchising, 
where the city authority specifies them.  If a city authority decides that private 
operation is beneficial, it should use, where legally possible, a franchising model 
in which it specifies the objectives and the optimal service levels and fares. 
 
8. If a deregulation model is required (in order to comply with national law), private 
operators should not be given complete freedom to  determine the operating 
conditions which meet their profitability target, even if the level of profitability is 
itself constrained as a result.  There are typically a number of combinations (e.g. 
of fares and frequency) which achieve a given level of profitability, and not all 
will be equally effective in terms of public policy objectives. 
 
9.6 Methodological recommendations 
The key steps for strategy/policy formulation, in the order they should occur, are 
given below.  Of these steps, the most problematic in terms of practical transport 
policy-making are steps 1 and 2, and they should be given special attention by policy-
makers:  
 
1. identify the policy objective(s) clearly; 
 
2. where a set of policy objectives is identified, indicate what the appropriate trade-
off is between them (assuming, usually correctly, that they are to some extent in 
conflict); 
 
3. identify the set of policy measures which are to be considered, and which can be 
expected to have a strategic impact (in particular, list those which meet the latter 
requirement); 
 
4. specify the range(s) within which the measures in point 3 can be applied, and the 
factors which limit that range (financial, political, legislative etc.); 
 
5. specify any other overall constraints (e.g. financial) on the specification of optimal 
strategies; 
 
6. employ a transport model which enables the full range of measures in point 3 to 
be assessed against all the objectives (from point 1), taking into account of all the 
user responses (mode, time of day, destination, frequency, route) of strategic 
relevance, and all the supply interactions (congestion, overcrowding, queuing) of 
strategic relevance; 
 
7. follow the optimisation procedure (as set out in Sections 1.5 of this report) to 
identify the optimum, taking into account constraints where appropriate; 
 
8. check that this optimum is feasible and acceptable and modify if necessary; 
 
 91
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
9. decide whether it is appropriate to use private finance or private sector operation, 
or both.  If so, decide how best to employ them within the context of a socially 
optimum strategy. 
 
 
9.7 Recommendations for further research 
The general approach taken in OPTIMA was well accepted, particularly by the city 
authorities involved in the consultation procedure.  However, the approach could be 
further refined in a number of directions, as given below: 
 
1. The objective functions have no measure of equity in them.  Issues of equity arise 
in two different aspects, amongst others.  Firstly, there is the issue of intrazonal 
equity, concerning the relative differences in benefits received by different socio-
economic groups living in the same neighbourhood.  Secondly, there is the issue 
of interzonal equity, which concerns the differences in benefit received by 
inhabitants of different neighbourhoods.  It is recommended that both issues of 
equity be considered in future research into the construction of objective 
functions.   
 
2. The choice of measures to be used for forming optimal packages did not include 
land use measures.  As explained in the OPTIMA Final Report, this was due to the 
lack of availability of appropriate models for representing combined land-use / 
transportation policies.  However, as such models are currently being developed, 
the possibility should arise for including land use measures in future optimisation 
work. 
 
3. Research should be carried out into making a comprehensive assessment of the 
consequences of private sector operation of public transport, both under regulated 
and deregulated regimes.  Such an assessment should not be limited to financial 
costs of operation, but should also take into account potential “external” effects of 
private operation such as: redundancies (and hence increasing social costs due to 
increased levels of unemployment); changes in employees’ wages; changes in 
safety levels and changes in other environmental benefits or costs. 
 
4. The policy measures considered by FATIMA were, for each city, relative to a 
“do-minimum” strategy specified by the respective city authority.  Typically, the 
measures involved with such strategies are those to which an authority has made a 
full commitment.  It follows that the recommendations given make an implicit 
critique of a city’s committed policies.  However, it could be argued that such an 
approach might misrepresent a city’s intentions since it might be planning “likely” 
policies to which it has not made a full commitment.  Such policies were not 
considered explicitly in the FATIMA optimisation work.  It is thus recommended 
that, in future optimisation work, a method be devised which takes account of 
potential city policies to which there has not yet been full commitment. 
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BOF Benchmark Objective Function 
BOF* Set of measures with highest BOF value (BOF optimum) 
COF Constrained Objective Function 
COF* Set of measures with highest COF value (COF optimum) 
DOF Deregulated objective Function 
DOF* Set of measures with highest DOF value (DOF optimum) 
EC External Costs 
EEF Economic Efficiency Function without external costs (used in OPTIMA) 
EEFP Economic Efficiency Function with external costs 
HOF Half-regulated Objective Function 
HOF* Set of measures with highest HOF value (HOF optimum) 
IH High public transport infrastructure 
IM Medium public transport infrastructure 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
MA Metropolitan Authority 
MS Mode Split 
NPV Net Present Value 
PVF Present Value of Finance 
PVF* Present Value of Finance for public authority when public transport is 
 deregulated 
ROF Regulated Objective Function 
ROF* Set of measures with highest ROF value (ROF optimum) 
SOF Sustainability Objective Function 
VC Value Capture 
α parameter used to calculate BOF (default value 0.1) 
β parameter used to calculate VC (default value 0.1) 
γ parameter used to calculate external costs in EEFP (given in Table 1) 
λ shadow price parameter used to calculate EEFP (default value 0.25) 
 96
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
ANNEX 2: DESCRIPTIONS OF THE CITIES  
Each test city is presented in a section of its own comprised of a short overall 
description of the city, its transport system and current policy measures. 
 
A2.1  Edinburgh MA 
 
General description of the city 
Edinburgh is the capital city of Scotland. The study area includes the city and its 
immediately surrounding commuter towns, including the southern part of Fife Region, 
immediately north of the Forth road and rail bridges. It is the principal centre for 
government, finance and legislation for Scotland, a regional shopping centre, and a 
base for high technology industry linked to its three universities. It is also a major 
centre for tourism focused on the castle and Old Town, and the Georgian New Town. 
The population of Edinburgh MA is 420 000, 58 % of households own cars and car 
ownership is 0.32 cars per inhabitant. 
Transportation system 
The transport network of the study area is constrained by the Forth Estuary, to the 
north of the city, and ranges of hills to the south. The city’s road network includes a 
purpose-built outer ring road, and motorway connections to Glasgow and Fife, but 
most of the roads within the city are of variable standard. Most public transport is by 
bus, supplemented by urban rail services, predominantly to the west and across the 
River Forth. 
51 % of all trips are made by car and 65 % of motorised trip-km are by car with most 
of the rest by bus. 
Transport policy measures 
In Edinburgh a combination of infrastructure, management and pricing measures is 
used to reduce car traffic in the city centre. The intention is to forbid long-stay trips 
by car but allow short-stay trips. On street parking is being reduced. There are also 
schemes for new highway construction and increasing capacity, but the attitude is 
changing towards encouraging public transport instead of building more roads. In 
residential areas traffic calming is being introduced. 
The public transport network has recently been expanded by a new rail line and a new 
light rail system is being planned. Better information systems for both public transport 
and car drivers are under preparation. 
There are several ongoing measures for enhancing non-motorised-traffic and its 
facilities, pedestrianisation in city centre, wide pavements, cycle lanes, parking 
facilities for bicycles etc. Also totally car-less development areas are planned. 
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A2.2  Merseyside 
 
General description of the city 
The Merseyside conurbation, centred on the city of Liverpool, lies on the west coast 
of England. Liverpool itself is a regional centre for shopping and business, as well as 
being the main west coast port and a university centre. It is bordered by the boroughs 
of Sefton, including the seaside resort of Southport, and Knowsley, which has several 
distinct town centres within an area of suburban development. St Helens lies further 
to the east, while the Wirral District, including Birkenhead, is separated from 
Liverpool by the Mersey estuary. 
Merseyside has a population of 1 440 000 of which Liverpool accounts for 700 000. 
The average population density is 22.2 inhabitants per hectare. 
Car ownership in Merseyside is low, 0.69 cars per household in 1991 compared to the 
national average of 0.88. 
Transportation system 
The area has several motorways and high capacity roads including two toll tunnels 
linking Birkenhead and Liverpool under the Mersey. It also has an extensive suburban 
rail network, centred on Liverpool, with a tunnel linking Liverpool to Birkenhead and 
towns on the Wirral. 
78 % of motorised person-km are by car, 19 % by bus and 3 % by rail. 
Transport policy measures 
Merseyside aims at improving the accessibility and efficiency of the transport system. 
For public transport the rail network and park and ride system will be extended, a 
light rail system is under consideration and new technology will be used to promote 
public transport. 
Also measures improving car traffic are being implemented. Parking measures are 
however used to favour short-stay trips to the centre and encourage commuters to 
choose public transport. A road pricing cordon around the centre has been planned if 
the ongoing measures are not enough to prevent congestion. Traffic calming measures 
are used in residential areas and residential centres. Improving facilities of non-
motorised traffic elsewhere includes pedestrianisation and new cycle routes and other 
facilities. 
 
A2.3  Vienna 
 
General description of the city 
Vienna is the capital city of Austria. It is the principal centre for government, finance 
and legislation of Austria, a regional shopping centre, a focus for culture and industry, 
and contains a concentration of universities. The traditional city centre, the many 
famous buildings and cultural associations have made Vienna a major centre for 
tourism. 
 98
 FATIMA: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT INTEGRATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS:  
DELIVERABLE D4: FINAL REPORT: PART 2 
 
Table A2.1 The population, area and population density for different zones in 
Vienna. 
Zone Population Area (Ha) Density (Person/Ha) 
City Centre 18 002 301 59.81  
Inside Districts 385 933 3 711  103.99  
Outside Districts 828 038 19 248  43.02  
Wide-area Districts 307 875 17 348  17.75  
Total 1 539 848 40 609  37.92  
Source : Statistiches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien, 1993, Tab. 1.08., 2.02, 2.03.E.    
Around 80 % of households own cars. 
Transportation system 
The city road network includes three ring roads and a north-south and east-west 
motorway. Reorganisation of the road network has been in planning to restructure the 
network based upon its function (PT main streets, Private car main streets, and 
PT/Private car main streets). Most public transport is by metro and trams 
supplemented by urban rail services and buses. Vienna public transport modes are: 
tram, bus, underground, commuter train, regional train and bus. The city centre is 
mostly pedestrianised. 
Around 37 % of all trips are made by car, 37 % on public transport and the rest are as 
pedestrians and cyclists. 
Transport policy measures 
Several measures for reducing car traffic in the city centre and promoting public 
transport, walking and cycling have been introduced already since 1970s in Vienna. 
Large pedestrian areas, wide and/or raised footpaths were needed and a wide cycle 
path network has been introduced. Also public transport has been promoted by 
continuous upkeep and construction, reserving separated lanes, giving priority at 
intersections as well as pricing policy and information.  
Also necessary car traffic has been taken care of by restructuring the road network, by 
building parking garages and park and ride facilities, by reducing on-street parking 
and by increasing levels of parking charge.  
 
A2.4  Eisenstadt 
 
General description of the city 
Eisenstadt is the capital of the province of Burgenland, one of the 9 provinces in 
Austria. The study area includes the whole of the city. Eisenstadt is the principal 
centre for local government, an education centre, and also a regional shopping centre. 
Tourism has increased through publicity as the City of Haydn. The city centre is a 
traditional shopping area and has the largest pedestrian zone (2.1 m² / person) in 
Austria. The city of Eisenstadt is a very rare case in that the city makes a profit out of 
the traffic system. 
Eisenstadt has a relatively small developed area and low population density. Car 
ownership is 0.66 cars per person and 1.66 cars per household. 
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Table A2.2 The population, area, and population density for the zones of 
Eisenstadt. 
Zone Population Area (Ha) Density (Person/Ha) 
City Centre 767 66  11.63  
Central city area 2 584 162  15.97  
Residential area 3 521 741  4.75  
Distinct town centres 3 037 2 432  1.25  
Business/Industrial area 440 889  0.49  
Total 10 349 4 290  2.41  
 
Transportation system 
Eisenstadt has a large pedestrian zone, a city taxi system in operation 24 hours a day 
as public transport, supported by regional buses and rail. The network of the study 
area includes the nearby motorways and the main street. 
Transport policy measures 
Car traffic in the centre of Eisenstadt has been restricted by severe parking policy and 
land use measures by dedicating a separate area for commerce and industry use. 
Public transport has been promoted by introducing a single tariff for all modes and 
integrating and improving PT operation. A speciality of Eisenstadt is a city taxi 
system which is highly subsidised. 
 
A2.5  Helsinki MA 
 
General description of the city 
Helsinki, the capital city of Finland, lies in Southern Finland by the Gulf of Finland in 
the Baltic Sea. It is surrounded by three other cities: Espoo, Kauniainen and Vantaa; 
and they together form the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, which is the study area. The 
old city centre of Helsinki lies on a peninsula which has its influence on the traffic 
system.  
Table A2.3 The population, area, and population density for  Helsinki MA. 
 Population  Area (land) Population density 
 1995 1990 hectares inh./ha 1995 
Helsinki  525 031 492 400 18450 28.53 
Espoo  191 247 172 629 31190 6.15 
Kauniainen  8 298 7 889 590 14.07 
Vantaa  166 480 154 933 24080 6.94 
Total 891 056 827 851 74310 11.99 
 
Car ownership is one of the lowest in Finland, at 320 cars/1000 inhabitants. Slightly 
over 60 % of households have a car at their disposal. 
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Transportation system 
The road network creates a system of seven radial and two orbital roads. The public 
transport trunk network is based on both rail traffic and buses. There are three local 
railway lines and one metro line radial to the city centre. Only the western corridor 
relies on buses only. In the inner city there are seven tram lines as well. The public 
transport system operates very well. 
In Helsinki MA 47 % of all trips are made by car, 29 % on public transport and 24 % 
as pedestrians or cyclists. 
Transport policy measures 
Helsinki has determinedly promoted public transport to keep it in a competitive 
position with private car. The means have been introducing new lines, improving 
frequency, speed and reliability, a simple price system, subsidies and especially good 
information with timetable booklets delivered free of charge to each household in the 
area. 
A very strict parking policy in the city centre is the main measure for restraining 
unwanted car traffic. Traffic calming using several measures has been implemented in 
residential areas both in the inner city and suburbs.  Cycling and walking have been 
promoted by ongoing construction of separate lanes for non motorised traffic all over 
the area. Also good and safe parking facilities especially for park and ride are under 
development. 
 
A2.6  Torino MA 
 
General description of the city 
Torino is a regional capital. It is one of the most industrialised cities of Italy. Torino 
Metropolitan Area is composed of Torino and 22 municipalities of the conurbation. 
Table A2.4 The population, area, and population density for Torino. 
 Population (1995) Area (ha) Density (inh./ha) 
Torino 924161 13017 71.0 
Belt 529667 48208 11.0 
Total 1453828 61225 23.7 
 
Car ownership in 1992  in Torino was 0.63 cars per inhabitant (from ACI data). 
 
Transportation system 
The available means of public transport in the area are a railway system used 
principally by commuters and for long distance trips, and the public transport system 
for urban and suburban trips which has 79 lines (11 of which are tramway lines and 
the remainder bus). 
The public transport share of motorised trips in Torino MA is 23 %, but 39 % for trips 
made inside Torino city itself. 
Transport policy measures 
In Torino many measures have already been implemented to improve the efficiency of 
the transportation system of the city, save time and decrease pollution and noise. 
There is a city-wide traffic control system with public transport priorities, streets and 
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lanes reserved for PT and pricing measures used to encourage PT and  reduce long-
stay parking in the centre. The most powerful measure was introduced in 1990, 
namely the Traffic Limited Zone where no private car traffic is allowed without a 
permit between 7.30 am and 1.00 pm. 
Public transport network extensions are planned for especially all rail modes, light 
rail, tram and metro. A park and ride system will be introduced. 
The ongoing large 5T-project in Torino (Telematic Technologies for Transport and 
Traffic in Torino) is a great step forward in developing and controlling the transport 
system. 
 
A2.7  Salerno 
 
General description of the city 
Salerno lies on the Tyrenian Sea, not far from Naples. It is a typical Italian medium-
sized city: it has a large concentration of activities and movements towards the central 
zones, a rather homogeneous daily distribution of mobility with three peaks at 8.00 
a.m., at 1.00 p.m. and at 8.00 p.m., and finally a significant quota of movements to 
and from with the outlying areas that account for 50% of all movements. 
Table A2.5 Population by zone in Salerno (1981 Census): 
ZONE POPULATION % 
centre 26915 17 
central area  82746 53 
suburban area 36105 23 
peripheral area 11619  7 
TOTAL 157385 100 
 
Population density  in Salerno is 26.2 inhabitants per hectare and car ownership is 
around 0.4 cars per inhabitant. 
 
Transportation system 
The modal split for internal trips is 40 % by car, 7 % by public transport, 6 % on 
bicycle and 47 % on foot. For commuters the modal split is 77 % by car, 19 % by bus 
and 4 % by train. 
 
Transport policy measures 
Salerno is at the moment at the planning stage of introducing transport policy 
measures. It envisages improving public transport by new investments, lane 
separation, information, promoting walking and cycling by good facilities and making 
car traffic smoother by increasing road capacity and off-street parking places. 
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A2.8  Oslo MA 
 
Oslo is the capital city of Norway. The green belt areas in the north and east of Oslo 
combined with the Oslo Fjord result in three corridors leading to the central parts of 
Oslo. Oslo Metropolitan Area, which is the study area, includes the city itself and the 
county of Akershus consisting of several municipalities. It is by far the greatest 
metropolitan area of Norway with a population of  918 500. 
Table A2.6 The population, area and  population density for the zones of Oslo MA. 
Zone  Area (hectares) Population Inhabitants/hectare 
1 Central business district 259 2000 8 
2 Inner city 2306 143000 62 
3 Outer city west 3789 97000 26 
4 Outer city east 8940 240000 27 
5 Green belt 30104 1500 0.05 
6 Akershus 491600 434000 1 
 
Transportation system 
 
The available means of transport in Oslo MA are walking, cycling and car (driver and 
passenger), and the following public modes: bus, tram/light rail, metro, railway, boat 
and taxi. 
The metro system comprises 100 km of track in an 8-armed star structure, on which 5 
lines are operated. Oslo is also the hub of the Norwegian rail system, with lines to the 
west, north, east and south. The length of tramway lines is 128 km. The structure of 
the trunk road system is three orbital rings and five radials, concentrated in three 
corridors: west, east and south. 
The modal split in the area is car 62 % of the trips, public transport 16.4 % and slow 
modes (walk and cycle) 21.6%. 
 
Transport policy measures 
A variety of transport policy measures are in use in Oslo. These include a highway 
construction plan for the period 1988-2007, partly financed by a toll ring. Bus lanes 
on the new and old highways are an important part of this policy. A new airport is 
being built, and a high speed rail connection is to secure a high share of public 
transport to the airport. The metro system has been constantly improved, and 
measures such as signal prioritisation and own rights of way are taken to increase 
journey speed of buses and tramways. On the other hand, traffic calming measures 
has been introduced in most residential areas. Parking policy has been restrictive in 
the inner city. Public transport fares policy has been changing, from rather big 
increases in the ‘80s to stable fares in the ‘90s. A unitary fare system for the whole 
region exists, and is shortly to be improved by electronic ticketing.
There are high taxes both on cars and fuel in Norway. The major feature of the land 
use policy is the ban on building in the green belt area. 
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 A2.9  Tromsø 
 
General description of the city 
Tromsø is a regional centre with a large hospital and several educational centres. The 
topology of Tromsø is special, with a large part of the town area on an island with 
bridges to both sides, and with steep hills and distinctive ribbonlike stretches of built 
up areas along the coast lines. 
Table A2.7 The population and working places for the zones of Tromsø (1996). 
 
 Population Students Working places 
City centre 4147 0 9459 
Tromsø island (rest) 24210 8713 16585 
Mainland 13696 0 2079 
Kvaløya 6784 0 1074 
Other 7778 0 717 
Total 56615 8713 29914 
 
 
The average population density is 0.26 inhabitants per hectare. Car ownership was 
0.382 cars per inhabitant in 1990. 
Transportation system 
The available motorised means of transport are local and regional bus lines, private 
car and taxi. 
54% of trips are made as car driver, 10% as car passenger, 14% by bus and 22% by 
walking and cycling. 
Transport policy measures 
Tromsø lies on an island and thus is physically separated from mainland. There are 
two special provisions; the first one is a local fuel tax for road construction and the 
second a private road tunnel crossing the island financed by toll collection. There is 
also another road tunnel crossing the Tromsø strait implemented by national and local 
authorities and a third tunnel for reducing overground car traffic is under 
consideration. 
Promoting public transport and restricting car traffic using parking policies are under 
preparation. 
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ANNEX 3: SUMMARY OF THE OPTIMA PROJECT 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT  
 
The overall objectives of Project OPTIMA were: 
 
(i) to identify optimal urban transport and land use strategies for a range of urban 
areas within the EU; 
(ii) to compare the strategies which are specified as optimal in different cities, and 
to assess the reasons for these differences; 
(iii) to assess the acceptability and feasibility of implementation of these strategies 
both in nine case study cities (Edinburgh, Merseyside, Vienna, Eisenstadt, 
Tromsø, Oslo, Helsinki, Torino and Salerno) and more widely in the EU; and 
(iv) to use the results to provide more general guidance on urban transport policy 
within the EU. 
 
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION 
 
Theses objectives were achieved by carrying out the following tasks: 
 
1.  specify two objective functions, one each for economic efficiency and 
sustainability, which are acceptable to, and can be applied in, all the cities 
being studied; 
2.  identify, separately for each city, an acceptable set of transport and land use 
policy instruments, and to extend this list to cover measures in use elsewhere 
in the EU; 
3. conduct a series of tests of combinations of policy measures, in each city, 
using currently available transport models of these cities; 
4.  use the optimisation methodology, separately for each city, to identify 
strategies which are optimal in terms of economic efficiency and sustainability 
in each city. 
5. draw policy conclusions for each city on the differences between the 
efficiency-optimal and sustainability -optimal strategies, the justification for 
those strategies, and the feasibility of implementation, in discussion with the 
city authorities; 
6. draw project-wide conclusions by comparing the results for the different cities, 
explaining the differences between them, and discussing their applicability in 
other EU member states. 
 
Definition of objective functions (Task 1) 
 
The Economic Efficiency Function (EEF) reflects the cities’ objectives of overall 
efficiency of the transport system, economising the use of resources, accessibility 
within the city and at least the possibility of economic regeneration. Essentially, the 
EEF performs a cost benefit analysis of the tested policy, while also imposing a 
shadow price on the financial support required. 
 
The Sustainability Objective Function (SOF) differs from the EEF in that the 
exhaustible resource of fossil fuel is valued more highly than its market price, and that 
a penalty is incurred for those policies that do not meet a certain minimum 
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requirement on fossil fuel savings. These features of the SOF reflect the aim to reduce 
CO2 emissions. Also, costs and benefits are only considered for the horizon year, 
representing the interests of future generations.  
 
Common set of measures 
 
Based upon an inventory of measures carried out by the project (Task 2), a set of 
common measures was selected for use in the optimisation process. Table A.3.1 
shows these measures and the maximum ranges considered (some cities used 
narrower ranges where it was felt that the maximum range was simply infeasible).  
 
Abbreviation Name Minimum  
Value 
Maximum  
Value 
IH High public transport infrastructure 
investment  
0 1 
(dummy) 
IM Medium public transport infrastructure 
investment  
0 1 
(dummy) 
CAP  Low cost increase/decrease of road 
capacity (whole city)* 
-20% +20% 
FREQ Increasing/decreasing public transport 
frequency (whole city) 
-50% +100% 
RP  Road pricing # (city centre) 0  10.0 ecus 
PCH  Increasing/decreasing parking charges 
(city centre) 
-100% +500% 
FARE Increasing/decreasing public transport fares 
(whole city) 
-100% +100% 
Table A.3.1: Measures tested 
* Road capacity measures include various types of traffic management and transport 
telematics, but do not include road building 
# The value of the measure Road Pricing refers to the cost per trip incurred by the car 
driver 
 
Optimisation process 
 
Once measures and their ranges were defined, transport model runs were carried out 
(Task 3) to test an initial set of combinations of transport measures (packages). The 
number of packages in this set was the minimum number required to start up the 
optimisation process.  The optimisation process (Task 4) was then applied to find the 
optimum set of values of these measures for each city, separately for each objective 
function. 
 
Consultation process 
 
Based on the initial review of the results, consultations were held with officials in 
each of the nine cities (Task 5).  They were presented with the results, and invited to 
assess them against a set of criteria which focused on issues of feasibility and 
acceptability.  Inevitably there was some overlap between the concerns under these 
two headings.  The officials were also invited to suggest alternative strategies which 
they would wish to have tested.  When these alternatives were tested, none of them 
performed better than the predicted optima (with respect to the objective functions), 
and the opportunity was taken to discuss these results.  The output of these 
consultations was discussed with two other cities to test transferability, and then used 
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to develop the conclusions specified below (Task 6). 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Policy results and recommendations 
 
The results from the optimisation process are summarised in Table 2, which gives an 
overview of the relative benefit (over the nine case study cities) of each measure with 
respect to the two objective functions used. 
 
 EEF SOF 
Public transport infrastructure - ** 
Low cost road capacity 
improvements 
*** ** 
Increase in public transport 
frequency 
* ** 
Reduction in public transport 
fares 
** *** 
Road pricing and/or increased 
parking charges 
** *** 
* indicates there is (overall) a small benefit to using the measure 
** indicates there is (overall) a medium benefit to using the measure 
*** indicates there is (overall) a strong benefit to using the measure 
Table A.3.2 : Summary of beneficial measures 
 
From the results in Table A.3.2 and from other aspects of the research, the following 
recommendations can be made for policy makers: 
 
• strategies should be based on combinations of measures, and should draw fully on 
the synergy between success measures; 
• economically efficient measures can be expected to include low cost improvements 
to road capacity, improvements in public transport (increased service levels or 
reductions in fares), and increases in the cost of car use; 
• public transport infrastructure investment is not likely, in the majority of cases, to 
be a key element in economically efficient strategies; 
• reductions in capacity to discourage car use are not likely to be economically 
efficient; 
• the scale of changes in service levels and fares will be influenced by the current 
level of subsidy; in some cases a reduction in service levels or an increase in fares 
may be justified on economic grounds; 
• the scale of increase in costs of car use will depend in part on current levels of 
congestion; the study suggests that road pricing and parking charge increases are 
broadly interchangeable, but this needs assessing in more detail; 
• in most cases economically efficient strategies can be designed which are 
financially feasible, provided that revenues can be used to finance other strategy 
elements; 
• the pursuit of sustainability is likely to justify investment in public transport 
infrastructure, further improvements to public transport services and/or fares, and 
further increases in the cost of car use; 
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• availability of finance will be a major barrier to implementation of many 
sustainability-optimal strategies, and further work is needed to investigate the 
extent to which financial costs can be reduced by strategies which are slightly sub-
optimal; 
• legislation will be needed to enable implementation of road pricing and to control 
parking charges; in the UK and Italy there is also a case for changing legislation to 
permit economically more efficient public transport strategies; 
• public acceptability will be a significant barrier with those measures which reduce 
service levels or increase costs; this implies the need for effective public relations 
campaigns, and carefully designed implementation programmes; 
• detailed measures to improve the environment and provide better facilities for 
cyclists, pedestrians and disabled people should be designed within the context of a 
preferred strategy. 
 
Methodological conclusions and recommendations 
 
• the optimisation procedure has been shown to be successful, and has attracted 
widespread interest; however, it is important that careful thought is given to the 
policy implications of each stage of the process; 
• the frequent use of upper and lower bound values in the optima is a cause of some 
concern; 
• strategic models are in many ways more appropriate than tactical models in the 
development of optimal strategies; 
• such models should include walking and cycling, both peak and off peak 
conditions, and the effects of public transport loadings on user costs. 
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